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I NTHODUCTION 
This thesis is a study of Indo-British relations in the 
important decade of 193?-1947. So far as the writer could 
discover no author has critically -and carefully, exhaustively 
and objectively examined this i mportant decade in the history 
of the .British E:npire. No author bas made use of the Indian 
newspapers to find out what Indian people thought, felt and 
did about the British rule in India during 1937-1947. No 
author had carefully documented t his decade.The writer has 
attempted to point out facts as he found them. Though a 
native of India he has not been an active member of any 
Indian political party. 
1. 
PROLOGUB 
In order to understand a decade of Indo-British Rel-
ations it is indispensable to trace clearly the salient poli-
tical and ~::onsti tuti anal developments in India prior to 1937. 
Queen Elizabeth of England signed a royal charter on 
December 31, 1600 and thus the East India Company, more fully 
called 11 the Governor and Company of the !VIer chants of London 
Trading into the East Indies, 111 came-. into existence. This 
charter granted a fifteen-year monopoly of Eastern trade to 
the Company, yet the Company was not under the direct control 
of the Parliament. The Company's first English vessels reach-
ed Surat on the west coast of India in 1608 and by a firman 
(order) of the Ivlogul :ID:nperor .Jehangir, the Company was allow-
ed to build a factory at Surat in 1612. The East India Camp-
any was eBsentially a trading joint-stock company but 
11 India was conquered by a chartered commercial 
monopoly and not by the Crown of England. The 
basic constitution of the Indian Empire was 
f()rmulated and written by the British East India 
Company. 11 2 
The :Bnglish traders built Fort St. George ( in .c1adras) 
in 1639. In all the Company built three forts namely: Fort 
St. George, Bombay Castle and Fort William. The governments 
1. Quoted by Hall & Albion, A History of England and t he Brit-
ish Empire, Boston: Ginn & Co., 1946, p. 330. 
2. Gorham D. Sanderson, India and British Imperialism, New 
York: Bookman Associates, 1951, p . 55. 
1 
2. 
which l1ad control over the Company's affairs wer e called Pre-
sidencies. A Presidency was composed of a president and a 
council of senior traders. These governments were housed in 
the above .:.:·mentioned forts. 
The year 1707 is an important landmark in the history 
of England for on ~~y lst England and Scotland united to for 
the Kingdom of Great Britain and some Scottish bells played 
~~"why should I be sad on my wedding day? 11 • 1 It was mainly 
for English trading privileges that Scotland gave up her own 
separate yE~t less representative parliament. The year 1707 
is important in the history of India too, because it was in 
this year that the last great fogul IDnperor Aurungzebe died 
and the politically united India became a prey to anarchy 
and a scramble for power . 
Fifty years later the East India Company defeated the 
French in India and became master of Calcutta and Bengal. 
Some terri "tory near J.V".J.adras and Bombay was also acquired. From 
there on the East India Company assumed a new role of a sove-
reign power in Bengal. In 1765 the Company made a treaty of 
peace with a descendant of the Mogul emperors. B,y the treaty 
of peace the Company received a title to rule Bengal. Seven 
years later Warren Hastings was named the Governor of Cal-
cutta. 
1. Hall & Albion, ~it., p. 420 . 
3. 
Under the leadership of Lord North (1770-83) the Brit-
ish Parlirunent passed the India Regulating Act in 1773. B,y 
this Act the British Parliament, for the first time, assumed 
further responsibilities in India. It bestowed upon the 
Company a :parliamentary title and thereby brought her under 
the direct control of the Parliament. Warren Hastings be-
came the first Governor General of Fort William. Thus the 
three combined presidencies of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta 
came under his direct authority. He ~as aided by a council 
of four men. A Supreme Court of Judicature was established 
at Fort william. The supreme administrative and military 
authority was vested in . the Company. So ~he all important 
question w·as which of the two ( i.e. either the Company or 
the Governor General-in-Council ) was to have paramount 
authority •. 
The Jf.ast India Company complicated affairs in both India 
and Ameri<~a. It was due to this very Company that the .Brit-
ish Government gave permission to sell tea directly to the 
American eolonists without paying the required duties be-
cause the Company's finances were low. It was this very Comp-
any's tea-chests that were tl~own overboard by an angry mob 
of fifty or sixty Americans in the garb of Indians ( natives 
of America ) on December 19, 1773. This incident which is 
known as the "Boston Tea Party11 in American history "was thus 
a turning point in the controversy between America and England ; 
4. 
it was the event which changed the family quarrel into an 
irrepressible conflict. 111 It ma y safely b e as s erted then, . 
that the East India Company played an important role in pre-
cipitating the American Revolution. 
The BJ~i t-ish Parliament succeeded in establishing t h e 
supr emacy of the Governor General of Fort William and his 
Council in 1781. Three years later by Pitt's Act a political 
Board of Control was introduced. So the Secretary of Btate, 
a lso a member of the British Cabinet, was made the President 
of t h e board to direct the a ffairs of the Company. This Act 
of 1784 remained the basis of the British rule in India till 
1858. Whereas India was thus driven under the direct clutches 
of Great !~itain, fortunately the thirteen American Colonies 
became independent and were declared the United States of 
America by the Treaty of Paris (1783). The American h evolu-
tion was over. 
EetwE~en 1784 and 1813 eight Governor Generals of Fort 
William in Bengal shaped the destiny of the East India Com-
pany and t.he people of India. In the year 1813 the Charter 
Act renewed the Company's control of its territories and re-
venue for twenty years. B,y 1819, outside the Punjab and Sind, 
almost every state in India was under the British control 
either by annexation or treaty. 
1. Oliver Perry Chitwood and Frank Lawrence OWsley, A Short 
History of the American People, New York: D. Van Nostrand 
Company Inc., 1945. p.l89. 
The ~econd Charter Act of 1833 entirely closed the Com-
pany's mercantile business. Parliament secured the right to 
enact and repeal the laws of the Company and from now on, the 
Governor General of Fort William was to be designated as the 
Governor General of India. The conquest of India was completed 
when the PUnjab was annexed and the "Kohinoor" (i.e • .l!iountain 
of Light) one of the most precious diamonds in the world was 
surrendered to Queen Victoria in 1849. 
Eight years later the Indian Sepoy ~rutiny (185?-59) 
broke out. As a result the British Parliament passed an Act 
(August 2,1858). This Act marks a turning point in the history 
of India because it substituted a parliamentary Secretary of 
State for India wi,th an India Council, for the East India 
Company, its Board of Control and Court of virectors. 
The Governor General was now to be styled the Viceroy of 
India as the Crown-representative. As such on November 1,1858, 
the government of the Company was transferred to the Crown oy 
the Proclamation of Q,ueen Victoria. This meant that hence-
forth the Imperial Crown and not the Company wa s to have the 
absolute control and rule in India. 
A provision was ma de, three years later, for six to 
twelve additional members to the Viceroy's Council by the 
Indian Councils Act (1861) in order to facilitate the Govern-
ment of India. 
Prime 1inister Disraeli (1870-78) who has been called 
the first modern statesman to pursue a more aggressive impe-
6. 
rial policy, flattered Queen Victoria by bestowing upon her 
the title of "IDnpress" of India in 1876 . Who would doubt the 
joy and pride in the heart of a widowed and lonely QUeen when 
she wrote for the first time "Regina et Imperatrix" after her 
own na.meJ 
The year 1885 s aw the meeting of seventy-two delegates 
of the First National Congress at Sanskrit College in Bombay . 
This organization was founded by an Englishman, Allan Octavian 
Hume , for free debate amongst the enlightened Indians. Little 
did Hume or Lord Duffer in, the then Viceroy of India who gave 
permission for its founding, know that this very docile debat-
ing society, would at a later date, be transformed into a 
revolutionary society to free India from oligarchic i mperi a l 
designs and dangers, thereby making her the strongest bulv1ark 
of democracy and freedom in the Eastern hemisphere. 
Seven years later the Bri ti sh Parliament passed the 
Second Indian Councils Act (1892). It allowed the Viceroy's 
council to have sixteen additional members of whom t en were 
non-offi cials. It also enlarged the non-official elements i n 
the Provincial Councils. Undoubtedly in the history of Con-
stitutional progress the Indian Councils Act of 1892 is to 
be considered another great mile-stone. 
The year 1905 saw the beginning of the rise of Indian 
nationalism, the force of which the British Government could 
not totally ignore. The second important organizati on t~~t 
was to pl ay a prominent role in Indian politics came into 
?. 
ex i s tence in 1906. It is known as the All India Moslem 
League. No one could then have dreamt that in the future this 
organization was to become the formidable champion of the 
partition of India. It was in this very year that the Indian 
National Congress put forth its demand for "Swaraj 11 (Home-
rule). 
A year later Indian nationalism rose to fever pitch and 
t here occurred a number of protests against the British rule 
both in terms of boycott of British goods and in violent dis-
order. 
The British Government took notice of these explosive 
elements and silenced them by suppressive measures. In order 
to quiet down the dangerous national restlessness the British 
Parliament thought it wise to pass the third Indian Councils 
Act of 1909, ·popularly known as the fuorley-hinto reforms. 
This may be said to be the first great step in the constitu-
tional development of India. It recognized the principle of 
representative but not responsible government. Whereas the 
British Government had fully recognized the principle of res-
ponsible government for the Dominion of Canada by the British 
North American Act of ~arch 28, 186?, for the Commonwealth of 
Australia by the Constitution of July 9,1900, and for the 
Union of South Africa by a royal proclamation of December 2, 
1909, India was considered, for obvious reasons, too back-
ward to have a responsible government. Briefly stated, the 
Morley-Ninto Reforms allowed two Indian members to sit in the 
8. 
India-Council in London, and one 'Indian member in the ~e­
cutive council of the Governor General. The number of elec-
tive members of t h e Central and Provincial Councils was con-
siderably increased. The franchise still rested upon a narrow 
scale and recognized property-interests. Representation by 
communities, such as the Ymslims, Sikhs, India n Christians 
and Scheduled Castes was recognized too. 
These reforms were eclipsed by an unprecedented a nd ex-
citing event. The occasion was the first Coronation of the 
English King George V of England and Emperor of India in the 
new capitdl Delhi, on June 12,1911. 
Hardly had the Indian people forgotten the occasion of 
the crowning majesty and glory of the British Empire than 
Great Britain found herself engulfed in the First World War 
with Germany . As a component part of the British Empire, Ind-
ian troops wer e rushed overseas and fought in every theatre 
of the war. So India in the spirit of co-operation and support, 
greatly contributed in rescuing Great Britain from her nation-
al crisis, by her men , money and material. 
Perhaps, it is not too much to say that India timely 
contribution helped to create a favourable opini on in the 
minds of the British people which in turn obliged the British 
Government to rethink the problem of self-government in India. 
After the war was over the British Parliament passed a momen-
tous act called the Government of India Act {1919). This Act 
is popularly referred to as the "Montagu-Chelmsford h.eforms."l 
1. E . S.l•1ontague has written An Indian Diary, London, 1930. 
9. 
The Government of India Act provided a new Constitution 
for British India. It introduced D,yarchy in the Provincial 
Cabinets and a bicameral legislature at the Center. The 
Governors and the Governor General still held the veto-powers. 
The masses and women still could not vote. A Chamber of Prin-
ces for Native States was established to meet annually with 
the Viceroy. The Indian National Congress was not at all satis-
fied with this Constitution because it had called upon Great 
Britain to announce in 1916 that a self-governing India was 
the goal of British policy and to grant the Indians a sub-
stantial instalment of reform after the war a s a step toward 
that goal. 
The Act of 1919 gave the Indians for the first time since 
1773, an opportunity to take a responsible share, however 
limited, in t he British-India administration. The year 1919 
is significant for another reason too. It was during this y ear 
that Mobandas Karamchand Gandhi appeared on the stage and b&-
came a principal actor in the political drama of India. He 
introduced a new feature, tl~t of non-violent passive resist-
ance as a political weapon against the military might of the 
British Empire. 
The rise of nationalism and the successfu~ co-operation 
in the War turned the scale in favour of India. At the end of 
the War India gained prestige in internationa l affairs, be-
cause the Indian representatives signed the Peace-Treaty 
(1919); Indian representatives were sent to the League of 
Nations and the Indian representatives participated in the 
Imperial Conferences (1921,1923). 
10. 
After the Prince of Wales visit to India (February 9, 
1921) the Congress Swaraj Party was led by C.R.Das and Pandit 
Motilal Nehru. A year later Gandhi was imprisoned for six 
years (1922-28) because the British Government thought t hat 
he was at the back of the riots and disorders in Western Ind-
ia. 
In the year 1927, the British Government appointed the 
Simon Commission under Sir John Simon to study the Indian 
problem in India. When it visited India in 1928, it was rece-
ived with funeral banners inscribed "Simon go ba ckJ" The 
Indian people rigidly boycotted tts proceedings because of 
the seven members (i.e. 2 Peers plus 4 members of the House 
of Commons and Sir Simon) not one was an Indian. Inspite of 
non-co-operation from the Indian public the Commission gather-
ed substantial information concerning all aspects of Indian 
life and published a document call the Simon Commission h e-
port ( in I~y 1930). The Report recommended responsible g overn-
ment for the provonces but not for the Central Government. The 
Indi a n nationalists rejected it. 
Before the publication of this report, three significant 
things had happen~d. Firstly, the year 1929, saw for the first 
time in the history of England the victory of the British Lab-
our Party in a national election. Secondly, on October 31, of 
the same y ear, Lord Irwin the Viceroy of India published an 
11. 
official statement "that the natural issue of India's con-
stitutional progreas ••• is the attainment of Dominion Status." 
This may be taken as a clear policy-statement on the part of 
the British Government. Thirdly, the All India Moslem Confer-
ence met under the Aga Khan and suggested complete provincial 
autonomy and separate electorate in a federal system. The 
gulf between the Hindus and :Moslems became wider because the 
Hindus had claimed joint electorate in an all parties confer-
ence of Indian Nationalists (1928). 
The political drama in India began to develop rapidly. 
Three Round Table Conferences were held in the y ears 1930, 
1931 and 1932, to recommend a workable solution to the Indian 
constitutional problem. BeforeGandhi went to the Second Hound 
Table Conference, the Irwin-Gandhi agreement was reached (.~:fu.rch 
1931). It had three conditions. (1) Non-violent political 
prisoners to be released, (2) Emergency Ordi~ances of the Gov-
ernment to be withdrawn, and (3) Civil Disobedience-movement 
to be discontinued. Gandhi attended the Second Round Table 
Conference from September 7 to December l. While at the Con-
ference, Gandhi's demand was that both in the Central and Pro-
vincial Governments re~ponsible government should be ins tall-
ed, and that the Princes should be granted the right to secede 
from the Federal Government if and when they so desired. Gan-
dhi returned from the Conference empty-handed. 
The British Government granted India what is commonly 
known a s 11 Communal Award" ( 1932). This provided t wice the num-
12. 
ber of seats in the Provincial Legislatures than in the past 
and separate electorates for minority communities. 
The proposals and findings of the Round Table Conferen-
ces and various committees of the Parliament were introduced 
as the Government of India Bill. It was on December 20,1934 
that the nev.r Government of India Bill completed its passage 
through the Parliament and on August 2,1935 it received royal 
assent and became the Government of India Act. 1 
It may be mentioned here that Churchill as a Conservative 
Opposition leader seemed to be mainly responsible for the 
British Government's fefusal to include in the Nevr Act any 
reference to Dominion Status as the ultimate goal for India. 
In doing so he stuck to the British Conservati~e policy of 
granting India self-government by degrees. 
The Government of India Act, briefly stated, provided for 
an All India Federation. The Federal Government was to be 
established after the Native States decided to join it and 
to nominate one half of the hundred and four members of the 
Federal Council. Sind and Orissa were to be created as sepa-
rate provinces . In all there were to be eleven large provinces 
under Governors and six small provinces under Commissioners ; 
autonomy was granted to the provinces ; the Governor General 
1 . R. Coupland writes in his The Indian Problem, that "On 
August 4,1935 the bill received the royal assent" p . 133. 
That is a mistake . The correct date is August 2, 1935 , cf. 
304 H. C. Deba te, 5s., 3015. 
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was to be head of the Federal Government and was to be appoint-
ed by the British Government for five years ; at the Center 
dyarchy was continued (i.e. in Defence and External Affairs 
the Governor General was to be a dvised by three members wlw 
were appointed by and responsible to him alone); the Federal 
Parliament was to consist of two Houses: a) the Council of 
State with 156 member s from British India (150 elected plus 
6 nominated by the Governor General) and 104 members from the 
Native States totalling 260 (it was a permanent body but l/3 
were to retire every year); b) the House of Assembly with 250 
members from British India and 125 from the Native States 
totalling 375. Franchise was extended to 6 million women a nd 
l 29 million men. These members were elected for five years by 
the Provincial Legislatures . 
The Indian Nationa l Congr ess rejected t he Act because of 
t he reserved powers of the Provincial Governors and the Gover-
nor General, absence of .any reference to Dominion Status, se.w-
aration of Burma from India and over-represented Native btates 
i n the Federal Parliament. Though it was not p ossible for 
the Federal part of the Act to operate unti l a specified num-
ber of Btates had joined the Federation, the Provincial art 
of it began to function partly on July 3, 1936 a nd fully on 
April 1, 1937. 
1. George Dunbar, India and t h e Passing of Empire, New York : 
Philosophical Library, 1952, p. 185. 
14. 
CHAPTER I 
PROVI NCIAL AUTONO~IT CO~IES INTO FORCE 
It has been observed earlier that the Provinvial part of 
the Government of India Act came into full force on April 1, 
l 
1937. (1) \f.hat d id the Indian National Congress t h ink or 
do before and after it came into force? (2) What did t he Mos-
lem League say about it? (3) What was the attitude of the 
Native l~inces towards it? (4) w~t happened wh e n the Provin-
cia l part of the Act came into full force on April 1,1937? 
These are some of the more important questi ons which need to 
be carefully considered in their respective order. 
(1) The Indian National Congress and Provincia l Autonomy. 
The Act of 1935 was an outcome of three Round Table Confer-
ences of 1930,1931 and 1932. As stated previously the Longres s 
was represented through Gandhi only in the second one ( 8ept-
2 
ember ?-December 1,1931). It is obvious then tha t it did 
not have substantia l influence in framing the structure of 
the Act. It is true that Gandhi's claim for the Congre s s a s 
the only organiza ti on representing India as a whol e, became 
an apple of discord i n the Round Table Conference. Never t he-
less, such a claim of his may not sound ambitious or arrogant 
if it is pointed out that the non-Congress Indian delega tes 
1. Prologue, p. 13. 
2. ibid.' p. 11. 
15. 
to the Round Table Conference representing other interests 
It/er e not rightly chosen or elected by the :people but were Gov-
t . l ernmen nom1nees. On behalf of the Congress representing t he 
masses of Indian people he demanded clearly i n the Round able 
Conference that responsible government be installed both at 
the Center and i n the Provinces fully and immediately. Proo-
ably this claim was far too much for the british Government 
2 
t o grant. 
It is self-evident that modern technology has :played an 
important role in conquering space and time. This in turn has 
affected modern world politics. our World is as if compos ed 
of neighborhoods. \f.hat happens in one part of the world affects 
or influences the other parts of the world directly or ind ir-
ectly. On November 25, 1936 over two thousand delegates had 
gathered in the great Kremlin Palace in Moscow. The occassion 
was the discussion and adoption of the new Constitution of 
the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. It was an outcome of 
not less than two revolutions, and decla red socialism as its 
goal. It wa s a r adical philosophy unacceptable to the Indian 
people and how much it influenced the propaganda-technique of 
the political parties is not certain. The Indian National Con-
gress met in Faizpur on December 27, 1936. 
1. Indian Round Table Conference. (Second Session), Proceedi~ 
of Committees, p. 16; Proceedings of the Conference,p.390. 
2. Prof. coupland observes that Gandhi "seemed unwilling or un-
a ble to make any practical sugg estions of h is own for bring-
ing a settlement about." QE.cit., part i, p.l25. But the quest-
ion was who could decide what was practical for India? 
Sitaramayya observes: 
"Is it any wonder that a t Faizpur the atmosphere 
should have been surcharged with socialist slo-
gans, emphasizing the rights of workers and pea-
sants on the one hand and declaiming against the 
forces of Imperia.lism and Fascism on the other?"l 
16. 
This Congress repre s enting India at large is i mpor tc.mt to 
our discussion in so far as it deals with the Goverru ent of 
India Act , the British Government and related events. 'We 
have one a ccount of the Faizpur-session of Congress which 
reads : 
" ••• perhaps the most i mportant of the subjects con-
sidered at Faizpur related to the (coming) elections 
and the Constituent Assembly , a convention of the 
elected members of the leg islatures, non-partici-
pation in the Coronation (of ~dward VIII on l~y 
12,1937) and other imperialist functions a.nd fin-
ally the hartal (strike) on April 1,1937. The last 
was meant to demonstrate effectively the will of 
the Indian people to resist the imposition of the 
unwanted Constitut ion (provided by the Government 
of· I~dia Adt of .· l935] \vhich, the Congress consid-
ered , would be a betrayal of India's struggle for 
freedom and only result in strengthening the hold 
of British Imperialism and a further exploitation 
of the Indian masses . India claimed for herself 
the right to frame her own constitution and if 
a genuine democratic state, with its political 
power transferred to the people as a whole , 
should come int o ex istence, it could only come 
"l, through a Constituent Assembly elected by adult 
suffrage and invested with the power to deter-
mine finally the constitution of the country.n2 
This a ccount clearly shows that the India n people had their 
own ideas. It also shows how different these i deas were from 
1 . Pattabhi Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National 
Congress , Bombay : Padma Publications, 1947, Vo.l.II, p .30. 
2. ibid., p .35. 
1?. 
t h e ideas of the British Government. Needless to say the Act 
of 1935 was a far cry from what the peop~e of India had claim-
ed. 
Add to this what Jawaharlal Nehru, President of the 50th 
Session of the Indian National Congress at J?aizpur, had to say. 
After having reviewed the international background in his pre-
sidential address he took up the nationa l problems and said: 
"The Government of India Act of 1935, the new con-
stitution, stares at us offensively, this new char-
ter of bondage which has been imposed upon us de-
spite our utter rejection of it; and we are prepar-
ing to fight elections under it."l 
A study of this important document clearly indicates the 
demands, programme and the policy of the Congress so far as 
its rela tions with the British Government were concerned. In 
the words of the President himself we are told: 
"With the effort to fight the Act (of 1935), and 
as a corollary to it we have to stress our posi-
tive demand for a Constituent Assembly elected 
under suffrage. That is the very cornerstone of 
Congress policy today and our election (to be held 
in January 193?) campaign must be based on it."2 
This then is the number one demand of the Congress . 
Explaining the second demand the President said: 
"Next to this demand for the Constituent .Assembly, 
our most important task will be to oppose the fed-
eral structure of the Act . Utterly ba d as the Act 
1. This presidential addres s is conveniently repr inted in o-
ward Freedom, the autobiographl of Jawaharlal Nehru, New York : 
The John Day Company, 1941, Appendix C, p. 416-431. The above 
quotation is on p.422. Neither Coupland nor Sitara.mayya in-
clude this important document in their a ppendices . It is to be 
regretted that Coupland fails to consider this important Faiz-
pur-Session of the Congress in his Indian Problem. 
2. ibid., pp.422-23. 
is, there is nothing so bad in it a s t h is feder-
ati on, and we mus t exert ourselves to the utmost 
to break this and thus the Act as a whole. 11 1 
18. 
To infer from this that Congress was totally against a fed-
eration is incorrect because in the same s peech further on 
Nehru said clearly that: 
11 ~e are not against the conception of a Federation. 
It is likely that a free Ind ia may be a federal 
India , though in any event there must be a great 
deal of a unitary control."2 
So mu ch for the Congress rea ction to the Act of 1935. 
(2) What did the Moslem League say about it? It was not 
as l arge an organization as the Congress because the Moslem 
Community was a minority. Nevertheless, it played an equally 
important role in shaping the destiny of India. Like the Mor-
ley• ~into (1909) and Montague-CheLmsford (1919) Reforms , the 
Act of 1935 was acceptable to the Conservative Moslems. This 
was so because this act, as pointed out earlier, had granted 
separate electorates to the minority communities. 
Earlier than the Congress-session, the Moslem League 
had its Session at Bombay in April 1936. As Gandhi was the 
guiding spirit of the Congress, so was Jinnah of the ~mslem 
League. Sir Syed Wazir Hasan presided at t he Bombay Session. 
This s ession was as radical as the Congress Faizpur Session 
if not more so. In his presidential address Sir S. W.Hasan 
emphatically said that: 
l. ibid., pp.423. 
2. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p.423. 
"A Constitution(provided by the Act of 1935) is 
literally being forced on us by the British Gov-
ernment which nobody likes, which no one a pproves 
of. After sever al years of Commissions, Reports, 
Conferences and Committees a monstrosity has been 
invented a nd is -being presented to India in the 
garb of this Constitution Act. It is anti-demo-
cratic. It will strengthen all the most reaction-
ary elements in the country, and, instead of 
helping us to develop on progressive lines, it 
will enchain and crush the forces making for 
democracy and freedom."l 
Undoubtedly both the Congress and the Noslem League had 
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bitterly opposed the Act but it is important to keep in mind 
one significant distinction between the two parties. wnereas 
the Congress rejected the Act fully, the Moslem League seem-
ed to be hopeful about the Provincial part of the Act. ~~t 
is the Moslem League, unlike the Congress, hoped that the 
Provincial Autonomy granted by the Act might be worth trying. 
It is apparent then that, like the Congr ess, the ~oslem ~ea-
gue thought that the Act of 1935 was not \vhat they wanted. 
(3) What was the attitude of the Native Princes? 
On February 23, 1937 the Princes and Ministers of the States 
me t in a Conference at New Delhi. They accepted in principle 
the proposal that the Indian States should join the All India 
Federation. But the final decision was subject to the recog-
nition of certain "essential guarantees". Next day the 14th 
Session of the Chamber of Princes opened. The I~haraja of 
Patiala was elected as the new Chancellor. 
1. Nripendra Nath X'litra, The Indian Annual Register, _  Bombay: 
Padma Publications,l936, i.294. 
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His election was interpreted as a victory for those with-
in the Chamber who took a constructive attitude towards the 
Federal part of the Act. Those rulers who opposed the Feder-
ation-plan wer e replaced by the new members of the committee, 
so that the Chamber's policy was in safe hands. It may be 
pointed out, however, that the princes were unanimous as re-
gards their policy relating to the Instrument of Accession.1 
(4) What happened when the Provincial part of the Act came 
into full force on April 1,1937? 
As stated before, on the closing day of the public-session of 
Faizpur Congress (December 28,1936), a resolution was passed 
urg ing the observance of a hartal (strike) all over India on 
April 1, 1937, to make "the country's protest against the im-
position of the new Constitution. 112 
]urthermore, the plenary session of the Congress pa ssed 
a resolution rejecting the new Constitution in the following 
terms: 
"The Congress reiterates its entire rejection of 
the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Con-
s t i tution that has been imposed on India against 
the declared vlill of the people of the country."3 
1. The Instrument of Accession was a legal document which every 
state was requir ed to sign if it desired to be admitted to 
the Federation. The Princes were decided unanimously to see 
that their powers were not drastical ly changed when t hey 
signed the Instrument. 
2. The Statesman, December 29, 1936. 
3. ibid. 
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On June 12,1936, the House of Commons considered five 
Orders based on 3ir otto Niemeyer's report under the Govern-
ment of India Act and the Government of Burma Act. 
It was Niemeyer's conclusion that Provincial Autonomy 
should come into operation a year after the passing of the 
Act, as such April 1, 193? had been set for its commencement. 
It was also proposed that the General Elections for India 
should take place eight months hence. 1 It has been already 
stated that according to Niemeyer's conclusion Provincial 
Autonomy (provided by the Act of 1935) came into full force 
on April 1,193?. But before that happened, according to Nie-
meyer's proposal the General Elections were scheduled to be 
held at the end of January and the beginning of February 1937. 
There were Legislative Assemblies in eleven Governor's 
provinces with a total number of 1,585 seats. 1'here were Leg-
isla tive Councils in six provinces (Assam, Bengal, Bihar,Bom-
bay, Madras and t h e United Prov i nces) with 260 seats. As this 
new Act l~d extended fra nchise privileges there were almost 
30,000,000 electors of whom 5,000,000 were women. 2 
l. London Times, J'une 13, 1936. 
2. It may be mentioned here that it was for t he first time in 
the history of Indian Elections tha t women had received t heir 
franchise. For fuller statistics see Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives, London Keesing' s Ltd., 1934-37, Vol. II, p. 2421C. 
See also Sitarwnayya, op.cit., pp. 38-39. 









The total population of India 351,399,880 
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1. 
The Congress Party decided to contest the ensuing elec-
tions and so did the Noslem League. The Congress Party was 
able to secure clear majorities in five provinces namely,Bo~ 
bay , Bihar , Central Provinces, United Pr ovinces , I~dras and 
Orissa. But it was in a minority in Assam, Bengal, the North 
\ est Frontier Province, the Punjab and Sind. In all, out of 
the total of 1585 seats ( in the Provincial LegislGtures) the 
Congress won as many a s 711 and the Moslems 424 . 2 
It may be noted that the Congress won 26 of tne hoslem 
seats it had contested. This may be taken as an indi cation 
of what the people in India thought and wanted. However, to 
conclude from it that nationalism was an exclusive monopoly 
of the Congress would be far from the truth. Nevertheless, it 
shows that the Congress and Moslem League \vere the tv1o maJor 
contestants to v1re s t pov1er from the British Government v1hen 
1. The World a l mana c and book of facts, New York: 
iforld Telegram, 1937, p .717. 
2. The distribution of 1585 seats was as follmvs: 
The New York 
General Seats (open ) 657 Land Holders 








Commerce & Industry 56 Europeans 
'> omen 41 Backward areas & Tribes Total 1585 
Labour 38 Indian Christians 
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opportunity arose. No power on earth can easily s et aside , 
without any qualm of conscience, the rising tide of National-
ism. This was one of the most potent factors i.vhich compelled 
Great Britain to make India a self-governing nation. 
Such an overwhelming success was unprecedented in the his-
tory of Congress . As such the Working Corr~ittee of t h e congress 
irr~ediately congratulated the nation in the following terms: 
"'l'he forking Committee congratulates the nation on 
its wonderful response to the call of the Congress 
during the recent elections, demonstrating the ad-
herence of the masses to Congress policy , and their 
firm determination to combat the new Constitution 
and end it, and by means of a Constituent Assembly 
to establish an independent and democratic state 
and remove the ruany burdens under which all sec-
tions of our people suffer . The Comrnittee realiz-
ing responsibility \v i th \vhich the nation has 
charged it, calls upon the Congress organisation 
and, in particular , the ne\vly elected Congres s 
members of the Legislatures to reme ber always 
t h is trust and responsibility , to uphold Con-
gress ideals and principles , to be true to the 
faith of the people, and to labour unceasingly 
as soldiers of Swaraj for the f:veedom of the moth-
erland and the emancipation of her suffering and ex-
ploited m.illions."l 
Pandit Nehru , one of the leaders of the Congress a lso said: 
"I am perfectly sa tisfied at the t urn of events 
(electi ons) are taking. We propose to go straight 
on, and we hope to put an end to this Constitution 
before long. 11 2 
Two pr i nciples of the Congress-policy emerge from this clear-
ly. First, that the Congress would combat the new Constitution 
(created by the Act of 1935) and try to end it and second, 
l. Quoted by Sitaramayya, op.cit., p .40. 
2 . Times of India , June 13 , 1936. 
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that it , .. ,ould try to "establish an independent democra tic 
state by means of a Constituent Assembly ." 
The 1oslem League did voice the feelings of the Moslem 
population of India and Ivlr. Jinnah was unha ·py to think that 
the Indian National Congress was of the opinion that "the l•1us-
lim League is composed of toadies , it is a reactionary body, 
1 it is in alliance with the Imperialistic power." \mat the 
Moslem League was striving for is made clear in its resolution 
on independence which reads: 
"Resolved that the object of the All India i!J.uslim 
League shall be the establishment in India of fu l l 
independence in the form of a federation of free 
democratic states in which the rights and interests 
of the Mussalmans and other minorities are adequate-
ly and effectively safeguarded in the Constitution."2 
From this resolution it is made abundantly clear that the 
Congress and the }'·oslem League both had independence of India 
as a common denominator. but h ovl this independence ivas to be 
acqui r ed or enjoyed wa s rather a different matter for both of 
them. Anyhow both the parties were proud of the election re-
sul ts . 
The Congress had de cided to end the Act and thereby the 
new Constitution. But what it was not decided about , for some 
time at least , was whether it should accept office after the 
winning of the elections or not. Meanwhile , the All India 
1. l~I . Norman, huslim India, Rise and Grov1th of the All India 
Muslim League: Allahabad , 1942. p.336.Hereafter to be quoted 
as Norman, Muslim League . 
2. ibid., p.354. 
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Congress Committee (A. I. C. C.) in its meeting at Delhi on l -arch 
18, authorized the elected Congressmen to go ahead and accept 
1 
office in the Provincial Legislatures. 
To interpret this a ction as an acceptance of the new Con-
stitution would be a mistake for Nehru while addressing the 
Congress Party Convention which met on Jv_arch 19, reiterated 
his condemnation of the new Constitution and said, "This Con-
stitution must go, lock , sto ck and barrel . wnat counts to-day 
for us is to break and end this Constitution." 2 
On Narch 27th, the Congress Party leaders in :Bombay and 
Madras decided unfortunately not to join the Provincial Cabi-
nets. This decis ion was followed in four other provinces 
where the Congress was in majority. This IDEJ.Y be considered as 
a new crisis created by the Congress Party to force Great Brit-
ain to grant India self-government . 
However , as proposed by Niemeyer and accepted by the House 
of Con~ons , Provincial Autonomy came into force on April 1, 
1937 and Burma received its new Constitution by which it was 
separated from India. 
It will be recalled that the Faizpur-Session of the Con-
gress had decided to observe April 1 as hartal3 (i . e. day of 
1. The Socialist wing within the Congress Party had introduced 
a n amendment urging n on- acce r tance of office but it was de-
feated. By 127 to 70 votes it was decided to a ccep t of fice . 
2. The Statesman, arch 19, 1936. 
3 . ibid., March 20, 19 3~. 
26. 
mourning and general cessation of work) as a token of the Con-
gress pledge to wre ck the new regime . Delhi, Poena , Lucknow, 
Lahore and atna were a ff. ected by this s trike. 
The Congress Party's decision not to join the Provincial 
Cabinets created a constitutional deadlo ck . ~'hen Lord zetlCl.nd , 
Secre tary of State f or India, leatnt about t he position creat-
ed by the refusal of the Congress to take offi ce , because 
certain assurances regarding the powers of the Gover nors were 
not g iven, he made a formal statement in t he House of Lords 
(April 8) to the effect that s ince the Act did not gr ant the 
Governors such powers it was unconstitutional to guarantee 
a s surances as demanded by the Congr ess . 
To r eply to him t he Congress Working Committee met a t 
Allahabad on April 28. It passed a resolution on the Consti-
tutional deadlo ck appr oving the action of the leaders of t he 
Congress parties in the provinces. The resolution criticized 
statements made by Lord Zetland , Secretary of St a te for India 
and MR. R.A.Butler, Parliamentary Under-Secretary to t he Indi a 
Office in London, as "utterly inadequate to meet t-iLe require-
ments of Congress 11 and as "misleading and misinterpreting the 
att itude of Congress."1 Thus for about three months the Brit-
ish Parliament and the Congres s argued back and forth about 
the validity of each other's position. 
A ray of ~ope appeared when Lord Linl ithgow, the Vi ceroy 
1. Times of India~ April 29, 193~. 
of India in hi s mess age ( June 21 ,1937 ) said: 
"Statements by respons ible party leaders have 
made it clear that genuine misapprehensions 
and misunderstandings existed three months ago 
in a certain quarter as the r elations of Gov-
ernors to their ~unisters and the extent or 
manner in which Governors would be likely to 
interfere with the day-to-day administrat ion. 
Three months experience of the operation of 
t he Constitution l1as shown that the specific 
assurances from the Governors sought by Con-
gress are not essentia l to the harmonious 
working of the Constitut ion."l 
Commenting on the powers of the Governors he said : 
"Apprehensions that Governors will seek oc-
casions for interfering with the policy of 
their h inisters , or for gratuitous and un-
call ed for experience of their special res-
ponsibilities , have no justificat i on , nor 
is there any foundati on for the assertion 
tha t the Governor is entitled under the Act 
a t his pleasure to intervene at random in 
the admi nistration of the province."2 
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Li nlithgow ' s message probably helped greatly to suggest to 
the minds of the Congres s leaders that it was not ea y for the 
Governors to invoke their special powers guaranteed by the 
new Constitution. So when the Congres s orking Committee met 
at Wardha on July 7, it resolved that: 
" ••• congres smen be permitted to accept office 
vlhere t hey may be invited to. But it desires 
t o make it clear that office i s to be accept-
ed and utilised for the purpose of working, in 
a ccordance with the lines laid down in the Con-
gress election manifesto and to further in 
every possible way , the Congress policy of com-
bating the new Act on the one hand and of 
l. Daily Telegraph, j·une 22 , 1937. 
2.ibid. 
prosecuting the constructive programme on the 
other. 11 1 
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As such Congress leaders in six provinces where they had 
a majority, were invited by the respective Governors to form 
nevi minis tries. Thus the constitutional deadlock wa.s solved 
f or the time being. It may be pointed out t}l.at soon after the 
elections the Moslem League, unlike the Congress , had accept-
ed office without asking for any assurances. 
To assure the fullest co-operation of the new Congress 
Nehru made public the following sta tement to the Indian people 
on July 20: 
"A change has come over all Provincial Govern-
ments and, though this change does not vitally 
affect the relation of Britain t o India, it is 
right that it should affect all our countrymen, 
whether they are in Government service or not. 
It is time that every Indian came out on India's 
side and co-operated with Congress in the high 
tasks that it has undertaken.,'" 2 
It wil l be recalled that the official policy of the Con-
gress was "rejection of the new Act and for non- co- operation 
in its working" nevertheless , on the invitation of the respec-
tive Governors the elected Congress leaders responded by accept-
3 ing the Cabinet posts . 
l . Si t aramayya , op . cit. , p.5l. 
2. Times of India, July 21 , 1937 . 
3. Beforethe end of J·uly 1937, Congress ministries were formed 
in 7 Governor's Provinces under the leadership of Kr ishna Sinha 
(Bihar) ; B . G . ~:her (Bombay); N. B. I(hare (Central Provinces) ; c. 
Raj agopalachari ( adras) ; B. Das (Orissa); G. B. Pant (United Pro-
vinces); N. \lf . F .Province a lso had a Congress leader , see l::itates-
~' July 23, 1937 . 
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So the ~o slem League and the Congress Party co-operated 
with the British Government to install and came into func-
tion Provincial Autonomy. The Indo-British relations appeared 
smoother , at least for the time being, as Provincial Auto-
nomy began to function. As a part of the new Constitution 
the Federal Court was also inaugurated and its fir st sitting 
was held at New Delhi on December 6,1937. 1 
1. The following were named to be its judges: 
Sir 1aurice Gwyer (Chief Justice); Sir ohah S'Ulaiman, lvlr. 
Jayakar; Sir Bhojendra I~ tter ( the Advoca te General of 
India) and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru {leader of Indian Bar) ; 
1anchester Guardian, December 7,1937. 
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CHAPTER II 
N.E I 1-r:DEPENDENCE PLEOO E 
1. Congress Ministers : 
a ) Independence pledge. The year 1938 began for the Con-
gress with ne\·l resolves. On the eve of the Civil Disobedience 
Iliovement or "Salt Satyagrahs." (1930) ., the Congress had drawn 
up the "Independence Pledge" and January 26 was observed as 
Independence Day. Every year on January 26 the pledge was r&-
newed. In this pledge ¥ras "described in some detail the moral 
and material injury done to India under British Imperialism."l 
It is necessary to draw one's attention to the new Charter of 
Liberty of the Congress as it suggests "the climate of opinion" 
of the Indian people at large. 
Due to the force of events the Congress thought it wise 
to alter the 1930 Independence pledge. 2 Therefore, on Janu-
ary 26,1938 the Congress and its members took a new pledge. 
It began with the words: 
"We believe that it is the ina lienable right of 
the Indian people, as any other people, to have 
freedom and enjoy the fruits of their toil and 
have the neces sities of life, so that they may 
have full oppo~tunities of growth."3 
1. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p.70. 
2. It must be mentioned here that in 1931 the Congress had is-
sued the Karachi Resolutions which included "Fundamental Rights 
and Duties." What the lV'l.S.gna Carta and the Bill of Rights were 
,~o the British, or t he Four Freedoms to the Americans, the 
Independence Pledge of 1930 and the Karachi Resolutions were 
to the Indians. 
3. Sitaramayya, QE.cit., pp.?0-71. 
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As to its relation with the British Government and its 
performance in India, the pledge went on to say: 
"The British Government in India has not only 
deprived the Indian people of their freedom 
but has based itself on the exploitation of 
the masses and bas ruined India economically, 
politically, culturally and spiritually."l 
The future Indo-British relations were clarified by further 
affirmation that: 
11 \lie believe, therefore, that India must sever 
the British connection and attain Purna Swaraj 
or complete independence ••• we pledge ourselves 
anew to the Independence of India and solemnly 
resolve to carry on non-violently the struggle 
for freedom till Purna Swaraj is attained."2 
That the Congress never deviated or digressed from this pledge 
is a fact accepted by all students of Indian history. 
b) Haripura Session: 
February was an eventful month for the Congress. Under 
the Presidentship of Subash Chandra Bose, the 51st Annual Ses-
sion of the Congress met at Vithal Nagar, Haripura, from Feb-
ruary 19 to 21st. A detailed discussion of the session need 
not detain us, but it is important for our purpose to point 
out those matters \vhich are directly related to the subj eot 
under our investigation. The attitude of the session is clear-
ly indicated in the policy outlined by its President when 
1. Sit~ramayya, op.ci!., p.71. 
2. ibid. It is probably not too much to say that zhis Pledge 
of Independence was equivalent to the American Declaration of 
Independence on July 4,1776. 
he said: 
"l'I.JY term of office as the Congress President will 
be devoted to resist this unwan.ted federal scheme 
(included in the Act of 1935] with all ita undemo-
cratic and anti-national features, 1.'1i th all the 
peaceful and legitimate powers, including non-vio-
lent non-co-operation if necessary, and to streng-
then the country's determination to resist this 
scheme."l 
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The President's statement therefore, makes it plain that the 
Congress was there to fight the Act of 1935, though it had. 
formed ministries in eight provinces. 
The two Congress ~rinistries of Bihar and the United Pro-
vincea tendered their resignations on February 15,1938, the 
reason being the refusal of the Provincial Governor's to en-
dorse their actions in ordering the indiscriminate release 
of all :political 'detenues'. There \vere twenty-three men in 
Bihar and fourteen in the United Provinces convicted of aeri-
ous offenses who were not released because the Viceroy had 
decided against the release of such prisoners. 
That being the first crisis for the Congress the Congress 
Working Committee at Haripura Session passed a resolution on 
February 20. It approved and endorsed the action taken by the 
Bihar and the United Provinces }linistries and congratulated 
them too. The resolution read: 
"In the op inion of the Congress, the interfer-
ence of the Governor General with the deliberate 
1. The writer was privileged to attend this session of the 
Congress. It was near the city of Surat. The quotation is 
from Sitaramayya, op.cit., p.?3. 
action of the respective Prime Hinisters is not 
merely a violation of the assurance ••• but it is 
a lso a misapplication of Section 126 (5) of the 
Government of India Act. There was no question 
of grave menace to peace and tranquility invol-
ved. 11 1 
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As regar~s the determination and the decision of the Congress 
the r esolution went on to say that: 
"The latest action of the Governor General justi-
fies ••• the utter inadequacy of the Act" (of 1935] 
and "there can be no true freedom for the country 
so long as t his Act is not ended and new Constitu~ 
tion framed bY- a Constituent Assembly, elected on 
the basis of adult fra nchi s e, takes its place. 11 2 
It may be pointed out that ~his resolution was a reaffirmation 
of the Faizpur-Session of Congress in 1937. The Haripura-
Session of the Congress was over the next day. 
To solve the ministeria l deadlock the Viceroy released a 
statement on February 22, which resulted in a compromise. 
The Governors and the Yrlnisters of the stated Prov inces agreed 
that the remaining ca ses (of politica l prisoners) should be 
examined individually and the Gover nors should follow their 
}tinisters' advice as to the result or such an examination. 
Hence the h inisters "t;li thdrew t heir resignations. In Sind , As-
sam and Orissa there appeared some problems but they need no t 
detain us . Nevertheless, it mu s t be pointed out that in due 
1. Times of India, February 21,1938. 
2. This resolut ion was adopted by the plenary ses s ion of the 
Congress on February 21s t . see Times of India, February 21, 
1938. of. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p .84. 
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time out of eleven provinces ·e ight provinces had Congress or 
Coalition ·viinistries. That \vas a gain for the Congress. 
The Moslem League had formed ministries in five provinces 
namely , Assam, Bengal, Orissa , the Punjab and Sind in 1937 
but as time went by it was obliged to have coa lition minis-
tries in Sind and Orissa. When , on June 5th, the Executive 
Council of the All India Moslem League met at bombay , it took 
notice of what had happened to the Ivloslem JY1inistry. Its Pre-
sident Jinnah, in a letter to Subhas Bose (President of the 
Congress) cla imed that the League wa s the only or ganizat i n 
that could speak for the Mos lems · nd that the Congres s repre-
sented only Hindus. 
Jinnah urged that all matters regarding lvioslems should 
be left in the hands of the hoslem League and furthermore the 
Congress should do nothing in the v1ay of nominating :~.oslem 
Candidates to the Provincial Legislatures . He also made as 
many as ten other demands from the Congress , the tenor of 
which appears to be that the Congress should consider the Mos-
lem League on an equality basis in every respect. 
}!Tom here on the Congress and the Ivwslem League \-vent along 
paths directly opposite. The Congress rejected the demctnds of 
the Lea~ue on three points . Firstly, the Congress had ~oslems 
as members in its organization so the ~1oslem League did not 
have a monopoly of the Moslems . Secondly, there were other 
representatives of large sections of l oslems. Thirdly , the Con-
gress \·/as not a Hindu organization since any person whatever 
1 
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his colour, caste or creed, could become a member. 
In reply to the Congress , on October 8 , speaking before 
a conference of Sind Moslems at Kar a chi, Jinnah condemned the 
Congress because : 
"The Congress High Command is in my opinion, the 
grea test enemy of India 's progress, and even of 
the interests of the Hindus. It has adopted a most 
oppressive and hostile attitude toward the All 
India muslim League since the Congress secured a 
majority in six provinces . It is obsessed with 
one idea and h3 determined to divide the JY1uslims t 
and particularly, to break the solidarity of the 
rus lim League. "l 
He also pointed out to the British Government that the 
Congress did not represent the people of India since 90 mil-
lion Moslems were outside it. To solidify the } oslem claims 
he forcefully affirmed that: 
"Jus t as the Sudeten Germans -..vere not defenceless 
so also the ~illslims are not defenceless, and they 
cannot give up their national entity and aspirations 
in this great continent."2 
The s e statements suggest the future line of a ction of the 
Moslem League. They also suggest ho\>T that line of action was 
going to affect the relationship between the British Govern-
ment and t h e Indi an people at large. 
The third important body of public op inion namel y , the 
Chamber of Princes concluded its session on June 13. It 
created ttvo advis ory committees within the Chamber . One was 
1. Statesman, October 9, 1938. 
2 . ibid. 
cal led the Princes' Comrni ttee and the other the l:1linisters' 
Committee \vi th t wenty-five members for each. The object of 
t hese t wo Committees was to advise the native sta tes on all 
matt er s in rela tion ot the Projected Federa tion. Of the 
t wenty- five seats alloted to the Princes- Conwit tee f i fte en 
were g iven to the major states and the r emaining ten to the 
1 
minor s t a tes . 
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Si n ce Great Brita in had 1nade s pecia l treaties with these 
native states the quest ion of t heir incorporation i n the Fed-
eration was a means through which their paramountcy could be 
returned without endangering any component part of the Br it-
ish .illnpire in India. That be i ng the case Great Britain had 
a .. specia l obligation and duty towards them. It needs to be 
pointed out that there always seemed to b e a very cordi a l 
rel ationship betv1een the Br itish Government and the native 
states . 
However , it must be asserted that the attitude the Pri n-
ces had towards their subjects sma cked of feudalism and ab-
solutism. I t meant a bsence of the rights of t h ose who were 
under their jurisdiction. It a lso meant absence of a valid 
const itution. Unlik e the Governor 's Provinces, most of the 
native states \ve r e without pa l.iamentary governmen~. 
1. The di stribut ion wa s on the basis of income of 10 mil-
lion rupees and 500,000 popula ti on fo r ea ch ma jor state. 
see Statesman, June 14,1938 . 
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Nevertheless, there were as many as t hirty states which 
had attempted having a durbar (i.e. consultative body) almost 
l 
regularly. orne of them 1ad progressed to the extent of 
2 having representative Assemblies and Leg isla tive Council s . 
but in practi ce all these devices were dR window-dressing. 
The only cons tructive outcome, if any, was that the princes 
began to hear the people's voice. It did not mean that in 
legislation and administrat ion the peqple's voice was ever 
effective. Therefore, there existed a definite difference in 
the political make-up of those provinces and areas directly 
under the British Government and those under the Native 
States . 
It mu s t be observed that the British Government was con-
sci ous that misgovernment existed in some native states. 
Attempts were made to bring direct pressure fro 1 time to time 
over the princes to introduce parliamentary form of g overn-
ment in their states. This can be seen in an address to t ne 
Chamber of Princes by Lord Linlithgow, when he s a id: 
l. For further discussion on classification of and the poli-
tical background of the States see Kevalram c. Oza, Indian 
States in Free India, Bombay : Vora and Co., Chapters II & III, 
pp. 12-26. Also V.B. Kulkarni, The Future of Indian St a tes, 
Ebmbay: Thacker and Co., Ltd., 1944, Chapter III, pp.42-79 . 
2. Hyderabad was considered the most important and the l a rgest 
state. In the past, Baroda, bikaner, Gwalior and Indore had 
Legislative Councils or Committees for some years. It has 
been estimated that there were not less than 562 Native 
States of various sizes and with various forms of administra-
tion and legislation. 
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"It goes 1.vithout saying that an effective machi-
nery by which the authorities of the states can 
sa tisfy themse·lves that all such complaints can 
readily reach the ears of the Durbar is an es-
sential necessity i present conditions; an~your 
Highnesses will all agree with me that it is equally 
essential that the peo ·les of the States should 
feel assured that their wants, their difficulties 
and t heir representation will receive the fullest 
attention and the fullest sym.pathy."l 
The Congress had watched passively the political drama of 
arrogance and authority in those native states till 1928. 2 
It could be no longer tolerated. Hence Congress followed a 
dynamic policy towards those States . It was at the Haripura 
Session of 1938, that Gandhi had introduced a resolution 
\vhi ch reads : 
"The Congress stands for the aame political,soc-
ial and economic freedom in the States as in the 
rest of India and considers the States as integral 
parts of India which cannot be separated . The 
Purna Swaraj or complete Independence, which is 
the objective of the Congress, if for the whole 
of India, inclusive of the States, for . the in-
tegrity and unity of India must be maintained in 
freedom as it has been maintained in subjection. 
The only kind of Federation that can be accept-
able to the Congress is one in which the States 
participate as free units, enjoying the same 
measure of democratic freedom as the rest of 
India."3 
1. Quoted from Proceedings of the eetings of the Chamber of 
Princes by Coupland, op.cit., p.l71. · 
2. Till 1921 the Congress constitution did not allow the form-
ation of Congress Committees in the States but the Congress 
policy towards the St a tes vras chang ed s ince t h e Ca lcutta -
Session of 1928. For further discussion see Sitaramayya , ~ 
cit., pp.78-8l. 
~The full text of the resolution is found in Harijan, Feb-
ruary 26,1938. See also M. K.Gandhi, The Indian Sta tes' Prob-
lem, Alunedabad: Navajivan Press, pp.401-403. 
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As r egar ds a constructive attitude of the Congress there-
solution furthermore reads: 
"The Congress, therefore stands for full res-
ponsible government and the guarantee of civil 
liberty in the States, and deplores the present 
backward conditions and utter lack of freedom 
and suppression of civil liberties in many of 
these States."l 
The peo ples of the States were not totally unmindful of 
the Princes' rule. On July 1934 they gathered in a n All I nd-
ia Conference i n Karachi . It was na~ed All India St a te s ' 
Peoples ' Conference. Its organizations called Associations 
grew ina number of ~tates. This political consciousness on 
the part of the peoples was undoubtedly a dynamic chapter in 
the history of the Native States. In order to identify them-
selves wi th the people of the British India, the States' 
People s tated inl t heir convention at Navasari prior to the 
Har ipura-Ses s ion (1938) that "India means the people of Indi a 
including the people of the Indian States."2 
4t its sittings he~d at Delhi in September 1938 , the 
All India Congress Committee passed a resolution which explains 
the policy of the Congress towards the St a tes. It went on to 
say that : 
" ••• the corpora te polciy of the Congress ••• must 
be one of continuous attempt to convert the Prin-
ces to the view that their true welfare consists 
1. i b id., p ~40l. 
2 . Sitaramayya, ~cit., p.79. 
in a voluntary surrender of power to the~· pe_ople 
ae as to bring them in a line v1ith the people 
of the so-called British India, consistently 
with the existence of the constitutional heads 
of the respective States ."l 
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Again on Dec ember 3, 1938, Gandhi clearly explained that 
a complete extinction of the States and their acceptance of 
2 full res~onsible government was an inescapable phenomenon. 
He requested the Pr inces "to cultivate friendl_y relations 
with an organization which bids fair in the future not very 
distant , to replace the Paramount Power (i.e. the British 
Government) let me hope friendly arrangement ." 3 
bat Gandhi felt about the Princes is well suggested in 
the following statements . He believed tbat: 
"The existence of this gigantic autocracy is the 
greatest disproof of British democracy, and is a 
credit neither to the Princes nor th the unhappy 
people who have to live under this undiluted auto-
cracy ••• And its perhaps the greatest blot on Brit-
ish rule in India."4 
It may be said, then, that at the end of the year 1938 
there appeared two nev1 currents in the political arena of 
India . Firstly, the States' Peoples ' Organization on an All 
India basis with a specific object of asserting the peoples ' 
rights , came into existence. Secondly , the Congress policy 
1. I•1 .K.Gandhi, The Indian Stated ' Problem, p . l43 . For full 
text of this resolution see Har~jan , October 10,1938. 
2 . Harijan , December 3yl938. 
3 . For a good discussion (O)f this subject see Gandhi 's article 
in Harijan, September 17 and December 3 , 1938. 
4. Gandhi, The I ndian States' Problem, p .iv-v. 
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of non-interference in the St a t e-affair s was modified by a 
s anction of moral support to t h e States' Peoples' Organization. 
To a dd to it the Congress also considered a policy of estab-
lishing Congress Co~nittees in the States. That t h ese two new 
currents directly affected both the Princes a nd the british 
Goverrunent i n their rela tionships with the India n People , may 
not b e doubted. 
From the preceding discussions certa in conclusions may now 
e a sily be reached. Firstly , that the Congress was firmly 
determined to get complete independence (Purna Swaraj ) from 
Britain under any circumstances. Secondly, that the ~oslem 
League want ed I n di a to be free and independent too, but it 
did not want the Congress to be t h e s ole monop oli s ing factor 
in winning ind e pendence, for if the Congress had t h e monopoly , 
then the h oslem League might not be a ble to c a rry out it s own 
progrrurune and poli cy. In other words, the Moslem League wanted 
to s lllire with the Congress the championship of Indi a 's freedom-
struggle . Thirdly , that with the mor a l support of t h e Cor~ress, 
the St ates' Peoples' Conference began to a ssert the fundamental 
human rights a n d clamoured for parliament~ry government in the 
Native St a tes. 
Is it surprising the, that the Brit i s h-Indi an relations 
were s trained? ~t els e could happen when the I n dia n people 
wer e cla i mi ng self-g overnment a t onc e whereas the british Gov-
ernment was t h inking of g iving India self-gover~~ent by stages? 
Under such circumstances how could Br itain bring i n t o being 
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the projected Federal scheme (provided by the Government ·~,of 
I ndi a Act of 1935)? Or would external factors compell the 
Btitish Government to soften its policy towa rds India? 
The answer to these questions will be seen in the chapter 
that follows . 
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CHAPT::ER I I I 
BRITAIN'S CALA¥tiTY AND IliDIA'S OPPORTUNITY 
A. Federation is Rejected: 
It has been previously observed that the Congress and 
the Ymslem League accepted the Provincial part of the new 
Constitution and accordingly formed ministries in eleven pro-
vinces. Wnat happened to the Federal part? This question 
must now be answered. 
The Congress opposed the Federati on. w~? Because the 
responsibility that was to be conceded to the Federal Govern-
ment was wholly inadequate. That is to say, there wa s dyarchy 
a t the Center. There were subject£ like Finance, Defence and 
Exter na l Affairs which were reserved for the Governor General, 
other subjects were entrusted to Indian hands. The Gover nor 
General might accept the advice of the members of the Exe-
cutive Council or he might not • • To the India n peop l e this did 
not sound like responsible gover nment • 
.Another point which t he Congress could n ot a ccep t wa s 
the representa tion of the Indian Princes. As has been pointed 
out, 
11 The only k ind of federa t ion that ca n be accept-
a ble to Congress is one in which the St a tes par-
ticipate a s free units enjoying the s ame measure 
of democr acy and freedom as in the rest of Indi CJ. . 11 1 
l. This was one of the principles of Congress polciy with re-
g ard to the Sta tes a s declared by the Haripura Session of the 
Nationa l Congress in 1938. 
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Accordir1g to that principle the Congress thought that 
the Princes should be represented in the Federal Government 
by elected members and not by their own nominees. It was a 
belief of the Congress that nominated representatives were 
bound to form a reacti onary group and act as a brake upon the 
expression of the democratic theory. The Congress also doubt-
ed whether the Princes would ever surrender sufficient so-
vereignty especially in fiscal matters to give a reality to 
the Federation. 1 
In the Upper House of the Central Government, the Prin-
ces were allotted two-fifths and in the Lower House one-third 
of the representation. 2 Why it was so manipulated may well 
be learnt from Lord Reading (the Viceroy of IndicL) who re-
presented the British point of view \'lhen he observed that: 
"If the Princes come into a Federation of All 
India ••• there will always be a steadying in-
fluence •••• wnat is it we have most to fear? 
There are those vlho agitate for Independence 
for India, for the right to secede from the 
1J1npire altogether. I believe myself t hat it 
i s an fnsig.lllfi c.B:nt ~.minori:ty . tba t :. i .a :.in ~. f~YOUF, 
but it is an articulate minority and it has 
behind it the organization of the Congress. 
It becomes important, therefore, that we 
1. Hindu, &ep tember 21,1938. 
2. The Lower House of the Central Government was to be com-
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should get what steadying influence we can 
against t his view ••• There will be approxi-
mately 33 per cent of the Princes who will 
be members of the Legislature with 40 per 
cent in the Upper Chamber. There are of 
course large bodies of India ns who do not 
t ake the view of the Congress . So that with 
the influence in the Federal Legislature I 
am not a fraid in the slightest degree of a ny-
thing that may happen, even if Congress man-
ag e to g et the largest proportion ot votes."l 
On the other l~nd it must be pointed out what the Pre-
sident of the Congress had to s ay. At Lucknow, on November 
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20,1938 in a press interview Congress President Subhas 1:3ose 
said: 
"Congress is n ot opposed to the idea of Federa-
tion, but to the Federal scheme as envisag ed in 
t he Act (of 1935). Hea l Federation ••• \..,-ill pro-
vide for a ssocia tion of the :people of Bri td..sh 
India with the subjects of Indian States in the 
federal machinery of an emancipated India. 11 2 
He was of t h e opini on that: 
"Until vle (Congress) control the Central Govern-
ment 1tl e s hall not be able to attain our objective.u3 
In order to learn the :British point of view on the sub-
ject one needs to turn to the Parliamentary deba tes on India. 
Lt. Col. Muirh ead (Under Secretary for India ) s a id on Dece n-
ber 16 , in a n answer to a question raised in t h e Hous e of 
Cormnons by Sir J. vlardlaw- II!.i lne: 
"The Paramount Power (i.e. Br itish Gov errunent) 
will not obstruct prop osa ls for constitutional 
1. R. Palme Dutt, The Problem of India , lfew York: International 
Publishers , 1943,pp.l08-l09 . 
2 . 'I'he St atesman, November 21 1938. 
3. ibid. ' 
a dvance initi a ted by Rulers. But His ~~jesty 1 s 
Government have no intention of bringing any 
form of pressure to bear u pon t h em to initiate 
c onstitutiona l changes. It rests with the 
lrulers themselves to d eci de what form of gov-
ernment t hey should adopt in t he diverse 
conditions of India n St a tes."l 
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Is t here any wonder, then, thclt the Princes were slow in 
rising from their feuda l slumber? 
The position of the British Govermaent, with regard to 
the Federa tion was a lso clar i f ied in unmistakable terms 
by Lord Linli tbgovl, the Crown Representat ive in Indi a , when 
he addres s ed the Associated Chambers of Commerce at ca lcutta 
on December 19,1938. He said: 
"Provincial Autonomy and Federation, essentially 
a nd intrinsica lly parts one of the other, re-
present a great decisi on, a ll more significant 
when outlined against the background, the em-
phasis on totalitaria n ideolog ies, have made 
no difference to the a t t itude of His Majesty's 
Government towards Indian constitutiona l ad-
vance. Their policy is uncha nged, they remain 
of op ini on t hat in the interests of India a.S 
a whole a s well as f r om t h e point of view of 
.individua l unit s whether States or Provinces 
t h e i deal embodied in the Act is that best 
ca lcula ted to a chieve results of real and per-
raanent value alik e to Indi a a nd to t he com-
p onent parts of the Federati on."2 
:&'Tom t he above sta tements it is made clear t hat t he British 
1. 342 !! . C. Deb., 5s.,2352. 
2. The Mar ques s of Linlithgow, Speeches a nd Statements, 
New Delhi: The Ti mes of India Press, 1945, p .156. Linlithgow 
was Viceroy and Governor General of India 1936-43. This is 
one of t he imp ortant primary sources from vihich the british 
p oint of view can be ea sily lea rnt. 
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Goverrnnent was firmly decided to carry out the Goverrnnent of 
India Act of 1935. 
To make the princes rea lize their folly the Congress 
changed its policy of non-intervention. It has been s tated 
earlier tha t Gandhi was responsible for it. He himself ad-
mitted tt and wrote, "They (Princes) know that I am respon-
sible for the ; :olicy of non-interference hitherto followed by 
l the Congress . 11 But since the circumstances had chang ed the 
Congress needed a change too. So he wrote: 
11 The policy of non-intervention by the Congress 
\•ras, in my opinion, a perfect piece of statesmanship 
when the people of the States were not awakened. 
That policy \vould be cowardice when there is all-
around awak ening among the people of the St a tes 
and a determination to go through a long course 
of sufferi ng for t he vindi cat i on of their just 
rights."2 
It is true as observed by Gandhi t hat t he people of the 
St a tes \•rere politically awakened. \~'hat these awakened peo1)le 
v1anted to a ccomplish may be characterized from the Rajkot 
( St a te) incident. For our purp ose it is sufficient to note 
tha t the people of ~ajkot demanded responsible g overnwent out 
the Thakor Sahib of Rajkot refused their demand, and h ence 
there itTaS vT i de spread disorder and confusion (satyagraha and 
hartals). 
Gandhi \vent to Rajkot on February 27, to solve t he 
l. Harij a n, January 28,1939. 
2 . ibid., l•lar ch 3, 1939. 
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pro olem. vJ1'1.en the 'I'hakore Sahib refused to a cce:pt h is terms 
Gandhi started an 'indefinite fast ' on ~ arch 3. He was con-
vinced t hat Thakor e Sahib was guilty of a breach of promise 
when h e refused to accept three name s of the Commission on 
constitutiona l reforms for Ra jkot. Thanks to the intervention 
of Lord Linli t hgovT \vho promised to refer t h e cause to the 
Chief J-ustice of Indi a , ( 8ir Maurice Gv1yer), Gandhi broke 
l his f as t on I:1arch 7. 
In other !:Jtates too such as Trava.ncore, - ~ashmir and Hydera-
bad, the reform-movement was gathering momentum but its de -
tails need n ot detain us . HovTever, it is important t6 note 
tha t the India n Princes in their conference at Bombay reject-
ed the revised Draft Instrument of Acc ession because "the 
terms ••• are fundamenta lly unsatisfa ctory."2 So they indirect-
ly rejected the Federation. 
That the Congress wanted to include the 8t a tes' people 
in its fight for freedom was made clear in the h esolution 
passed by the Tripuri-session of Congress . It decla red: 
"The g reat awa..kening that is tak ing place among 
the people of the States may be lead to a relaxa-
tion or to the complete removal of the · restraint 
\vhich the Congress imposed upon itself; thus re-
sulting in an ever increasing identification of 
1. All the telegraphic co:rrespondence a nd the lett ers that 
pas sed between Gandhi a nd the State authorities are conveni-
ently reproduced in Gandhi 's, The Indian States' Problem, 
pp.l96-228 , also see Harijan, !"arch 4 , 1939 and Harch 11, 
1939. 
2 . Times of India, Mar ch 12, 1940 
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the Congress with the otates' :?eople."l 
P~rthermore, t h e stGtus of the states in free India was 
cla rified a s the resolution went on to say: 
"The Congress desires to reiterate its objective, 
Comp lete Independence is for the v;hole of India , 
inclusive of the States, \vhich are integ r a l parts 
of India , ':I h i ch cannot be se ::,;a ra ted, a nd which must 
have the s ame mea sure of politica l, social a nd 
economic freedom a s rest of India . 11 2 
On August 27, 1939 at Delhi, the Council of the l1oslem 
eague pas s ed t h e following resolution: 
11 (a) h esolved that t h is Council, while dep lor-
ing the p olicy of the British Gover nment to-
wards the ~illslims of India by a ttempting to 
force u p on t h em against their will a consti-
tution and in particular t h e Federa l Scheme, 
a s embodied in the Governr.o.ent of Indi a Act, 
1 935, which allo·ws a p erma nent hostile com-
munal majority to tramp le u p on their religions , 
p olitical, soci a l and economic rights, a nd 
the utter neglect a nd indifference shown by 
the Viceroy a nd the Governors in the Congress-
g overned Provinces in exercising their special 
p owers to protect a n d secur e justice to . the 
minorities ••• "3 
So t h e :iYioslem Le ague opposed the Feder-ation on t h e grouncl 
th~t if the Fede r at i on did come into existence it would be 
l. Har ij a n, 2~rch 18,1939. s ee a lso Gandhi, The Indi a n ~tate s ' 
Problem, pp . 479-80. 
2 . i b i d . 
3. Anil Chan dra Banerjee, The I~Lak ing of the Indi a n Constitution, 
1 9 3 9- 47, Calcutta : A. Mukherjee r Co., 1948, Vol.I: Documents, 
p .ll. This is a source book valuable to every student of 
Constitutional h istory of Ind i a because i t contains texts 
of s ome of the most i mportant documents rela ted to t h e event-
ful p eriod of 1939-47, though t h e author's occasi on a l silemce 
on the source of h is comp ila ti on a nd ommi s sion of some i mper-
t ant d ocu.lllent s is distracting. A refer ence will be mad e to 
tha t effe ct where ne ede d . 
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domin~ted by the Hi ndus . Suleri observes that jinnah ' s fears 
regarding the Federa ti on were 'dell-founded for he foresa·w· 
that: 
"Once s addled in t he Center (Federa l Government), 
the Hindu \vill be in a commandi ng position to 
muzzle the four or five husli , provinces into c om-
plete subordina ti on."! 
Tha t \..ra s no t true because: 
"In a ctua l practice it is estimated that Hindus 
could have won at mos t 425o of the sea ts. •lore-
over, it i s clear t ba t \•l i th the EUropeans and 
the extreme conservatives among t he landholders 
·.,; ould be certain to hold t h e balance of p mver 
in both the upper and the lov1er chambers, and 
could easily block any progressive mea sures 
pr oposed by the representa tives of the Congress . 11 2 
It so happened tha t the Hindus were numer ically in a 
majority. In a democracy it is expected t ha t a majority 
ought to dominate in the political life of a na tion. 
Anyway, it has been asserted t hat the Moslems urg ed a con-
federation of the ioslem-majority provinces. When the All 
Indi a Moslem League met for its 26 th session a t Patna , it pass-
ed a resolution which decla red the Federat ion una ccep t able. 
-~though, it declared that the League was prepared to exp lore 
11 t h e possibility of a sui t able a l t erna ti ve \.Yhich \vould com-
pletely safeguard t he interests of 11uslims a nd other minori-
ties in Ind i a . 113 
1. Z. A. Suleri, Iviy Leader, Lahore: Imperial Pr inting vvorks , 
1945, p .83. 
2 • .Ka te L. :iYli tchel1, India \'/i thout A ].!"'able, Nevi York: Alfred 
Kno pf, 1942, p.194. 
3 . Times of India,January 3, 1939. 
It has b een also mainta ined t hat t he Lea gue denounced the 
Federa l plan because, 
11 
••• it 1.-las devoid of all basic and essential 
elements, and it \if ould lead them to nothing 
but bitterness and ill-\vill, and nothing but 1 \vrangles in the so ca lled Federal Legislature." 
It has been further claimed that, 
"The rejection of t h e Federation part of the 
Act of 1935 was a great achievement on the 
part of Jinnah and t he huslim League, because 
\•Ti thout that there could have been no demand 
for Pakistan in the coming years. 11 2 
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Whatever may have been the motives of the Muslim League, 
it should be noted that both the fuuslim League and the Con-
gress opposed t 11.e Federal Scheme -for different reasons. The 
X' oslems aimed at securing a more privileged position for 
themselves while the Congress \vas striving for a greater con-
trol at the Center. 
Before the subject of Federation is dropped, it is en-
lightening to read the verdict of one of the outsta nding Bri-
tish authorities on the Indian constitution, Professor A. B. 
Keith. \'ii th reagard to the nevi Constitution of India he says: 
11 It is difficult to resist the impression that either res-
ponsible government should have been fr ankly declared impos-
sible or the reality conceded. 11 3 
l. ~uoted by A.B. Rajput, Muslim League Yesterday and Today, 
Lahore: Imperia l Printing Works , 1948, p .56. 
2.ibid., p.57. 
3. A. B. Keith, A Constitutional History of India , 1600-1935, 
London: 1936, pp .~73-4. 
He was also of the opinion t hat : 
"It is difficult to deny t he contention in India 
tha t federation wa s l argely evok ed by t he desire 
to evade the is sue of extending responsible gov-
ernment to the center government of British Ind-
i a . :JYioreover , the wi tholding of defense and ex-
ternal affairs from federal control ••• renders the 
a lleged concession of responsibility all but mean-
ing less."l 
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It is not surprising that t he Indian p eople rejected the Fed-
erat ion. 
B. Britain's War and India's men: 
wbile the Indian political parties were deeply engrossed 
in fight ing tenaciously the constitutional battle, a world-
shaking calamity happened. FUhrer Hitler declared war on Po-
land on the morning of September 1,1939. Following the bro ad-
casts of Neville Chaniberlin a nd His Majesty, the King Emperor 
on September 3, Crown-representa tive Lord Linlithgow declared in 
India that war had broken out between Great Br itain and Ger-
many. Therefore, he pleaded, 
11 In a cause such as this the whole hearted sym-
pathy and the support of a ll in this great country, 
\<Thether in British Inc.ii a or in the Indie.n States , 
vlill, I am certain, be forthcoming without dis-
tinction of class, of creed, of race, or political 
par ty. I am confident ••• that India will make her 
contribution on the side of human freedom a s 
aga inst the rule of forc e , and will p l ay a part 
worthy of her pl a ce among the great nations, and 
the historic civili zations of the world."2 
l. i bid. 
2. Linlithgow, op .cit., pp.l99-200. 
On the same day he had a lso procla i med in the Ga zette 
of Indi~ ( September 3 ,1939), 
"I Victor .P..lexander John, Marques s of Linli t bgow, 
Governor-Genera l of India a nd ex-officio Vice-
Admira l t h er ein, being s a tisf ied t hereof by in-
formation received by me, do hereby procla i m 
that war has brok en out between His Majesty a nd 
Germany." 
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So t h e Viceroy's broas ca s t a nd writing declared Indi a a 
belliger ant country. One mi ght a sk, was it a s simple as t hat? 
The answer i s yes. \'ihy? Because he did so without consulting 
representa tives of any group or party in India . 
The story was diff erent in other parts of t he British 
Commom..real t h . How they entered the war needs to be p ointed 
ou t, so tha t one may be able to under s t a nd India 's pos ition 
better . Prime }Yii nister Iv1ack enzie King of Ca nada ha d promised 
t hat Canada would enter t he war only on autho r iza ti on of its 
Parli ament. So, unlik e Indi a , Canada wa s not a t war as soon 
a s Neville Chamberlain declared \<rar '\iln Ger many on Sep t ember 
3r d . It was only on Sep t ember lOth, a fter the s anction of the 
Cana di an Parliament a nd public opinion t hat Cana da was a t war 
l 
with Ger ma ny. 
Australia and New Zea l a nd , because of t hei r unanimous 
s entiment decla red war with Germany in t he King 's name with-
out consulting t heir parliaments. In South i~rica , t he war 
1. Paul Knapland, ~he Br itish Empire, New York: Harper & 
Brothers Publishers, 1941, p .6 42 . 
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issue was decided in a Parliamentary deba te by 80 to 67 votes. 
Prime l'iinister &nuts succeeded Hertzog and a Parlia.mentc..ry 
majority declared war against Germany • .. The Irish :B'ree St=·te 
declared its neutrality perhaps because she did not desi r. e to 
continue her membershi p in the British Commonwealth of Nations. 
In India it \vas the Viceroy's own decision. As the Central 
Government or the Gover11..ment of India was functioning under 
the Act of 1919 and not the Act of 1935, it may be tha t: 
I 
"Legally, too, the Viceroy was entirely within h is 
rights, for control of forei gn policy was exclu-
sively in his hands . Indeed he could not have done 
. anyth ing else, because he \vas responsible through 
the becretary of St a te for Indi a to t h e British 
Parliament, '-'lhi ch had declared v1ar on Germany. 11 l 
But there is no doubt that no legal point or constitution-
a l rule vTould bave been violated if h e had consul ted, on 
grounds of exp edienc8 a t least, the Executive or Legislc..tive 
. branch of the Government. It has been observed t hat 11 ••• it 
is interesting to specula.te vlhether he might have disarmed his 
nationalist opponents by a different course of a ction. 112 Prob-
ably , under the circumstances, he consider ed it inadvisable 
or unnecessary to consult public opinion in Indi a . Be that 
a s it may , Indi a v1as a t war with Ger many. 
The British Parliament in a hur r y pas sed a Government of 
l. T. A. taman, Report on Indi a , New York: Oxford Unive:csity 
Press, 1943, p .l29 . 
2. vlarren 0. Ault , Europe in l<.Lodern Times, Boston: D. C •• ea th 
and Company , 1946, p .720. 
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Ind i c:.. Jl..mend ing Act. I t bestowed u p on the Vice r oy the p ower 
of suspending the ' Provincia l Aut onomy' part of the Act of 
1 935 . On September 3 , the day of t h e decla r at ion of t h e war , 
t h e Viceroy promulgated t he Defence of Indi e, Or d inance. It 
conferr ed wi des t pos s ib le po·>~ers on the & ecut ive wh ich in-
eluded rule by decree, prohibition of meetings a.nd pro:pa-
gnada , and a rrest \·l i t hou t \¥arrant. 
The Viceroy inte rv i ev1ed Gan dhi on September 5, and Gandhi 
expres s ed h is sympathies i1li t h Great Br ita i n a nd l!rance. Hi s 
opinion , h owever , was personal and not off icia l. The Congres s 
~forking Committ e e me t betHeen Sep t ember 8 a nd 14. It decided 
to defer its fina l deci s ion as regards the ~urope~n Jar. 
sub-committee consisting of Nehru, V. Patel and Azad was ap -
p ointed to dea l wi th matters p erta ining to the war . It took 
the g r aves t v i ew of the decla r a ti on of India a s a bell i g erent 
country, t he lli~endment of the Government of Indi a Act, the 
promulgation of Or dinances and t h e curta i lment of the powers 
of the Provincia l Governments. It was declared by t he com-
mittee t hat t he matter of pea ce and war sho ul d be decided by 
t h e I nd i 6.n people t hemselves . 
The Commi ttee passed a resolut ion supporting democracy 
and reaffirming its opposition to Hitleri sm and Fascism. B,y 
f a r t h e most i mporta nt part of the resoluti on i nvited the 
British Government to decla re their War- a i ms . It read : 
11 If the· \Ja r is to defend the sta tus guo, i mperia l-
i s t p ossessi ons , coloni es , v es ted interests ~nd 
~r iv i leges , then India ca n have nothing to do 
with it ••• If Great Br itain fights for the main-
tena nce and extensi on of democracy, then she 
must necessarily end Imperi a lism in her own pos-
sessions a nd establish full democracy in India, 
and the Indi an people must have the right of 
self-determination by fr aming their own con-
stitution through a Constituent Assembly ••• 
The -.,'forking Committee, therefore, invite the 
British Gover nment to declare in unequivocal 
terms \vha t their aims are in rega r d to demo-
cracy and Imperi a lism and the new order tha t 
is envisag ed , in particular, how these aims 
are going to apply to India a,nd to be g iven 
effect to in the present. Do they include treat-
ment of India as a free nation whose policy will 
be guided in accordance with the wishes of her 
people?"l 
56. 
Linli thg ow read a message from I ing George VI to the joint 
session of the Indian Legislature on September 11. In it the 
I~ing expressed deep satisfaction at the widespread attachment 
of Indi a to the cause in which Britain had t aken up arm~ . The 
Viceroy said that nothing could be more significant tban the 
unanimity of approach of all in India- princes, leaders of 
great political parties, the ordinary men and women. He also 
announced that prepara tions in c onnection witl1 the introduction 
of the Federation would remain in suspense for the period of 
war, but that the Federati on remained the objective of the 
British Government. 2 
\fhen the Viceroy said that the introduction of the ~edera-
tion would remain in suspense it almost sounded as if it was 
1. The full text of this resolution is reproduced in Anil 
Chandra Banerjee, op.cit., pp.l-4. 
2. The Hindu, September 12,1939. 
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the officia l announcement of the funeral of the Federation, 
since, as observ:ed before, it \vas rej acted by the Congress, 
the Moslem League and the Princes. It must be pointed out here 
that the Viceroy's message was just a decla ration; he had 
made no pretence of consulting the India n Legislature. 
The voice of the Moslems was heard through the resol-
ution of the Working Committee (All India l~slim League, 8ep t-
ember 18) deali~~ with its attitude to t he war. The Committee 
appreciated the Viceroy's reference to the suspension of the 
Federation, but wished it was compl etely abandoned. It ma de 
it clea.r that the b.oslems did not endorse the Federal objec-
tive referred to by the Viceroy and urged His Majesty's Gov-
ernment t 6· review and revise t he problem of Indi a 's future 
c onstitution de novo. They claimed that the Provinci al Con-
stitution (under the Act of 1935) resulted in a permanent 
coiiLmun ct. l maj ority, i.e. the domination of the Hindus over the 
Moslem minority. They sympathised 1.·li th Engl a nd, Poland and 
France. The Committee felt t hat, 
" ••• rea l and solid Nuslim co-operation and sup-
port to Great Britain ••• cannot be secured success-
fully if His ¥~jesty' s Government and t he Vice-
roy are un&.ble to secure to the Ivluslims justice 
and fair play in the Congress-governed provinces 
where to-day t heir liber ty, person, property 
and honour are in danger."l 
'l'he resolution also asked for an as surance tha t no decla-
r a tion r egarding the ques tion 6f constitutiona l a dvance or 
1. St a tesman, Sep tember 18, 1939. 
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its adop tion for India be made without the consent and ap-
proval of the l•.Loslem League. 
It may be inferred from t his tbat the Ivioslem League \"las 
rea dy to ba-ega in vri th the British Government. Politically 
speaking it meant . that if the British Government a s sured t h e 
Moslem League equality of status a long with the Congress it 
wou1d fully co-operate with Britain's war efforts. 
The Viceroy, on October 17, made a public statement on 
the Allies' war objectives, the future constitutional develop-
ments of India, and the methods of closer association of 
Indi an political opinion with the prosecution of the var. 1 
As regards the British policy in India he recalled the state-
ment made by the l a te ;:;ecreta ry of St a te f:or India (Sir 
Samuel Hoare) on ] ebruary 6,1935 which made it clear that 
the securing of Dominion Status was the goal of British policy. 2 
It is necessary to mention for clarifica tion that on 
August 20,1917, the Secretary of State for India had communi-
cated to the House of conm1ons the h istoric announcement which 
read: 
"The policy of His Najesty's Governrnent ••• is ••• 
the gradua l development of self-governing insti-
tutions with a view to the progressive realization 
of responsible government in India as an integral 
part of the British .IDnpire."3 
1. For full text of t h is sta tement see Linlithgow,op.cit.,pp . 
204-210. 
2 i bi d . 
3.97 H. C. Deb., 5s., 1695. I'rime l:l.ini s ter Lloyd George; Lord 
Curzon, Lord Nilner and Balfour wer e c.. t the back of· t h is 
announcement. 
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FUr t hermore , I"Lr . ·ledg ewoo d Benn (l,abour l<iember) s a id that 
no Secretary of St ate desired, 
u ••• to l ay a finger upon this principle of t a -
riff autonomy which has been establ ish ed in prac-
ti c e for ten years in Ind i an a ffairs. There is 
Dominion St a tus in a ction ; there is a Dominion 
a ttribute. It has now become part and parcel of 
the rights of India . 11 1 
Add to these Lord Irwin's clear-cut statement of October 
31, 1929 when he s a id: 
" ••• I am authorised on beha lf .of His .Majesty's 
Government to state clearly t hat it is i mpli cit 
i n the Declaration of 1917 tha t the natural is-
sue of India's cons titutiona l progress as there 
contemplated, is t he a ttainment of Dominion 
.... t a tus. "2 
The sum total of these statements needs no elaboration. 
The Viceroy J..~i nli tbgmv further stated in his public mes-
sag e of October 1 7 , that: 
11 I am a uthorised now by His l•iajesty's Govern-
ment to say tha t at t he end of war they \vill 
be very wi lling to enter into consultation 
with representatives of the several corranuni-
ties, parties and interests in India and with 
t he Indian Prov inces, with a v iew to s ecuring 
t heir· aid and co- operation in the framing of 
such modifica ti ons as may seem desirable. 11 3 
To se cure t he consensus of the public op ini on in Indi a 
with regar d to t h e conduct of wa r he propos ed to have a con-
sulta tive g roup representating all major political parties 
and of Indi an Princes ov er which he v1ould preside. 
1. 233 H. C. Deb., 5s., lffi52. 
2 . Lord Irwln 's s p eech of October 31,1929. 292 H.C. Deb., 5s., 
1172-74. 
3. Linlit~~ow , ~.cit., p . 206. (ita lics mine ). 
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A d iscussion of the reaction of the Indi a n p olitica l 
parties to the Viceroy's sta tement of October 17, is in order. 
The Congres s wa s disappointed because it thought tha t t h e 
statement fell far short of meeting t he dema nds i mplied in 
the resolution endorsed by the All Indi a Congress Cor~1ittee 
a t vlardha on October 10. It dema nded an immedi a te chang e and -
suggested t ha t 11 India must be decla red an indpendent nation, 
and p resent app lication must be g iven to this status to the 
largest p ossible extent. 111 
GanillLi 1 s statement of Octo ber 18, described Linlith-
g ovT' s statement as 11 p rofoundly disappointing" a n d said tha t: 
11 It would have b een better if the Br itish Gov-
err~ent had declined to make a ny decla ration 
whatsoever. The long sta tement mad& by tpe Viceroy 
simply show tha t the old policy of divide a nd 
rule is to continue. So far as I can see, t h e 
Congress will be n o party to it nor can the India 
of the Cong ress concep tion be a partner with 
Britain in her war with Herr Hitler ••• The Vice-
roy's declaration s h ows clearly that t here is 
to be no democracy for India if Britain can 
pr event it ••• The Congress asked for bread and 
it has got a stone ••• The Congress will have 
to g o into the wilderness aga in before it 
becomes strong and pure enough to reach its 
objective. 11 2 
The Congress Presi dent h a jendra Prasad commented t lLat the 
Viceroy's statement was disappointing but not surprising •• 
The Congress official rep ly to Linlitbgow's statement 
c ame through a momentous resolution passed by the Congress 
l. Si taramayya, op . cit., p.l37, a nd India n Annu &,l Reg ister, 
1939, ii 231. 
2. Times of Ind i a , October 19, 1939. 
work i ng Co llllitte (.j a t ,;ardha on October 22. The resolution 
chara cterised the Viceroy 's statement as , 
" ••• wholly unsa tisfactory and calcula ted to arouse 
resentment among a ll those who wer e anxious to 
gain, and intend gaining , India 's independence. 11 l 
As regards the Congress attitude towards Eritish- policy 
the resolution went on to say that , 
ttThe Commi ttee must therefore regard the state-
ment as in every \vay unfortunate. In the cir-
cumsta nces it canno t poss ibly g ive a ny support 
to Great Britain, for it wo uld amount to a n en-
dorsement of the imperi a list pol icy which the 
Congress has always sought to end. As a first · 
step in this direction the Committee ca lls upon 
the Congress £·iinistr.ies .., to tender their resig-
nations ." 2 
Accord ing ly by l~ovember 15, a ll t h e Congress .l•iini stries h · d 
res i gned. 
i multaneously, the Council of Liberal Federa.tion (one 
of the p olitical parties) of India met a t Bombay and p~ssed 
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a resolution. It shmved (1) dissatisfaction wi t h Linlithg ow's 
decla r a tion; (2) demanded the application of the St a tue of 
Westminster (1931) within a definite period after the war ; 
(3) rap i d Indianiza tion of the Defence Forces a nd (4) the 
3 
i mmedia te introduction of I espobsible Government a t t he Center. 
Five days later the \vorkint?; Committee of the I> oslem 
1. Times of IndiaL October 23, 1939 . 
2. The full text of this resolution is reproduced in Indi an 
Annua l Register, 1939, ii. 237 - 239 . 
3 . The St a tesman , October 23 , 1939 . 
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League met and pa ss ed a resolution (October 22 ) expres s ing 
s a tisfa ction tha t t he Br itish Government ha.d "emphatically 
repudiated t h e unfounded cla i m of t h e ongres s t hat they 
a l one repre sent a ll Indi a " and recognised the f a ct t hat t h e 
JJ.l India l~mslim League a lone truly represented t h e l,.Luslims 
of Ind i a and a lso t ha t the rights a nd intere s ts of the mino-
rities ha d been duly recognised. 1 
The. resolution authorized Jinnah to give an assurance of 
Moslinl support and co-operation t o t he British Government for 
t he prosecution of war once t he doubts were removed and clari-
fication secured. 2 It may be inferred from t his t hat the hos-
lem League did not endorse t he Vicer oy's sta tement a s t he eans 
t nrough \vh ich the I'lloslem aspiration might be fulfilled. 
The House of Commons deba te the Indi a n Qolitical situa tion 
The Hous e of Commons held a debate on 'India ~nd ·war 1 
on Octob er 26 with particular refei' ence to the Viceroy's state-
ment of Oct ober 18. 3 It was op ened a t 4:21 p .m. by a speech 
from }~ . Wedgewood Benn on behalf of the Labour Party of Great 
Britain and clos ed by Sir H. O' Neill at 10:05 p . m. 
1. The Hindu, October 2 3 , 1939. 
2 . ibid. 
3 . For complete record of this lively and important debate 
one must read, under t _e heading 'India and ·war' 352 H . C~ 
Deb., 5s., 16 22-1714 . 
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Sir Samuel Hoare, the Lord Pr ivy Seal, in a lengthy 
s peech (which lasted 4:49p.m. to 5:37 p .m.) a s an answer to 
Wedg e\·Jood' s que stions said, 
"It is these (communal) d ivisi ons t hat have 
made so diffucult the task of s etting up res-
ponsible Goverruaent a t t he Centr e and achiev-
i ng the gr eat i dea l of an All-India Federa -
tion. The Pr inces a re a fraid of domination by 
British India ; Moslems a re f irmly opposed to 
a Hindu maj ority at t he Centre ; the Depressed 
Cl asse s and other minorities g eniunely believe 
that responsible g overnment, meaning a Govern-
ment dep endent upon a Hindu majority , will 
s acrifice t heir interests . These anxieties 
still exist . I wish that they did not. But as 
long as t hey do ex ist it i s i mpos s ible for 
the .government to accep t a demand for immedi-
ate and full responsibility a t the centre on 
a particular date."l 
itlhile commenting on it Sir Stafford Cripps ( La.bour- Hem-
ber) S.aid, 
11 I regre t very much the final passages of the 
Lord Privy's Seal 's speech , t he unveiled tlrreat 
to u s e force and sup2ression i f the Indi an 
people should dare not to come to heel. I am 
afraid t hat is how that speech will be inter-
preted t hr ough out India . Certainly, it was 
hmv the speech appea led to me a s I listened 
to it. 11 2 
Furthermor e, pointing out t he inconsistency of Brita in's 
relation to I ndia, he pleaded that, 
"I believe we have to make up our minds , t here-
for e, \vhether we ar e genuinely determined, not 
1. 352 H. C.Deb., 5s., 1637-38 ; Hoare's s peech covers columns 
1634-1644 .---- . 
2 . Cri pps' speech covers (352 H. C. Deb., 5s.,) columns 1656-
1660 . 
in words, bu t in action, to g ive self-govern-
ment to the people of India - and I believe 
that if we did so, we should be able to wel-
come that country as a great and pov1erful ally 
and friend for all the years in the future -
or whether we are to ally ourselves \oJi th the 
reactionary Indian Princes, as we .-have been 
doing in past, for a joint exploitation of 
the Indi an people by the British Raj and the 
Indi an Princes."l 
Suggesting the lines on which a reply should be g iven to 
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the Congress for the elucidation of Britain 's war aims , he said; 
"The Indian people, therefore, ca n be assured 
that our immedi a te objective is self-govern-
ment for the Indian people."2 
~urtnermore he recommended tha t, 
" First of all, w·e abandon all idea of Federa-
tion and deal with the problem as one for Bri -
tish Indi a . The ~ajor parties in British Ind-
i a have expressed t~eir views against Feder~ 
tion, and it is idle therefore to continue with 
that at t he present time." Then 11 Secondly, we 
consent to the election of a new Central Legis-
lative Assembly for British Indi a " and " Thirdly , 
the maj ority parties in that Legislature should 
form a Government, \vhich the Vi ceroy should 
then ap:ppi nt as his Ex:e cu ti ve __ Council" and 
"accept t heir advice as the Cr ov1n here accepts 
the advice of the Cabinet when duly tendered 
to it."3 
That the honourable member for East Bristol, Sir Staf-
ford Cripps , sincerely believed what he said , will be made 
clearer at a later date . However , ~vo thi~s seem clear from 
t hese s peeches. Firstly, that the Conservative Party members 
1. For Cripps' speech see 352 H. C.Deb., 5s., column 1665. 
2. ibid. 
3. ibid., column 1666. 
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wanted to continue i n India on imper i a listic lines on the 
ground of communal divi s ions but t he Labour Party members 
1:1ere ready to be explicitly democratic a s rega rds Indo-
Br itish rela tions. That is, t he Labour Party member .a were an-
x ious to grant India self-governm.ent aft er t he war. As such 
it should be noted tha t t he Labour Party of Great Brita in be-
carne an i mportant f actor in helping India become a self-gov-
erning nat ion. 
The Congress ~linistries resigned on the issue of War: 
In India the Parliamentary Sub-Committee of t h e Con-
gress had issued instructions for the guidance of l'linistries 
and Congress parties in the Congress provinces: the first 
part read: 
"The resolution of the \larking Committee calls 
up on the Congress Provincia l Governr~ents to 
tender t heir resignations. These resignations 
should be given after the Assembly meetings 
v1hich have been convened for the purpose of 
dis cussing such urgent business as may be pend-
ing but it is expected that resignations will 
be tendered by October 31,1939. 11 1 
1. Sitaramayya , op .cit., p . 141. 
The follovi ing a re the dates of the res igna ti ons of the Congress 
'linistri es: 




Bihar II 31 
U. P. November 3 
Orissa II 5 
C. P . II 9 
N. \•f.F. II 7 
Assam II 15 
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The Central Provinces a nd Orissa Mini s tries were alow-
ed to remain in office till the beginning of November because 
their Assemblies were convened then. So between October 28 
and November 15, in eight provinces t he Congress }linistries 
had resigned from office. 
The Vicer oy meets the Indian Leaders: 
Between October 26 a nd November 4, Linlithgow inter-
viewed more than fifty persons representing all parties, com-
munities ~nd interests. On November 1, he interviewed and cor-
responded with Gandhi, Raj endra Prasad (Congres s President) 
and Jinnah (Noslem League President). 1 On November 5, he 
issued a statement and the same day he announced it in his 
broadcast . In the first par t of htis statement he recalled 
the history of the last few weeks dealing with the political 
situation in India. As regards the outcome, t _he statement read., 
"The discussions which I suggested have taken 
place. But the result to me has been a profound 
disappointment. There remains today entire dis-
agreement between the representatives of the ma-
jor parties on fundamente,l issues."2 
Furthermor e, stressing the need for unity he said, 
1. Full text of this statement a nd broadcast may be studied 
from Linlithgow, op.cit., pp.2ll-15. No ernest student of 
Indi a n History can afford to i gnore the text of correspond-
ence between the Viceroy a nd Indian leaders. For the text of 
correspondence between November 2 and De cember 23 , 1939, see 
Linli t hg ov1 , .2J2• cit., p . 392-400. 
2. i b id.!., p.213. 
"Unity, too, mea ns that Indians, v1hatever their 
community or \>Tha tever their party allegiance, 
and whether they dwell in British India or in 
the Indi &,n Sta tes must work tog ether in e, com-
mon scheme."l 
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So the British Government kept on demanding a co~uunal 
unity from India if she wanted to qualify for becoming a self-
governing na tion. \1ha t the Congress stood for may easily be 
learnt from the Congress President Raj endra Prasad -vrho s aid, 
"It has pained us to find the communa l ques-
tion being dragged in t h i s connection. It h a s 
clouded the main issue. It has been repeated-
ly said on beha l£ of the Congress that it is 
our most earnest desi r e to settle all points 
.of communal controversy by agreement and iAre 
propose to continue our efforts to this end. 
But I would point out that this question does 
not in any respect come in the way of a decla-
ration of Indian freedom a s suggested above." 2 
Add to it what l'{ehru had to say on this matter. He said , 
"The problem 1.vhich had assumed importa nce since 
the war was a purely political one- the free-
dom of India and the right of her people to 
frame their constitution."3 
Is it n ot clear from this that the Congress had made up 
its mind to have the British Government decla re India's in-
dependence and let her frame her own constitution by means 
of a Constituent Assembly, freely elected under wide adult 
fr a nchise? Is it also not clear that the British Government 
1 . ibid. 
2 . Pra sad ' s lett er to the Viceroy dated November 2,1939 . For 
the text of the letter refer to Linli thgovl , O£• cit., pp. 395-
396 ; the quotation will be found on pag e 396 . 
3. Nehru, The Unity of India, p . 364 . 
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v1 ould rather have a communa l settlement first and then, if 
possible, s omething els e? 
The liJ.oslem Lea ue President Jinnah, clarified t h e Leagues 
p osition when he wr ote to the Viceroy a nd requested, 
•i That so soon as circumstances may permit or 
i mmediately after the war t he enti re problem 
of Ind i a 's future constitution, apa rt from 
the Govermnent of India Act of 1935, shall be 
examined and reconsidered de novo;" and " That 
no decla rat i on sha ll, eith er in principle or 
othervlise, be made or any cons titution be en-
acted by His Majesty's Govermnent or Parli a -
ment v1i thout the approva l and the consent of 
the t':l O _, o,j or communi t i es of Indi a , viz., 
the Mussalmans and t h e Hindus."l 
I t may be ob s erved , then that the Congress and the h os-
lem League rnade t heir respective demands knmvn, in no unmis-
takable terms , to the Br iti sh Government . 
lit.e amvhile, t h e Congress Vlorkifl..g Committee met at Alla.ha-
bad on November 23 and reitera ted the vi ew tha t, 
" ••• recognition of Indi a 's indep endence and 
t he right of her people to fr ame their consti-
tution t:b..rough a Constituent Assmebly is es-
sentie.l i n order to remove the t ain t of i m-
:per i a lism fr om Bri t a in's policy and to en-
able t he Congress to c ons i der further co-opera-
tion.112 
It passed a resolution which declar ed t hat no communa l 
considera tion arose in meeting t h is d emand because the mi n-
orities , whatever their other difference , ai d not oppose 
1 . Jinna.h ' s letter to t he Viceroy dated November 5 , 1939. 
see Li nlitbgow, ~.cit., pp . 397-98 . 
2 . The Hindu, -ovember 24 , 1939. 
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Indi a 's right to freedom and independence. Furthermore, the 
resolution continued, 
"The d ecla ration ma.de on behalf of the British 
Goverr.unent has compelled t he Congress to dis-
associate i±self from British policy and war 
efforts, and as a first step in non-co-opera-
tion to bring about the resigna tions of a ll the 
Congress Governments. 'I'hat policy of non-co-
operation continues a nd must continue unless 
the British Government revises its policy and 
accepts the Congress contention."l 
It also remin~ed the Congressmen, 
" ••• that it is inherent in every form of'Sat-
yagraha' (passiv e resistance) that no effort 
is spared to a chieve an honourable settlement, 11 2 
.· and accordi11..gly, the committee would continue to strive 
for this end , u ••• even though the Br itish Gover:nment has 
banged the do or in the face of the Congress. 11 3 
Gandhi wrote an article in the Harija:g_ of november 25, 
in vlhich he reaffirmed tho..t, 
11 f.J.l resources must, t herefore, be exhausted 
to reach the Constituent Assembly before dir-
ect action is thought of."4 
So Indo-British rela tions were strained. 
Jinnah delivered -a s peech on December 2, in which he 
said, 
11 I wish the Hussalma ns all over India to ob-
serve Friday the 22nd December a s t he 11 day of · 
1. The Hindu, November 24, 1939 . 
2 . ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Harijan, November 25, 1939. 
deliverance" and thanksg iving a s a mark of re-
lief t hat the Congress r eg i me has at last ceas-
ed to function."l 
He also repeated h is a llegations tha t the Congres s mini -
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s tries had. fallen short of safeguarding the rights: and interests 
of t h e I-'iosl ems and other minorities. 1Tehru spok e in Bombay on 
December 12 and mentioned thatit was i mposs i ble for him t o 
resume t he tal ks on t he communal problem vlhich he had had with 
l1r . Jinnah. The · following day (December 13) J innah demanded 
fr om t h e British Government t hat a Royal Commis s ion with pure-
ly judi cial personnel should investigate t h e communal problem. 
It may not be doubted t hat his speech jeopardized the pros-
pect of Hindu-~ruslim agreement . 
The ab ov e discussion may no~be summarized as follows: 
The Congres s expres s ed emphat ica lly that the Nat ive St ates 
should not have been a ssigned a prominent place at the cost 
of the peoples of tho 0e states . That is, the Congress wanted 
t h e p eople t o have a greater control in .the Centra l g overn-
ment because t hat is hmv modern democra cy works . Therefor e, 
the Congress supported the reform-movement in t hos e Native 
St a te s vlhere autocracy v1as the order of the day. The Congress 
was of the opini on that if responsi ble government was what 
the Briti sh Government rea lly wanted to give to Indi a it was 
pr oper that such a government should be the respo~3ibility 
1. For the fu l l text of Jinnah's appeal for ... observance of 
11 Deliverance Day 11 see A. C.J3anerjee, o:g.cit., pp.7-14 . 
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of the peoples' representa tives a nd not of the Princes. o 
the Congress strove for a greater control at the Center. In 
that event it was not possible for her to accept the Federal 
SchBme of the Act of 1935. 
The Congress did not appreci a te the idea of India's 
participation in the war without the consent of the people. 
So it rightly charged the British Goverrunent with dragging 
Indi a into the vrar by the no ;"e• The. t being the cas.e it \vas 
inclined to be unco-operative but not unsympathetic in the 
war- efforts. 
The l1uslim League rejected Federation because it was not 
a ssured of an equ al representa tion in the Central GoverTh~ent. 
This demand for equal representation of the .!.<l.Uslim League 
ultima tely lead to the division of India . If tha t demand be 
judged from the common standards of proportiona l representa -
tion in a modern democracy, it may not be doubted , that it '.Jas 
undemocra tic, to s ay t he least. The Muslim ~eague shoved con-
ditionally a co-operative attitude tm.vards t~ e \var-effort s 
of Brita in. It's a ttitude fluctua ted in proportion to the 
privileg es accorded to it by the British Gover nme·nt. 
It must be a d.mi tted that \vorld \-Jar II lJrovided a g olden 
opportunity to India to solidfy her ~osition both politically 
and economica lly '.vi t h rega~d to Britain. The Indo-British 
r ela ti ons became tens e because of the war . If Britain was 
det er mined to ·vrin the war - Iniia via s equally, if not more, 
determined to win independence. 
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In the course of the 1.var did Britain revise her policy 
to1t1a rds India? Did she propose any nev1 scherue? If she did, 
were the India n people in general a nd the p olitical parties 
in particualr satisfied \<Ti th it? 'rhese questions a n d oth ers 
a re d iscussed in Ch pat e r IV. 
.7,3. 
CHAPTE..R IV 
BRITAIN PROPOSES BUT INDIA OPPOSES DOI•liNION STATUS 
Lord Linlithgow was invited to speak at the Orient Club 
in Bombay on January 10, 1940. He stated in explicit terms 
that, 
11 
••• His l~ajesty 1 a Government have made it clear, 
both through statements issued by myself, and 
in Parliament, that their objective for India 
is full Dominion Status, Do~inion Status,too,of 
the Statue of "le s trains t er var iety ••• 11 1 
As regards the minority-problem he said he would ask the 
people of India 11 to consider whether they cannot get together 
and reach some agreement between themselves.n2 It may be 
observed that Linlithgow as well as those interested in Ind-
ian affairs knew that the promise of Dominion Status was not 
a new thing. It will be recalled that it was promised eleven 
years earlier (1929) by Lord Irwin the then Viceroy of India. 
Linlitbgow 1 s approach to the minority-problem seems pe-
culiar because it meant, in the final analysis, that the mi-
nority be allmored to dictate. Such things do not exist in a 
modern democracy. This is n·J t to say that the minority be 
suppressed, far from it. 
The Congress President Rajendra Prasad commented on the 
1. Linlithgow, op.cit., p.228. 
2. ibid. 
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Viceroy's speech that it was the clearest of all the de-
clarations that had been made and suggested that the Congress-
goal was "independence pure and simple. "1. 
"New Talks": 
Since the Congress-Minis t ries had resigned between 
october 28-November 15, 1939 ; there existed a constitutional 
deadlock. So once again the Viceroy attempted "new talks" 
with the leaders of the Indian political parties between ]'eb-
ruary 3rd and 6th. wnen Linli thgow and Ga ndhi met on February 
6th they decided to defer, temporarily at least, further di~ 
cussions on the future constitutional developments in India. 
An agreed communique was issued after the meeting. It stated 
that the Viceroy had stressed the desire of the British Gov-
ernment to grant India Dominion Status at the earlies date 
and had suggested that the Federal Scheme Act, in suspense dur-
ing the war, was the surest stepping stone to that end. 
It was added that the Viceroy's November-offer of en-
larging the Central Executive Council remained open too, and 
if the Indian political parties consented, the Federal Scheme 
would be reopened. l~. Gandhi made it clear that the British-
Government- offers did not meet the full demand of the Congress 
Party and he suggested with the approval of the Viceroy that it 
would be well, for the present to defer further discussions. 2 
1. The Hindu, January 11,1940. 
2. For detailed record of this interview see Linlithgow, op.cit., 
pp. 411-12. 
75. 
Next day the Viceroy and Moslem League President Jinnah 
met. After their meeting a statement was "issued to the effect 
that the Viceroy had assured him of the British Government's 
full responsibility for safeguarding the legitimate interests 
of the minorities and tl~t Jinnah need not be under any ap-
prehension that the importance of these matters would be mini-
. d 1 m~ze • 
~ress· · demand Complete Independence: 
The Congress ~orking Committee met at Patna from Feb-
ruary 28 to ~~rch 1. It drew up a historic resolution again 
disapproving of the action of the British Goverrunent in de-
claring India a belligerent country without the consent of 
her people. It declared that, 
" ••• nothing short of complete independence 
can be accepted by the people of India11 a.nd11 The 
recent pronouncements made on behalf of the Bri-
tish Government in regard to India, demonstrate 
tl1at Great Britain is carrying on the war fanda-
mentally for imperialist ends and for the pre-
servation and strengthening of her Empire ••• 
The Congress vii thdrew the l:Unistries from 
the ~ovinces in order to dissociate India from 
the war and to enforce the Congress determination. 
This preliminary step must naturally be followed 
by civil disobedience, to Y.Thich the Congress 
will unhesitatingly resort as seon as Congress 
organization is considered fit enough for the 
purpose."2 
There will be more to be said about t lus resolution a 
1. ibid., Coupland remains silent about this interview. 
2. ~Statesman, March 2, 1940. 
little later. 
The Princes v/ake Up: 
The Viceroy had declared India a belligerent country on 
September 3, 1939 without the c onsent of the Indian people. 
The Princes did not have enough time to clarify their position 
officially until the Chamber of Princes met at Delhi on I~rch 
11, 1940. It assured the King Emperor of assistance from the 
India n Princes in men, material and money. 
The following day a resolution was passed to the effect 
that (1) Dominion Status should be conditioned by the guaran-
tees conserning the sovereignty of their States (2) their 
trea ty rights should be protected (3) the Princes should be 
assured that their consent would be sought before any real 
transfer of power from the Crown to some other authority in 
India . It also dema nded that all Indian parties be assured of 
their due share in the working of the new constitution. They 
were ready to collaborate in whatever conaultations the Vic~ 
roy might initiate in formula ting the constitution provided 
that the States were allotted a position proportionate to 
their importance. 1 
The Rrungarh Resolution: (~mrch 20, 1940). 
Meanwhile the 53rd Session of the All India National 
Congress met at Ramgarh between }mrch 16 and 20. It adopted 
1. Times of India, ~mrch 12, 1940. 
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a momentous resolution previously pa ssed by the Congress 
Working Committee at Patna . 1 It contained three important 
points. Firstly it confirmed that; 
" ••• the Congress cannot, in- any way, directly 
or indirectly, be a party to the war which 
means continuance and perpetuation of this ex-
ploitation.112 
Secondly, it demanded in unequivocal terms that, 
"The Congress hereby delcares again that noth-
ing short of complete independence can be accept-
ed by the people of India. Indian freedom can-
not exist within the orbit of imperialism, and 
Dominion Status, or any other status within 
the imperial structure, is wholly inapplicable 
to India , is not in keeping with the dignity 
of a great na tion, and would bind India in 
many ways to British policies and economic struc-
ture."3 
Thirdly, that, 
"The Congress is further of opinion that while 
it will always be ready, as it ever has been, 
to make every effort to secure comnunal har-
mony, no permanent solution is possible except 
through a Constituent Assembly (elected on the 
basis of adult franchise), where the rights of 
all recognized minorities will be fully prot-
ected by agreement, as far as possible, between 
the elected representatives of various majority 
and minority groups, or by arbitration if agree-
ment is not raached on any point. 11 4 
1. ]Ull text of the 'Ramgarh Resolution' is usefully reprin-
ted in Nehru, The Unity of India, appendix B2, pp.414-15. 
2. ibid. 
3. ibid. 
4. It is to be regretted that A. B. Rajput takes the liberty of ··· 
inserting a whole paragraph beginning with "The Congress seeks ..... 
and ending with 11 in the whole nation", see Raj put.., Muslim League 
Yesterday .and t7oday:,_tjl~83~1~ Then:pata.gr~phewhic!,i~ he , q}iot~.!- :I:i!. .npt c 
to be found in the original text, of. Nehru, The Unity of India, 
pp.414-15. Dutt quotes this resolutionin part but is silent 
anout the source, see R.P.Dutt, op.ci~,p. 194. 
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It is clear then that (1) the Congress did not want Bri-
tain's war nor Dominion Status. On the contrary (2) it wanted 
complete independence and (3} a Constituent Assembly. That 
the Congress was not unrealistic towards the communal problem 
may be directly shown from Gandhi's utterances to the session 
on l~ch 20th, when he emphasized that, 
"I still believe that without Hindu-Muslim settle-
ment there can be no Swaraj •••• God makes no dis-
tinction between Hindus and 1mslims. 11 1 
As regards the methods t~ough which the Congress goals 
could be reached he suggested, "Satyagraha" (force of love 
or truth} with three pillars - of "Charkha11 (spinning-wheel), 
11 Khadi 11 (home-spun cloth) and "Ahimsa11 (non-vio l ence). Fur-
t hermor e, he ref~ected tha t, 
"Compromi s e ' i s · ihherEn1t in- Sa tyagraha ~ Com:pro-
mise ·is ·my very being. I shall go to the- Vice-
roy 50 times if necessary •••• If you b.ave a sus-
picion that I will compromise, you must know 
t hat comprorili3e v!ill not be· a t t h e cost of the 
country. I will not s ell India. wnatever I do, 
I do to increase the strength of our country. 
The bas is of my fight i s love for the opponent. 11 2 
The I~arh Resolution, then, was a ca ll to the Indian 
peo ple to gird up their loins, non-violently of course, for 
the fight of freedom and a declar a tion to the British of Ind-
i a 's inevitabl e role. 3 
1. The Hindu, March 21, 1940. 
2. ibid. 
3. This resolution was approved by a vote of 2,500 to 15 at the 
plenary session of the Congress at Ramgarh on ~~rch 20. It is 
disappointing that A.C.Ba.nerjee fails to include t his resolu-
tion as an important document in his The Making of the 
Indian Constitution, Vol. I (1939-47). 
79. 
Jinnah Proposes Division of India into Autonomous States: 
The historic Ramgarh-session of the Congress was follow-
ed by the historic Lahore-session of the Muslim League. From 
~~rch 22 to 24, the 27th Session of the l~slim League met 
at Lahore. While delivering his presidential address (I~rch 
22) J-innah declared, 
11 '£he problem of India is not of an intercommun-
al character but n~nifestly of an international 
one, and it must be treated as such ••• the only 
course open to us all is to allow the major na-
tions separate homelands by dividing India into 
'autonomous nation~l states'."l 
Finally he said that, 
" ••• Ivfussalmans ~(l'<Ioslems) are a nation according 
to any definition of a nation, and they must 
have their homeland, their territory and their 
State. 11 2 
It is undoubtedly true that Jinnah had not used the word 
'Pakistan' in his entire speech, nevertheless, no one can deny 
its objective was nothing bU.t -:Pakistan. Next day, the League 
unanimously passed the famous Lahore resolution popularly 
known as Pakistan. Let the resolution speak for itself: 
"Resolved that it is the considered view of 
this session of the All-India Muslim League that 
no constitutional scheme would be workable in 
this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it 
is designed on the following basic principle, 
viz., that geographically contiguous units are 
demarcated into regions which should be consti-
tuted with such territorial readjustments as 
1. Times of India, March 25, 1940. 
2. ibid. 
may be necessary, that the areas in which the 
Muslims are numerically in majority, as in the 
north-western and eastern zones of India, should 
be grouped to constitute independent States in 
which the constituent unit shall be autonomous 
and sovereign."l 
ao. 
The second paragraph of the resolution dealt with the pro-
vision of 'adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards' 'in 
the constitution for the minorities. It is crystal clear that 
7) othi-ns 
if for the Congress~.short of complete indeJ;:lendence was a must, 
then for the I~slim League nothing · short of Pakistan was a 
must. The Ramgarh Resolution (March 20} and the Lahore Reso-
lution (~arch 23) beg&n to shape the ultimate destiny of 
India. Both may be considered as the turning points in the 
respective histories of the Indian National Congress and of 
the Moslem League. 
Repurcussions of the Resolutions: 
About two weeks later Gandhi wrote that the Moslem League 
had created a "baffling situation11 at Lahore but it was not 
so baffling as to make Civil Disobedience an impossibility. 2 
He still maintained that without communal unity no independence 
was pos-sible and did not believe that the I'l!uslims wanted to 
vivisect In~ia. Between April 6 and 13 the Congress celebrated 
l.The text of the Lahore Resolution is reproduced in the · 
Indian Annual Register, 1940, i.312. cf. A.C.Banerjee, op.cit., 
pp.22-23 and Rajput, op.cit., pp.?9-~0. It must be noted that 
the texts in both these authors vary slightly, both assign dif-
ferent dates to the Resolution, i.e. Banerjee gives lmrch 25 
( p.22) and Rajput, Y~ch 26 (p.81 footnote no.l); the correct 
date is ¥~ch 23rd. 
2.Harijan, April 6, 1940. 
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a 'national week' in various parts of' the country. At that 
time the party-leaders emphasized the importance o:r all Con-
gressmen adopting Gandhi's programme based on non-violence, 
communal harmony, removal of untoucha.bi~ity and the need for 
1 
spinning and using homespun cloth. 
Deterioration of War Situation and Britain's New Cabinet: 
The German occupation of No"'eway, Denmark and the Nether-
lands, the Nazi blitzkrieg of Belgium and Britain, the epoch-
making collapse of ~Tance, arrogant attack of Italy, and the 
dreary downfall of ·the Chamberlain Government deepened the 
war crisis in the months of IV1ay and .June 19 .:.10. Winston Chur-
chill became Prime Ivlinister and L. S • .Am.ery succeeded Lord 
Zetland as Secretary of State for India. 2 It will be recalled 
that L'b:_'was sWt~ston Churchill \vho had opposed the inclusion 
of a promise of Dominion Status in the Act of 1935. His atti-
tude to the Indian problem was not that of a liberal but 
rather that of a die-hard. 
Expressing sympathy with Britain, Prasad widhed that 
England and France win the war. 3 Realizing the seriousness 
1. The Hindu, April 14, 1940. 
2. May 1940~ The War Cabinet included: Prime l~nister: Churc-
hill (M.P.); Lord President of the Council: Neville Chamber-
lain (M.P.); Lord Privy Seal: C.R.Attlee; Secretary .of State . 
for Foreign Affairs: (Viscount) Halifax; Minister without 
portfolio: Arthur GreenWood ( . Ivi.P.); Minister of Aircraft 
production: Lord Beaverbrook; For India: Secretary of State 
Rt. Ron. Leopold Charles I~urice Stennett Amery (M.P.); Under-
Secretary of State: Duke of Devonshire. 
3. Hindustan Times, ¥1ay 12, 1940. 
of the situation Gandhi wrote, 
''• •• I repeat that I shall do nothing wilful to 
embarrass Britain. It will be contrary to my 
conception of Satyagraha. Beyond this it is not 
in the power of Congress to go. Indeed it is the 
duty of Congress to prosecute its demand for 
independence and to continue the preparations _ 
for civil disobedience to the fullest extent 
it can. Britain is fully damaging her own cause 
by :persistently refusing to examine the Con-
gress position and recognize its justice and in 
raising issues."l 
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.Furthermore, he said, ''we do not seek our independence out 
of Britain's ruin."2 
The Viceroy gave recognition to the critical war situ-
ation through his broadcasts on 1~y 26th and June 19th, and 
assured the Indian people of "strength, courage and confid-
ence11 in His Majesty's Gpvernment.3 
The Working Committee of the Hoslem League in its Bombay 
Resolution (June 15-16) assured the British Government of its 
support in the war efforts and authorized Jinnah to work out 
defense arrangements with the Viceroy. 4 
The Congress Working Committee passed a resolution at 
-wardha on June 21. It demanded that Congressmen should abstain 
from co-operation with the Government-sponsored War-Committees 
., 
and Civic-guards. Instead they should organize for ee~f-de-
fence, though difference of opinion existed between Gandhi 
1. Harijan, May 25, 1940. 
2. ibid., June 1,1940. 
3. Linlithgow, op.ci~.,p.425. 
4. Times of India, June 16, 1940. 
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and the Congress working Committee on the question of non-
violence and defense. So Gandhi was absolved from responsi-
bility for the progr~ne and activities which the Congress 
had to pursue. He ceased being a card-carrying mamber of the 
Congress though his spirit never left the Congress. 
Two days later when the Council of National Liberal 
Federation of India met at Poena it appealed to the party 
leaders to sink their difference and for National Governments 
both at the Center and in the Provinces. 
To end the constitutional deadlock the Viceroy had 
talks with the Indian leaders again. He met Jinnah on June 
27th, Gandhi on June 29th and V.D.Savarkar (President of the 
Hindu Mal~sabha, a reactionary Hindu political party) on 
Jttly 5th. After the interview, Gandhi wrote on July 6, that, 
"The first thing everyone has to cons.ider for 
himself is v/hether Dominion Status of the West-
minster variety can be acceptable to India. If 
it has not become a myth already, it wi11 be at 
the end of the war. Britain herself, whether 
victorious or defeated, will never be the same 
as she has eeen for these few hundred years. 11 1 
FUrthermore, to clarify India's immediate demand he wrote: 
ttit is clea:t to me that India's immediate ob-
jective must be unadulterated independence. 
This is no time tor mincing words or hiding 
thoughts. I cannot think of anyone wanting 
less than independence for his country if he 
can get it. No country has ever got it with-
out its people having fought for it."2 
1. Harijan, July 6, 1940. 
2. ibid. 
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N~1 Approach of the Congress: 
The Congress Working Committee had met at Delhi from 
July 3rd to 7th. It passed an important resolution (july 7). 
It maintained specifically that, 
11 The Working Committee are more than ever con-
vinced that the acknowledgment by Great Britain 
of the complete ind~pendence of India is the 
only solution of the problems facing both India 
and Britain and are, therefore, of opinion that 
such an unequivocal declaration should be im-
mediately made and that as an immediate step 
in giving effect to it, a provisional National 
Government should be constituted at the Centre, 
Which;., tho.ugh formed as a transitory measure, 
should be such as to command the confidence 
of all the elected elements in the Central 
Legislature and secure the closest co-operation 
of the responsible Governments in the provinces.nl 
]'Urthermore, the Working Comm.i ttee made "it clear that if 
India's complete independence was recognized and a provision-
al National Government formed, "it will enable the Congress 
to throw in its full weight in the efforts for the effective 
organization of the country. 11 2 
It must be observed here that the Delhi resolution marks 
a definite departure from previous resolutions of the Congress. 
The Ramgarh resolution (lllarch 20) had declared that 11 Congress-
men, and those under the Congress influence cannot help in 
the prosecution of the war with men, money and material. 113 
1. 'I'im.es o1· India , July 7, 1940. (Italics mine). 
2. ibid. 
3. :Hehru, The Unity of India, loc.cit., 
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But the Congress was now prepared to support Brita in's war 
efforts b oth morally and materially {on the national level) 
and she was also eager to participate in the govermnent if 
her demands were met. 
'I'o clarify the Congress' position 1'1a.ulana Azad (Con-
gress-President) requ'ested J"innah, by telegram, that, 
"(The) Congress- Delhi resolution definitely 
means by National Government a composite cabi-
net not limited to any single party. But is it 
the position of the League that she cannot agree 
to any provisiona l · arrangement not ba sed on the 
nations' scheme? 11 1 
Jinnah replied by telegram thus, 
"I refuse to discuss with you by correspondence 
or otherwise as you have completely forfeited 
the confidence of I•Iuslim India . Can't you real-
i ze you are m~'.c'l. e a Hu slim show-boy Congress Pre-
sident to give it the colour that it is .nation-
al and deceive for eign eountries?"2 
In this way the conflict bet\veen the Hoslem League and the 
Congress was brought to a head. 
While criticizing the Delhi resolution, on July 9th, 
Jinnah expressed the opinion that the demand of the Congress 
for a proposed National Government spelt 11 Congresa•.Raj 11 • It 
meant a permanent Hindu majority Government in the Central 
Government. That was wholly unacceptable to the 11Uslims. There-
fore, Jinnah reiterated his demand and mainta ined that the 
l.The Hindu, July 8, 1940. 
2. A.A.Ravoof, Meet }tt. Jinnah, Lahore: Muhammed Ashraf, 
1944, pp. 124-25; also Times of India, July 8, 1940. 
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~ruslim League firmly stood convinced that the only solution 
v1as a division of India as laid down by the I"iuslim League at 
Lahore. 1 
In order to ratify the Wardha (~une 21) and Delhi (July 7) 
Resolutions the All India Congress Committee met at Poena 
(~uly 25-28). The \vardha resolution was ratified, on J"uly 27, 
by 91 to 63 votes. It was made clear that circumstantially 
Congress considered it inadvisable to apply the princip~e of 
non-violence to the national defence of free India. It was 
Nehru's contention that no state could exist without a n army. 
Next day, Rajagopalachari, the architect of the new policy 
of the Congress, delievered a speech after which the Committee 
voted on the Delhi resolution. B,y 95 to 47 votes the resolution 
was confirmed. It enabled the Congress to pledge co-operation 
in the war-effort; in return it expected from the British Gov-
ernment a provisional National Government. Though Gandhi be-
lieved that this resolution was an undoubted departure "in 
spirit" from the previous policy of the Congress yet he wrote 
"I advise as a disinterested but staunch friend that the 
British Government should not reject the hand of friendship 
offered by Congress. 112 It will be recalled that it 1.'/aa after 
this resolution that Gandhi had withdrawn his membership from 
the Congress. 
1. The Hindu, July 8, 1940. 
2. ibid. 
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11 The August Offer" (August 8, 1940). 
The British Government, probably realizing the change 
in the Congress attitude towards the war and due to the speci-
fie political demands of the Huslim League, authorized the 
Viceroy to make a further statement of the British intentions 
in India. Simultaneously, on August 8, the British policy-
statement was announced in England a nd India. Lord Linlitbgow 
announced it in India and Amery (Secretary of State for India) 
in the House of Commons. 1 
Its important features may be summarized thus, (1) to 
invite a certain number of representative Indians to join the · 
Viceroy's Executive Council. (2) To establish a War Advisory 
council containing representatives of the Indian States and 
of other Indian interests. (3) To continue to give full weight 
to the views of the minorities. {4) To set up, 
" ••• after the conclusion of the war with the 
least possible delay of a body representative 
of the principle elements in India's national 
life in order to devise the frameworkof the 
new constitution and they will lend every aid 
in their power to hasten decisions on all re-
levant matters to the utmost degree. 11 2 
(5) To help the representative Indians to "reach a basis of 
1. For the full text of this statement see Linlithgow, op.cit., 
pp. 250-52; see also the parliamentary debate and Amery's 
statement in 364 H.C.Deb., 5s., 402-405, under the section 
"India (constitution)". 
2. Linlitbgow, op.cit., p. 251; also see 364 H.C.Deb., 
404-405. 
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friendly agreement" as regards the formati on of 11 the post-war 
representati -ve body" and "the principles and outlines of the 
Constitution itself."1 From this summary it need n ot he 
hastily inferred that the British Government had radically 
changed their policy towards India, for the statement ended 
\v i th these words, 
" ••• t he at ta1nment by India of that free and 
equal partnership in the British Comraonwealth 
which remains the proclaimed and accepted goal 
of the Imperial Crown and of the British Parlia-
ment.112 
Su!'fice it to say that so far as the general .British policy 
towards India.ns was concerned Linli tbgow reiterated on .August 
8, 1940 what Lord Irwin had pro9laimed on October 31, 1929. 3 
"The .August Offer" and the Indian 11 Climate of O;pinion11 : 
A discussion of how this statement was received by the 
significant Indian ;political ;parties is in order. Sir T.B. 
Sapru a leader of the Non-Party Conference was of the opinion 
that, 
11 It is clear that the basis of settlement is 
going to be Dominion Status and not indepen-
dence. If by independence is meant a complete 
severence of the political and constitutional 
ties that have hitherto united India and ~ng­
land, then I have at no time thought tha t it 
1. ibid. 
2. ibid., ;p.252 and column 405. 
3. For Lord Irwin's statement see 292 H.C.Deb., 5s., 1172-
74 and India in 1929-30, Calcutta: GoveDnment of India,l93l,;p.2. 
could form the basis of a settlement between 
the two countries. 11 1 
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Sir Si.kand.er H. Khan (Prime 1· inister of the Punjab and a 
leader of the Unionist Party) declared that the Viceroy's 
statement constituted " ••• a substantial concession to Indian 
opinion" and would serve as a basis for Dominion Status.2 
The Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha met a t Nag-
pur on August 11, under the chairmanship of Savarkar. It 
took a favourable attitude towards the Viceroy's statement. 
It co-operated in submitting a panel of names for the Vice-
roy's proposed Council. 3 
The Muslim League President Jinnah had interviews with 
the Viceroy(August 12 and 14) in connection with the probable 
strength of the expanded council and the 11 composition of the 
War Advisory Council." The Working Committee of the Muslim 
League which :met at Bombay-; passed a resolution on September 
2. It expressed satisfaction that, 
"His :t'Iajesty's Government has, on the whole, 
practically met the demand of the League for 
a clear assurance to the effect that the fu-
ture constitution, interim or final should not 
be adopted by the British Government without 
its approval." 4 
l. The Hindu, August 8, 1940. 
2. ibid. 
3. ~Statesman, August 11, 1940. 
4. The Hindu, September 3, 1940. 
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A second resolution was also passed reaffirming t h e Lahore 
resolution (I~rch 23,1940) proposing the partition of India 
and stating that, 11 ••• t he Muslim of India are a nation by them-
selves a nd will exercise their right to self-determina ti on."! 
The Committee authorized Jinnah to seek clarifica ti on 
from t h e Viceroy regar ding the proposed constitution, the 
composition and functi ons of the proposed War-Council and also 
the expansion of the Viceroy's Executive Council. 
Another resolution granted complete individual freedom 
to a ll the 1-luslim League members to join Government sponsored 
war- Committees and other~ war efforts. Xt must be stated that 
this was a change in the Muslim League policy because formerly 
Jinnah had imposed a ban on its members. 
The Hou s e of Commons Deabte t he Vicerol's Sta tement: 
wnile the Indian people were discussing the Viceroy's 
statement of Augu~t s, · the House of Commons also had a debate 
on it, on August 14th. 2 It began at 8:05 p.m. and ended at 
11:25 p.m. The Secretary of Stat e Mr • .Amery spoke for thirty-
five minutes (8:05p.m. to 8:40p.m.) explaining the political 
background and the demands . ., of various political parties in 
India. As regards the Congress demand he said, 
1. The Statesman, September 3, 1940. 
2. In order to understand t he "climate of opinion" in England 
one must study this debate carefully. The whole debate covers 
columns 870-924 in 364 H.C.Deb., 5s., under section "India 
(Constitution)." 
11 There can be no agreement on a Government res-
ponsible to the Legislature until there is agree-
ment on the nature of 1~he Legislature and upon 
the whole structure of the Constitution."! 
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He reiterated the probler!l of minorities. Speaking about 
Dominion Status he assured the House that 11 There is no higher 
status in the world than that. That is the status which we 
have delcared to be the goal of our policy in India. 11 2 Need-
less to say that that was th1~ official British-policy of the 
Conservatives towards India. 
At this point it is int19resting to read what :tr.J.r. Sorensen, 
(the Labour Party member of :Parlaiment from Leyton 'West) said: 
"I tis an entire misnom,er -to say to the Indians 
that they shall be perfectly free provided they 
choose Dominion Status. That is a qualification 
of the very idea of freedom which is more than 
a paradox and which makes it nonsense. Why should 
we hesitate to say that the same sense of in-
dependence which we enjoy is the independence 
which we desire for India herself? 11 3 
As to the British Government's position as regards the 
Indian minorities he argued: 
"We appreciate the rights of minorities, and I 
entirely agree that a democracy which ignores 
the rights on minorities cannot live. We ap-
preciate that fact and always have done, though 
there have been on occasions some back-slidings. 
Do we say to ourselves that, because there ia 
a minority in t his country who might possibly 
wish s till to retain the reudalistic idea or 
Government and organi za,tion, Parliament must 
1. ibid., column 875. 
2. ibid., column e76. 
3. IP!Q., column 903. 
never meet and Governments must never be formed, 
and we must submit to some foreign Power to dic-
tate what we shall do? vfuatev er minorities they 
may be which still believe in~ somefeudalistic 
or Fascist rule, we sa.y to them, "You are mino-
rities. Your legal rights shall be appreciate~ 
but the majority party must govern." I s.uggest 
that we should apply that to India. 11 1 
Finally he said, 
"Therefor~, I hope yet. that it may be possible 
for the Viceregal Executive Council to be that 
responsible democratic: Government, that real 
Cabinet, responsible in turn to the people, who 
shall have thepower to compose the differences 
that ·exist. Let that Cabinet and that Govern-
ment be free to negotiate on a basis of equa.-
li ty with our own .British Government respecting 
immediate needs and future development."2 
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In saying this ~Ir. Sorer1sen was expressing the views of 
the Labour-party of Great .Britain as a whole, with regard to 
India's political status. Urldoubtedly, the views of the Lab-
our-party on India were in direct conflict with those held 
by the Conservative-party of Great Britain, Tl:ms the Labour 
Party solicited independencE~ for India and · helped India to 
achieve it. 
The British-policy and Indi~~n Political Parties: 
The Congress 'Ylorking C()mmi ttee met at Wa.rdha from .August 
18th to 23rd. Incidentally, the day the Congress working Co~ 
mittee met Gandhi published his thirteen point programme for 
1. ibid., column 903-904. 
2. ibid., column 904. 
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the attainment of Swaraj 1 (st3lf-goverJ]JJlent). The Committee 
passed a resolution (August :a2) expressing regret that the 
British Government had 
. 
11 
••• rejected the friendly offer and :practi-
cal suggestion (of the Congress) contained 
in the Poena Resolution of 3uly 28, framed 
for a solution of the- deadlock and to en-
able the Indian National Congress to with-
draw its non-co-operation and secure in the 
recent crisis the patriotic co-operation 
of all people of India in the governance of 
India in the organization of national def-
ence."2 
It charged the British Government of making minority-issue 
"an insuperable barrier to India's progress. 11 3 Finally it 
emphasized that, 
11 The British proposals. were, therefore, not 
only oppo·aed to the principles of democracy 
but also ·to the best interests of India, and 
the committee called upon the people to con-
demn the British attitude in public meetings, 
in the Provincial Legislatures and elsewhere. 11 4 
The Congress, the largeEit political party in India, reject-
ed the Viceroy's statement because it was in direct conflict 
1. Harbj_an, August 18, 1940 .. 
The thirteen points were: 
l.Hindu-B.lslim Unity 
2. Removal of untouchability 
3. Prohibition 
4. Khadi 
-5. The promotion of Vi l lage 
6. Village sanitation 
7. New or basic education 
B. Adult education 
9. women's welfare 
10. Education in Hygiene and 
Health 
industries ll.Propagation of Rastra-
bhasha 
12. Cultivating love of one's 
own language 
13. '\.Vorking for economic equality. 
2. '£he HinduL August 23, 194,0. 
3. ibid • . 
4. The Statesman, August 23, 1940. 
'\ 
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with the Congress goal of independence and National Govern-
1 
ment for India. 
:VJX . I'I. S • .Amey~ · representing the All India Hindu League 
asked for an assurance, on Allgust 20, from the Viceroy's 
Council that t h e minorities would not be a llowed to create 
constitutional deadlocks. 
In answer to Jr.iX. Amery's (Secreta ry of State t·or India) 
. difficulty regarding the Indian minorities, Rajagopalachari 
(Congressman) suggested, on August 24, a 11 sporting offer 11 that 
11 If His IV.w.j esty's GovE!rnment will agree to the 
provincial national government being formed at 
once I undertake to persuade my colleagues in 
the Congress to agree to the I.:t.uslim League be-
ing invited to nominate the Prime Minister and 
let him form the national government as he would 
consider best. 11 2 
Two days . later the Couneil of the National Liberal Federa-
tion at Allahabad met under the Chairmanship of Dr.. R.P. Pra.njpye. 
The resolution \vhich it pas :3ed contained the following demands. 
(1) Dominion Status irrespective of the refusal of the mino-
rities. (2) Defence portfolio in the hands of an Indian re-
presentative. (3) Defence forces of India be organized on a 
purely national basis. (4) The new members of the Viceroy's 
Council be selected from the representatives. (5) India must 
achieve her independence. 
1 • .Amery conceded in the House of Commons debate that, "It is 
true that they (the Congress) are numerically much the largest 
single· party in British Ind.ia." see 364 H. C. Deb., 5s., 872. 
2. Daily Herald, August 23 , 1940. 
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The Bombay Resolution: (September 16, 1940). 
Meanwhile the Congress Working Committee mat at Bombay 
(September 13-16). It withdrew, the Poona Resolution (July 
28, 1940) and invited Gandhi to resume the leadership of the 
Congress Party. The resolution was moved by :Nehru a nd second-
ed oy Patel and ~ t was adopted. It wa s then suomi tted, on 
September 15, to tne All Ind.ia Congress Committee. The main 
part of the resolution was that, 
"The Congress is pledged under Gandhiji's lead-
ership to non-violence: for the vindication of 
India's freedom ••• The Delhi resolution (July 7, · 
1940( confirmed by the A.I.c.c. at Poena no 
longer applies. It ~s lapsed. 11 1 
The .All India Congress Committee endorsed this resolution by 
a majority of 183 to 7 votes; on September. Speaking about 
this resolution Gandhi commented: 
"The resolution declares that the Congress can-
not co-operate \Y'i th the (British) Government in 
the war ·effort therefore we do not believe in 
violence. I wish to mc~e it clear that we do 
not w1ah ill to Britain. We do not want her to 
be defeated. But in the present struggle she 
cannot expect any help from the Congress. 11 2 
Gandhi requested, for the time being at least, the sus-
pension of mass civil disobHdience, as he was to be inter-
viewed by the Viceroy. As such, civil disobedience was called 
off by the Congress working Committee's resolution ofSeptam-
ber 18. 
1. The Hindu, September 16, 1940. 
2. ibid., S~ptember 17, 1940. 
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The Viceroy's Interviews With Some of the Indian Leaders: 
The Viceroy inter viewed Dr. B.S.Moonje, Vice-President 
of the Hindu-¥~sabha and discussed the statement of August 
8th. After that, through a resolution (September 22,23) the 
Working Committee of the Hindu-~~hasabha expressed its willing-
ness to co-operate in .the war effort if the Government (1) clear-
ly denied any partition of India. (2) allotted to the Hindu-
Mahasabha six seats .an the Viceroy's Council and fifteen. ·on 
the war Advisory Council. (3) denied ~mslim League's demand 
of 50% representation at the Center. (4) grant Dominion Status 
of the 'westminster Variety' a year after the end of the war. 
Jinnah was interviewed by the Viceroy on Septem·ber 24th. 
They discus s ed the formation of. .. the two proposed councils. 
Next day t .' le Viceroy wrote Jinnah a formal letter in v1hich he 
categorically state that " ••• I am bound to confess with ~egret 
that I have in fact after the most careful thought found it 
(Jinnah's suggestion of 50% representation in the two proposed 
Councils] impracticable. 111 
Three days later, Jinnah, in a speech before the w·ork-
ing Committee of the ~~slim League at New De1hi, stated that 
the Muslims were prepared to give every help in men, and 
money to the British Government. The Viceroy was willing to 
grant five seats in the War Advisory Council and two in the 
1. For His Excellency's letter to Jinnah dated September 25, 
1940 and Jinnah's reply see Linlithgow,op.cit., p.410. 
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Executive Council to the Muslims. But .Tinr1ah wanted an equal 
number of seats in the Executive Council. The working Committee 
rejected the Viceroy's offer unanimously because {1) the Vice-
roy's Council was to have only two Muslim members (2) the 
Government failed to appoint non-official advisers in the Gov-
ernor's Provinces. (3) no specific infornultion was available 
as to the Constitution and the functions of the war Advisory 
1 
Council. 
The Viceroy interviewed Gandhi on s~eptember 27th and 
30th and discussed the paeifistic attitude of the Congress as 
contained in the resolution endorsed by the JU.l India Congress 
Committee (September 16). As regards the fre edom of speech 
during the ~ar the Viceroy explained to Gandhi that by the law 
of the United Kingdom, 
11 
••• vrhile the conscientious objector is not ab-
solved from the duty of fighting arJ.d is allowed 
ever to profe~s his faith in public, he is n ot 
permitted to carry his opposition to the length 
of endeavouring to persuade others whether sol-
diers or munition workers, to abandton thei:r al-
legiance or to continue their efforts."2 
Furthermore, he stated that if the CCingressmen and non-
Congressmen were allowed, as Gandhi had requested to deliver 
speeches against the war that, 
" ••• would certainly amount not on:Ly to the 
1. The Statesman, September 28, 1940. 
2. After the interviews the Viceroy wrot19 a letter to Gandhi 
dated September 30, 1940; for the fli.ll t19xt of this letter 
refer to Linlithgow, op.cit., pp.413-413. 
inhibition of India's war effort, but : to that 
embarrassment of Great Britain in the prosecu-
tion of the war which the Congress f;tate that 
they are anxious to av·oid ••• "1 
To this Gandhi replied that, 
11 
••• the Congress does still want to refrain 
from embarrassing the British Goverrlment in 
t heir war-effort. Btit it is impossi ble for the 
Congress to make of the policy a fetish by 
denying its creed at this critical ;period in 
the history of mankind. If the Cong:ress has 
to die, it should do so in the act of pro-
claiming its faith. It is unfortunate that 
we have not been able to arrive at •a.n agree- 2 
ment on the single issue of freedom of speech." 
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It should be noted that t h ough the ways of Linli thgow and 
Gandhi seemed to diverge, they hoped that their ~ersonal 
friendship would "bear the strain of divergence. 113 
Aftermath of the Interviews: 
To hear what had been the results of Gandhi's talks with 
the Viceroy the Working Committee met at Wardha (October 11-
13). It heard Gandhi's repor-t on October 13, and promised him 
its full co-oper a tion in a~. future line of action that he 
might suggest. Speaking of the "Direct Ac:ti on" (of Civil Dis-
obedience) Gandhi expla ined to the Cozmnittee on October 1, 
that Vinoba Bhave alone would commence it immedi a tely. 
1. ibid. 
2. Gandhi's reply to the Viceroy is conveniently reprinted in 
Linli tbgow, op. cit., pp . 414-15. The quotation vlill be found 
on p. 415. 
3. ibid~, P• 415. 
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Congress Launched Individual Civil Disobedience Campaign, 
As planned, on October 17, Vinoba Bhave began the Civil 
Disobedience Campaign at Panour. He was one of Ga ndhi's old-
est pupils, a s pecia list in home-spinning and in educa tion 
and a thorough pacifist. He gave three reasons for doing so. 
1'hey were (1) The British Government's rejection of Congress 
demand for a National Government (2) The Viceroy's denil.&.l c5f 
freedom of speech against war-efforts (3) The British Govern-
ment's refusal to admit that India was declared a belligerent 
1 
country without the consent of the Indian people. 
The Government of India (i.e. the Viceroy and his 
Executive Council) by its Order of Octobelr 26th, forbade .s.ll 
anti-war propaganda . Therefore, Gandhi announced tha t tha t 
Order forbade h i m also to v1ri te freely, and suspend his 
... , 
Harij an and other weeklies indefinitely. e.. While on October 
31, Nehru, returning from Allahabad, was arrested and sen-
tenced (on November 3) to four years of imprisonment on 
3 three counts. Before the month of Novem1)er was over many 
important Congress-members all over India were jailed under 
the Defence of India Rules. 
1. The Hindu, October 18, 1940. 
2. Gandhi's Harijan was suspended on Nov,~mber 10,1940. 
3. These three counts were, 1) anti-war ::~peeches, 2) dis-
couragment of war contributions, 3) preparing the way for 
mass movement. For each count he was aen·tenced to one year 
and 1·our months i mprisonment. 
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Muslim League 1 s Stern Stand: 
:November ls t wa s what the l''U.lslim Les.gue had decided 
to call the " Iv.ioslem Day". So Jinnah made a ste1 tement decla-
ring that, 
"The Viceroy's offer was only in nazne purport-
ing to give a real share of authority in the 
Government. We think that the BritiBh Govern-
ment does not care for our support or co-oper~ 
tion on an honourable basis with a real share 
in the authority of the Government, nor are 
the ) oslems in India satisfied with regard to 
the policy pursued by Great Britain in Pales-
tine."! 
It must be noted here that "J"innah took this attitude 
because the Viceroy had rejected his equal-representation -
at- the-Center theory. 
Ten days later the Sub-Committee of the iiuslim League 
met at Delhi under the Chairmanship of Si:r Abdulla Haroon and 
proposed the Pakistan-scheme. 2 
1. Times of India, November 1, 1940. 
2. l!;tymologically explained, the term 'Pa1<:istan' is derived from 
the Persian word 'pak' which means 'the Pure or Sacred' and 'stan' 
which means 'land or country'Le."Land of the Pure." It has been 
suggested that . the word "Pakistan" was first uded in 1930 by 
the Moslem ~oet Muhammad Iqbal (see Indian Annual Register ,ii, 
1930, p.338). It was used by Chowdhary Rahmat Ali, a Cambridge 
(England) graduate as a propaganda term in 1933. (see his 
The Millat and the lll ssion, Cambridge: 1933,p. 3 ff.) The term 
PAKISTAN is formed in this way: P for Punjab; A for A£ghanistan, 
part of :N.W.F.P., K for Kashmir; S for Sind and "Tan" for .Balu-
chistan. It must be noted that unfortunately the Eastern part, 
namely Bengal,.wa·s left out in such a term-formation, though in 
actuality, it is a part of Pakistan. "These territories -vrere 
christened Pakistan by C.Rarunat Ali, founder of the Pakis.ta.n 
National Iviovement, 1933, 1.-/i th a vie\v to their preserving their 
historical, national and cultural entity, - as distinct from Hindu-
stan (land of Hindus) proper." see F.KEetJrkow, Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, Leiden, 1937, Supp. no.4. p. 174. 
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Briefly stated it included (1) a seJ)arate homeland .for 
the entire J.viuslim community without any transfer of popula-
tion. (2) Land comprising the Punjab, the N. W. F.P., Kashmir, 
Sind, Benga l, Assam, HYde~ab~d (Deccan), J~luchistan and a 
few districts in Nadras. ( 3) Each .of these~ areas to cons ti tu te 
separate units.,, owing allegiance to one common regional save-
reign state. (4) Each sovereign state may enter into treaties 
with similar Hindu sovereign states in matters of common inte-
rests. If necessary, these states, on a VCJluntary basis, could 
be united in some form of federation but each one of them to 
be directly responsible to the British Go-v·ernment. 1 It may 
be mentioned that this was the first concrete proposa l look-
ing towards the formation of Pakistan. 
The Constitutional Deadlock and the Views of the Indian 
Political lea ders, parties and the Viceroy. 
Rajagopalachari former premier of JYiadras and Bhulabhai 
Desa i the Congress-leader in the Central Assembly said, on 
November 20, that the Congress was willing to settle with 
the I¥1oslem League the question of the membership of the lia-
tional Government if the .British Government agreed. On the 
same day BhulabJ:1..ai Desai as the opposition leader opposed the 
Finance Bill, on the grounds that it suppo,rted the war about 
which India wa s not consulted. So the Central Assembly rejected 
1. The Statesman, November 12, 1940. 
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it and the Viceroy was forced to use his reserve power of 
certification to certify it. 
The Hindu Mahasabha which had responded with co-operation 
in the war efforts urged upon the Government that the Defence 
of India Act did more harm than g ood. It demanded that the 
.British Government g ive India Dominion Status immediately if 
she desired full co-opera ti on from the Indi an people. It 
passed a resolution on 1'-rovember 22, disaasociating itself 
from the Congress Party's Civil Disobedience Campaign. 
Gandhi announced, on December 2, tl~t when all the 
Congress 1-Iembers of Legislative· Assemblic:Js and of the Congress 
forking Committee had finished offering Satyagraha, he \vould 
permit others to follow their suit. To h:im the ultimate llssue 
was of "free speech" and "free pen" and an il independent India". 
He favoured Civil Disobedience only on an individual basis 
and not on a mass scale. He suspended Civil Disobedience bet-
ween December 20 and January 5, 1941 because of Chridtmas and 
the New Year. 
In his speech before the Associate·d Cahmber of Commerce 
in Calcutta on December 16, Linlitbgow said: 
"Our objective remains to lead Ind.ia to the pro-
claimed goal of Dominion Status, and that as early 
as may be. There is nothing more that we can do 
than we have done. vie are entitled to claim, lve 
do claim, and I claim to-day, that it is for the 
Indian parties, for those conn:nunities, interesrs 
and political leaders concerned to get together 
and to see what they can 'do by way of reaching 
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an accomodation with one another ••• "1 
Needles s to say he again stres s ed Indi.an unity before 
granting Dominion Status while the Government of India was 
busy rounding off the innumerable Satyagrahis during the month 
of December. 
At this time, the Premier of Bengal,, A. K.Fuzlul Huq, 
was of the opinion that since the country was slowly drifting 
to a state of chaos the Muslim League and the Congress should 
get together and make a united demand. Suoh a demand made by 
400 million Indian would make the British Government concede 
to an interim settlement which, he felt would lead to a per-
manent settlement. Sir s. Hyat Khan, Premier of the pUnjab, 
who had fully suppo~ted the Congress schame of a National 
Government said, on December 10, that no one from the Punjab 
should dream of an exclusive Iv.Ioslem , Sikh or Hindu raj. 
·- Three days later, Sir T. B. Sapru, representing the l~ation-
al Liberal Federation, urged that Gandhi and J·innah should meet 
i 1nmediately and settle their differences and form a National 
Government. 
Between December 22 and 25 the Radical Democratic Party 
inaugurated its conference at Delhi and resolved to unite all 
anti-Congress elements. 
The President of the Hindu Mahasa blm speaking on Decem-
1. Linlithgow, ..2J2•Cit., p.283. His full Hpe ech covers p:p.273-
284. 
ber 28, at the .Annual Conference at lVIadura, declared that 
(1) the Hindus must participate fully in the war-effort, (2) 
the Congress Civil Disobedience was a lesB effective way to 
achieve substantial political gain_, (3) the Government had 
at last recognized the fact that the Cong:r-ess was not a re-
presenta thre Hindu body. 
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Next day, the Conference adopted a resolution that be-
fore March 31, 1941 the British Government must declare its 
intention of granting Dominion Status of the "Westminster 
Variety" within a year of the end :of the war and must announce 
its rejection of the Pakistan scheme. Thus the Hindu I~a­
sabha disagreed with both the Congress and the huslim League 
with regard to its political aspirations. 
At the same time, the National Libe!ral Federation held 
its Annua l Conference at Calcutta (December 28-30) under the 
Chairmanship of V. N.Chandavakar and resolved to (1) protest 
against the Viceroy's declaration of August 8 as 11 virtually 
giving minorities a veto on constitutional :progress," (2) urge 
the British Government to promvse India xull Dominion Status 
within two years of the termina-t ion of the war1 (3) to recon-
struct, meanwhile, the Central Govermnent on a national basis 
with Defence and Finance :portfolios iu non-official Indian 
hands, (4) deplore the Congress Civil Disobedience~ (5) oppose 
the :partition of Indi a into Hindustan and Pakistan, {6) re-
affirm its wholehearted support of the war if the British Govern-
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1 
ment change its policy, towards India. I~ far,this was one 
of the most. comprehensive and moderate res.olutions that was 
paased a s the year 1940 came to a close. 
The year 1941 began with .Jinnah's appeal to the Hindus 
for Pakistan. Speaking on behalf of his 11\:tslim League he de-
cla red, at Bombay on .January 10, that if India was divided the 
Hindus and the Noslems would respect one another as friendly 
neighbors and say to the world uHands o11· India". He str-essed 
again, that if the Congress-demands for National Government 
were granted it would mean Hindu Raj and :if the· British type 
of democracy was accepted in India it would result in domi-
2 
nation of one party over the other. For him nothing short 
of Pakistan was the only ultimate solution for India's con-
stitutional problem. 
Next day Gandhi announced the suspension of the Civil 
Disobedience Campaign on J-anuary 26, 11 Ind.ependence JJay". 
He suggested 5 points for the "Independer1ce pledge 11 as follows: 
1. Determination to continue to struggle for PUrna &waraja 
through non-violent action. 2. A reaffirn~tion of the opposi-
tion to lfu.:i:tish Imperialism but love townrds all ]J;nglishmen. 
3. A declaration of abolition of caste-differences and un-
touchabili ty. 4. Attaiv.ment of communal harmony. 5. Extensive 
1. The Statesman, .January 11, 1941. 
2 . Times of India, .January 11, 1941. 
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use of the Charkha (spinning wheel) and IDJadi (home-~pun 
cloth) • 1 
On Independence Day, Subhas Bose, a .. leader of the Con-
gress Left Group, who had been 'on parole', after his hunger 
strike on December 6,1940 disappeared mysteriously from his 
house. He was the leader of the "Forward Bloc" a revolution-
ary group which had pledged India's in ependence, if nedes-
sary through violence. He went to Germany and met Herr Hit-
ler. From there, he went to Japan and raised a National 
.A:rmy (Azad Foj), through Japan's co-operation, to liberate 
India from British-subjection. He was called Netaji, i.e. 
11 leader", just as l"Iussolini was called Dutce and Hitler 
FUhrer. Unluckily he died in a plane cra:ah on J?ormosa. 
It must be pointed out that his methods were directly 
opposite to those employed by the CongreBs. Yet his extreme-
ly revolutionary appeal burnt with fiery zeal in the hearts 
of hundreds of extremely patriotic young men in India. on 
one occasion he said, 11 Friends: It is blood alone that can 
avenge the blood that the enemy has spilt.n2 It must be ad-
mitted that like Hitler and Jviussolini, Subhas Bose failed in 
materializing his dream of liberating India. 
1. The Hindu, January 12, 1941. 
2. Ganpat Rai, Famous Speeches an~ Letters of Subhas Bose, 
Lion Press, 1946. Bose$"~ Presidential Address Title was, 
11 Give me Blood! (I) Promise you freedom. 11 pp.ll9-23. The 
quotation will be found on page 123. 
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Publication of Details of Pro12osed Pakistan-Scheme: 
The Foreign Committee of the Iv.Loslem :League published, 
on February 18, details of the proposed Pakistan-scheme for 
submission to the League's Working Committee. It may be out-
lined as 1) Muslim India to be comprised of 3 zones. a) 
North-West Zone to include Sind, Baluchistan, the N. W.F.P. 
the Punjab with Delhi have a population of 32 millions of 
whom 20 millions i.e. 63% would be Moslems. b) North-East 
Zone to include Assam and Bengal (excludir~ the Bankura and 
Iviidnapur districts but taking in Purnea from Bihar, \-Jould 
have had a population of 57 millions with 31 million Mus-
lims (i.e. 54%). c) Hyderabad State, the V~real thiest of 
Indian states, be allovTed to become an inclependent I•oselm 
state. d) certain Native States should feclerate with one ot: 
1 
the zones. 
To back it up, the Ivioslem League Council met on Feb-
ruary 23-24 at New Delhi. It passed resolutions to the effect 
that (1) Congress Civil Disobedience wa s directed against 
the Moslems and non-caste Hindus. (2) Pakistan-scheme be adopt-
ed and .Amery's "Ind.i a First 11 slogan and a constitution based 
on the "economic and political unity of India11 be opposed. 
(3) 11arch 23 be observed as Pakistan Day. ~he Council elect-
ed Jinnah as the President. Sir Sikander Hyat Khan and 
1. For details see The Statesman, February 19, 1941. 
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Fuz1ul Huq, who were in favour of Hindu-I•lualim reconcilia-
tion, remained absent from this meeting, but Hyat Khan gave 
an alternative interpretation of Pakistan on March 11. He 
suggested that seven or eight Hindu Provinces and four l• os-
lem r~ovinces should possess complete autonomy with an elas-
tic Federal Government administering custo:ms,defence and cur-
. 1 
rency eto. 
But Jinna.h held that "In India ••• there are two nations, 
and t a lk of democracy and a single unit is impossible. 11 2 
Furthermore the Muslim League Conference (April 13-16) in-
eluded in the League's Constitution the Pakistan-scheme as 
its principle goal. It a lso condemned the Congress Civil 
Disobedience Movement as planned to coerce the British Gov-
ernment to submit to their claims. 3 
On I•Iarch 11 the President of the Hindu J.Vlahasabha l"~Ir. 
Savarkar was a ssured by the Viceroy that the Pakistan-
scheme was not officially recognized by the Government and 
that it \vas the intention of the Government to preserve 
I ndia 's economic unity. The Viceroy also reassured h im that 
it v1as the intention of the British Gove-rtllllent to grant Ind-
ia, Dominion Status after the war, as soon as poesible. The 
Mahasabha showed readi.ness to co--operate in the expansion of 
the Governor General's Executive Council lf the Hindu-I•lils1im 
1. The Times of India , l1arch 12, 1941. 
2 . The Statesman, March 15, 1941. 
3. The Hindu, April 17, 1941. 
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representa ti on vra s proportionate to the Hindu-JV!..Uslim popu-
lations respectively. It insisted that a H:lndu be appointed 
to the proposed Defence-member. If that wa:~ not possible 
t hen it desired that the Defence-Council b•~ appointed on 
the proportion-principle. It is clear from this that the d~ 
mands of the Hindu l'Iahasabha and the Iv1uslim League so far as 
the principle of selection of the members to the Viceroy's 
council was concerned, \.,ere directly oppos:i te to each other. 
While Delhi was busy with the Pakistan-scheme, Bombay 
was busy with the 1'Ioderate Leader's Confer,ence from J.'.iarch 13 
to 14. It was a non-party affair. It's obj ,ect was to find a 
solution to the political deadlock. It was initiated by Sir 
Tej Bahadur Sapru and Sir Jagdish Prasad both ex-members of 
the Viceroy's Executive Council. The Congress and the Ivrus-
lim League was not represented. 1 
Sir Sapru said that the Conference m~st approach the 
Indian problem not from the point of view of any particular 
party but rather from the point of view of the country as a 
whole. He appealed to the Congress and the ~mslim League 
leaders to indulge less in theoretica l discussions but to 
1. Besides Sapru and Prasad, the following were present at 
the Conference: Savarkar and B.S.Moonje (Hindu-Mahasabha) 
M. S.Aney (leader of Congress Nationalist Party in the cen-
tral Assembly); B.Ambedkar (leader of the Scheduled Castes); 
V. N.Chandvarkar (President of National Liberal Federation); 
Sir N. N. Sircar (ex-law member of the Viceroy's Executive· 
Council); the 1•1aharaja of .Burdwan, Sir li'Iaharaj Singh (repre-
sentative of Indian Christians) and Paranjpe. 
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graple with the realities of the situation and arrive at some 
settlement. Sir N.Sircar moved the resolution. In brief its 
demands included (1) immediate need for thel reconstruction 
of the Governor General's Executive Council as the existing 
Council, consisting of 3 l!Uropeans and 3 Indiana {of whom 2 
were non-officials and 1 member of the Indian-Civil Servtoe), 
was inadequate. The whole Executive Council must include 
non-official Indiana only. (2) India's defE3nce be laid on 
firm ground. (3) The Reconstructed Council to have joint and 
collective responsibility and be responsible to the Crown 
directly during the war. ( 4) That the Couneil be treated as 
other DominionJa Governments with regard to Inter-Imperial 
and Interna. tional affairs. ( 5) The reconst:ruction of the 
Council be simultaneously follm..red by the declaration of 
the .British Government that India will be granted Dominion 
Status \vi thin a specified time after the t ~ermination of the 
1 
war. This offer showed a middle-of-the-:road approach by 
the Indians to the Indian constitutional deadlock. 
Two days later, the Bombay-Conference appointed a 
Standing Committee to implement the resolution. Meanwhile, 
Sir Sapru was interviewed by the Viceroy after which he 
stated that the Congress and the Muslim League might join tbe 
reconstructed Council if and when they desired to do so. He 
did not think it necessary to make any amendment to the 
1. The Hindu, April 6, 1941. 
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Government of India Act for the reconstruction of the said 
Council. He suggested that Mr. Amery's personal visit along 
vli th h.a~f-a-dozen Members of Parliament to India would be 
1 
desirable. wnat did ¥~. Amery say about it? 
li!Jr. Amery's Statement in the House of Commons: (April 22.,1941). 
The Secretary of State for India, Nr. Amery, said 
that, "The purpose of the Ivlotions ••• is to extend for another 
12 months the Proclamations issued under the provisions of 
Section 93 of the India Act.n2 His reason for such a mo-
tion was, 
11 There has been no change in the situation 
since then (October 1940) and we have I re-
gret to say, no alternative to a further 
extension of these emergency provis i ons. 11 3 
The high-lights of the statement were (1) The Congress 
1. Times of India, April ?, 1941 • .Among the parties and bodies 
that attended the Conference included 1) Hindu I'lahasabha,2) 
The Congrss National Party, 3) ~he Hindu j~eague, 4) the Lib-
eral Party, 5) The Sikhs, 6) The Indian Christians, ?) The 
Parsees, e) The Scheduled Castes. 
2. 3?1 H.C. Deb., 5s., 4?. J.Vlr • .Amery's statement covers co-
lumns 4?-60. His statement was followed by a debate which 
covers co lumns 60-118. Section 93 empower19d th.e Governor to 
assume, (when the government stopped functioning according 
to the Act,) by proclamation, powers resi1iing in the Pro- -
vincial Governmental agencies. In other words the Governor's 
will becp~e the law ~~ the Province. vlhen the Congress-minis-
tries had .:J resdl.gil.edt fun October 1939, the Governors of ? pro-
vinces resorted to the 93 section of the Act of 1935. These 
proclamations of the Governors' were approved by the House 
of Commons on April 18 , 1940. 
3. i bid., column 4?. 
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resigned to bring ab out a complete br eakdown of t h e ad-
ministra tive and Parliamentary life of the Provinces . (2) 
Jinnah's growing demand of Pakistan and refusal to accept 
any other constitution. (3) Viceroy's sta tement of August 8 
was a "revolutionary announcement. It was in fact a recog-
nition in advance of India 's Status as a Ilominion. 111 (4 ) 
The future Constitut'lon and the Constituent Assembly "must· 
be the outcome of agreement bet\veen the principal elements 
2 in India 's political life." (5) The Viceroy very reluc-
t antly discontinued his efforts for an expanded Council 
"mainly because of the difficulty of reconciling 1-ioslem and 
3 
Hindu cla i ms for rela tive position." (6) The Bombay re-
solution pas s ed t hrough t h e efforts of Sir Tej Bahadur Sap-
ru " ••• would create internal constitutional problems of no 
little difficulty ••• " 4 
Therefore, "My appeal to Sir Tej an<i his friends 
\vould ••• be ••• to concentrate, first and foremost, upon bring-
ing the contending elements in India together. 115 The sum 
total of these points is that unless India is united inter-
nally, the British Government is unable to promise any con-
stitutional progress. 
1. i oid., column 53. 
2. ibid. 
3. ibi d.' column 57. 
4 . ~., column 56. 
5. ibid. 
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Nr. Sorensen s peaking on behalf of the Labour Party s a id 
that , 
"As far as we have gone upto now is to say that 
at some distant date we may grant Dominion st~ 
tus. We have never stated, nor I am sure wou~d 
the Secretary of State for India state to-day, 
that he agrees with the suggestion t.hat we 
should at some distant date concede the right 
of independence to India. 11 1 
At the end of the debate the House ree1olved to accept 
the Seven 1-Iotions which empowered the Governors of the 7 
Provinces to rule under the section 93, i.e. without a cabi-
1 . '1 2 nat and according to the p easure of the~r own Wl. 1. 
Reaction to Amery's Statement in India; 
Gandhi severly criticized what he c:::Llled Amery's "call-
ousness and contemptuous disregard of the situation in India. 11 
He said that- the Secretary of State had " i nsulted India.n in-
telligence by reiterating ad nauseam that Indian political 
parties have but to agree among themselvel3 and Britain will 
register the will of the united India. 113 
Furthermore, he maintained that so long as " ••• the 
British Si.Y" Ords hold India under bondage divisions vrill con-
4 
tinue. 11 
1. ibid., column 86. 
2. Those seven provinces v1ere Bihar, 
vinces, Madras, N. W. F.P., Orissa and 
3. Times of India , April 25 ~ 1941. 
4 . _!bid. 
; . ' -
:.., • -.. ,:. I •· • t 
Bomba.y, Central Pro-
Uni t ~ed Provinces. 
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11he President of the National Liberal Federation, l1r. 
Savarkar' s criticism \•Tas that Amery' a speech would depress 
all who had striven for good-will between India and Britain 
and that Amery had lost a golden opportunity in creating Ind-
ian confidence in British statesmanship. 
said: 
T.B.Sapru who had convened the Non-Party Conference 
111-Tr. Amery's indiscreet and unfortunate speeahes 
••• have done the worst service to us and~ilie has 
no business to make that pious appeal to us when 
he himself has done nothing to promote unity~ 
mong the contending elements in India."l 
The most comprehensive criticism came from the Standing 
Committee of the Bombay Conference. It issued a statement 
on April 29 criticizing the 11 amazing misunderstanding of the 
real political ai tuation in India. 112 FUrther, Yll'. Amery'~a 
11 
••• unsympathetic and unbending attitude towards 
the aspirations of India would ••• strengthen the 
forces of disruption in the country and to create 
the impression that, in. point of fact, the .Bri-
tish Government have no . desire to part with real 
power at this juncture. "3 
The charges which the Standing Committee made against 
Amery's statement were as follows: (1) Amery's demand of no 
change a t the Center is a step back. (2) His contention im-
plied that the British Government would not c;.gree to the trans-
fer of the key portfolios of Ftnance andDefence in the Vice-
1. The Hindu, April 29, 1941. 
2. The ·s t a tesman, April 29, 1941. 
3. Ibid. 
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roy's Council to Indian hands. (3) Reconstructed Executive 
was to be responsible to the Crown and not to the Indian 
Legislature. So .Amery.t.s fear of a conflict appeared to be 
extremely hypothetical. (4) If the present British policy 
of drift is not changed and real pov;er and. responsibility 
a re not given to the Indians the British G·overnment is mis-
taken in thinking that India will co-operate heartily in the 
l 
war-efforts. 
The national Liberal Federation expressed the opinion 
that .Amery's speech was "not calculated to promote communal 
2 
accord and harmony." Suf fice it to say that though .Pmery's 
statement was vehemently opposed by most of the political 
parties in India, the J.li\.lslim League was almost silent about 
it. 
Lord LinlithgOW and the Moslem Premiers: 
Neanwhile Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, Premier of the Pun-
jab, was interviewed by Linlitbgow on May 13, after wluch he 
suggested that "all of us put politics aside and get together 
3 
for the effective defence of India ." 
The Viceroy also interviewed Fazlul Huq, the Premier 
of Bengal. In his press intervie\olS (Nay 14-15) Huq reported 
the main points of his interview with the Viceroy as follows: 
1. The Statesman, April 29, 1941. 
2. Times of India, June 29, 1941. 
3. The Hindu, May 19, 1941. 
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(1) Discussion of the means to promote the war effort in 
the best possible manner. (2) Huq proposed. to form National 
Government at the Center and in the Provi.nces urgently and 
these should be responsible to the Legislatures a nd compos-
ed of Indians only. (3) He suggested a Round Table Confer-
ence of 25 political leaders of various pt,ints of views. 
( 4) The large-section of the J.'Iuslim League would co-operate 
in such a 1\fational Government. He hoped that the Hindus and 
the Muslims would arrive at a mutual agreement. 
Views of Two Indian Political Parties Towards Proposed 
VICeroy's Council 
When the Sikh Political Conference met at Lahore on 
l•Iay 30, it passed resolutions to the effeet that (1) the 
Viceroy's Council be completely Indi a nize<i and one Sikh 
member be appointed in it. (2) Pakistan a(3 a nti-national 
scheme be condemned. (3) the communal tem:don existed be-
cause of the propaganda of the supporters of the Pakistan-
scheme. 
The National Liberal Federa ti on had its meeting at 
Poena (June 29 ). Through resolutions it expressed that the 
direction of the control of India. ' s war effort should be 
entrusteQ. to an Executive Council compose'i of non-official 
Indians. 
Viceroy's Announcement of National Advisory Defence Council 
and Enlarged Executive Coun~il. 
The Viceroy appointed a National Advisory Defence 
11?. 
1 
Council on June 6. It was to meet at intervals of not less 
than 3 months. Its inaugural meeting took :place on J'uly 31 -
Augus t 1 a t Simla Jinnah compelled 3 of the 4 Moslem Prime 
¥rinisters of Bengal, Assam, Sind and the P~njab appointed on 
his Council, to resign because 3 \vere members of the :r:Ioslem 
League. 
The Viceroy announced the expansion of his Executive 
Council on July 22, with five new seats bringing the total 
(besides the Viceroy) to 12 of whom? were Indians. 2 It must 
be a dmitted that for the first time in its history the Coun-
cil was given a non-official Indian majority but, it must 
also be admitted that the newly appointed members did nQt 
represent officially, either the Congress or the Muslim 
League and that the Indians \vere not entru.sted with the most 
important portfolios of Finance and Defenc:e. 
]fUrthermore, the Council still remained solely respon-
sible to the Viceroy who had the power to veto any or all 
1. The Defence Council consisted of 30 members,i.e. 22 from 
British India, of v1hom 20 were Indians, and 9 from the Ind-
Indian States. 
2. Formerly the Council consisted of seven members of whom 3 
were Indians. Now the t •Jro brand ne1r1 portfolios were created 
and 3 former joint portfolios were separa ted; thus there ·were 
five ne\'J posts. For details see 373 H.C.Dl~b., 5s., 795-96. 
The Secretary of State V.~r. Amery also made a similar announce-
ment in the House of Commons on the same (lay~ For the purpose 
of this Council of. 373 H. C. Deb., 5s., 1682·-90. The following were 
the members of the Viceroy's enla:tged Exeoutive Council: Sir 
Hormusji P. Mody: Member of Supply; Sir ~~bar Uydari: Member for 
Information; E. Raghavendro Rao: l\'Iember for Civil Defence; Sir · 
Firoz Khan Noon: I-1ember for Labour and M. i3.Aney: Hember for 
Indians overseas, ibid., column 795. 
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acts of the Central Legislature. Thus in the words of ~~. 
Amery, "The powers of the Viceroy under the constitution re-
1 
mained unchanged." The expansion of the Executive Council 
failed to terminate the political deadlock betw·een Bri ta.in 
and India because it did not meet the demands of the Indian 
nationalists. It did not help to improve the Indo-British 
rela tions. 
Indian Leaders a nd the Vicero~s Executive Council. 
Gandhi still oontinued his Civil DiE1obedience Campaign 
. 
and said "I resolutely deny that this movement is cmmnunal or 
2 
anti-Moslem or anti-l!.nglish. 11 He also commented that the 
expansion of the Viceroy's Council did no t meet Congress de-
mands to any ap})reci able extent and t hat the Congres s a t t i-
tude, on t h e whole, was unaffected. 3 
Jinnah delcared that the Viceroy's acheme had no hU.slim 
support a s the l 'l.'uslim nominees in the Council did not repre-
s ent the p eople in general or the liluslim :League in particular . 
l~. savarkar, President of the Hindu Yahasabha, welcomed 
t h e Viceroy's move as a step in the right direction and ex-
pressed his joy that at last the British Government recog-
nized that the Congress and the I~Iuslim League did not repre-
sent the Indian nation as a whole. 
1. ibid., column 798. 
2. ~Hindu, July 13, 1941. 
3. ibid~, July 22, 1941. 
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Amery's Statement in the House of Commons, August 1,1941. 
said, 
JYir. lunery endorsing the Viceroy's enlarged Council 
11 The immediate object of these measures has been 
to increase the efficiency of goverr~ent ••• At 
the same time they are an earnest of our desire 
to transfer to Indian hands a steadtly increa-
sing sha:te in the control of Indi§t 'B destiny. 
They mark a change i n t he s pirit, · if not in the 
letter, of India 's 0Qnsttt~tion. 11 l 
Furthermore , as usual, harping on the same string he 
said, "If Indians can drop considerati ons of party and commun-
a l riva lry ••• 11 then vrill be removed " ••• the main obstacles 
to the a ttainment of her rightful position as a free and 
equal partner in the British Commonwealth. 112 
The l'Iusl im League (Bombay Session August 24-26) express-
ed the opinion that the Viceroy's announc,ement (of the ex-
pansion of the Council)was, 
"••• a concession to the demands of the Hindus 
in disregard of the wishes of the Muslims and 
the promises made to them. 11 
and Amery's statement rejected the Pakistan-scheme, 11 ••• \vhich 
amounted to a breach of faith \•ri th IVluslim I-ndi a . n 3 The 
other parties did not welcome Amery's statement either. 
Churchill's inter pretation of the Atlantic Charter (signed on 
August 12, 1941). 
After Amery's statement came the Atlantic Charter, 
signed jointly by Roosevelt, the President of the U. S.A. 
l. 373 H.C.Deb., 5s., 1689. 
2. ibid., 1690. 
3. Times of India, August 27,1941. 
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and Chruch ill, the Prime IV!inister of Britain . Expl a ining the 
signi f ica nce of t ha t Charter in r ela tion to Indi a Churchill 
declared i n t he House of Commons on September 9 tha t, 
" The .Joint Declaration (of Eight-Points) does 
not '1ua lify in any \vay the various sta tements 
of policy which have been made from time to 
time about the d-evelopment of constitutional 
government in India ••• "l 
Reiterating t h e British policy he s a id, 
" \'le a re :pledged by the Decla r a tion of August 19-
40 to help India to obtain free and equa l :part-
nership in the .British Commonwealth with our-
selves, subject ofcourse, to t h e fu l filment of 
obligati ons arising from our long connection 
vii t h Indi a and our responsibilities to its ma ny 
creeds, races and interests."2 
His interpretation of the Atlantic Charter vras, 
"At the Atlantic meeting, we ha d in mind, :pri-
marily, t he restora tion of sovereignty, self-
government and na tional life of the States 
a nd na tions of Europe now under the ro1zi yoke, 
a nd t he pronciples gover ning any alterations 
i n the territorial boundaries which ~1y h ave 
t o be made. So that is quite a separate :pro-
blem from the :progressive evolut ion o:f self-
g overning institutions in the regions a nd 
p eop le vlhich ov1e a llegiance to the British 
Crown." 3 
'l\vo days l a t er in a n ora l ansv.1er to Sorenson's (Labour) 
questi on in the House of Commons, a s to wby the principle of 
t h e choice of Government (implied in the po.int three of the 
Al l Indi a Charter) should not be applied to India , MX. Amery 
refer red him to the Prime Mini s t er's statement of September 9 
1. 374 H. C. Deb., 5s.,68. Churchill's sta temen t covers columns 67-82. 
2. i b id., column 68. 
3. Ibid., column 69. 
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and said, "The declaration of August 1940, made it s pecifi-
cally clea r that it was for the people of Indi a. to frame the 
l type of Government they want themselves." 
Reactions of the Indians to Churchill's interpretation of the 
Atlantic Charter. 
President Roosevelt and Prime l•linister Churchill had 
jointly agreed by the Atlantic Cha±ter ~at, 
"They (Roosevelt and Churchill) respect the 
right of all people to choose the form of gov-
ernment under which they will live; and they 
wish to see sovereign rights a nd self-govern-
ment restored to those who have forcibly been 
de prived of them. 11 2 
The leaders at once cla i med that the explanation of 
Churchill (September 9) aaid one t hing and the Charter (as 
quoted above) another. Sapru decla red, on September 13, tha t 
Churchill's interpreta tion sugg ested tha t his a ttitude to-
wards India remained unchanged. 
Gandhi maintained silence which was more eloquent than 
1.vords. 1'-lr . A. J. B.Kripalani, General Secretary of the All Ind-
ia Congress Committee and Dr. Prasad expre·sse.d that Chur-
chill convinced them that Britain was fighting the war for 
preserving her empire a nd keeping India ir.t bondage as long 
3 
as she could. 
1. ibi d., columns 286-87. 
2 . That was the third point of the Atlantic Charter. 
Q,uoted by w. Norman Brov1n, The United Sta tels ~ India and Paki-
stan, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,p.l05.(italics mine). 
3. The .hanchester Guardian, September 10, 1941. 
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Sir Sikander F.yat Khan , I>ioslem Premier of the PUnj ab 
said, "!VIr. Churchill's statement is the biggest rebuff Indi a 
1 
had ever received." Dr. Ivl . H.Jayakar, Sup:ceme Court Jus -
tice sa id, 
"It was the slave owner's argument and natu-
r a lly Indi a vJas indifferent to the outcome 
of ·t he war as long ae she did ncbt stand to 
gain anyt hing as a result of the War ••• 11 2 
Hr. Savarkar (President of the Hindu Ivi.a.hasabha) cabled 
to President Roosevelt on Augu s t 21 to inquire whether A-
merica would guarantee India 's freedom within a year at the 
end of the war. On September 11 he declared that Churchill's 
"blunt candour" did not surprise the ·Mahas abha because the 
Mahasabha had already expressed tha t Britain was fighting the 
vJar for her persona l benefit. 3 
'I'he All India Council of India n Christian s demanded 
responsible Indian Government and expreased anxiety at 
Churchill's statement. It is clear from t h i s that Churchill's 
interpretation and Amery's expl a na tion in the House of Com-
mons did not convince the Indi an leaders that the British 
Government intended to grant India self-government in the 
immedi a te future. 
The 1-'Ioslem League -was quite upset about the Viceroy's 
attitude. So on October 27, the League's party in the 
1. Q,uo t ed by Kate l'li tchell, op.cit., p. 23~i . 
2 . ibid. 
3. 'Tiili8s of India , October 29 , 1941. 
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Central Assembly deci ded by ll to 5 votes to wi thdrav/ from 
the Assembly for the entire-session. Next clay, it stated 
that the decision was conditioned by the refus a l of the Bri-
ti sh Government to grant a real share of responsibility and 
authority at the Center and in the Provinces. This action of 
t he League Party s hov.red resentment and disapprova l of the v.ray 
in whi ch the Viceroy's Council was enlarged and the Defence 
l 
Council constructed. 
The British Government Revised its Policy Towards the Civil 
Disobedience Prisoners. 
SUddenly the Government of India issued a press com-
munique in New Delhi which read, 
"The Government of India, confident in the de-
termination of all responsible opinion in India 
to support the war effort until victory is se-
cured have reached the conclusion that those 
Civil Disobedience prisoners whose offences have 
been formal or symbolic in chara cter can be set 
free including Pandit J~waharlal Nelrru and 
lviaula na Abdul Kalam Azad. 11 2 
So on December 4, Azad (President of the Congress) and 
Nemu were released along with all politiea l prisoners of 
'symbolic' offens es. At leas t four f a ctorB seem to have pres s -
ed t he British Government f.or su.Ch an act:Lon. (l) the views 
l. ibid. 
2. Si tara.mayya, op. cit~ ., p. 285. 
Ivtr. Amery. had stated in the House of Com.mons on September 11, 
1941, that there were 12,129 persons includi,ng 28 ex-minis-
ters and 290 members of the Provincial Legislatures who were 
serving sentences in connection with the Civil Disobedience 
l1ovement on July 1,1941. cf. 374 H. C.Deb., 5s., 283. 
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of the members of the Viceroy's expanded. Council.(2) Ger-
many's advancing armies in Russia (June 22:nd Russia had en-
tered the war against Germany). (3) Japan's occupa tion of 
Indo-China and threat to India from the Ea:st. (4) '£he 
· Indian political leader's (Congress and non-Congress) change 
1 
of mood. Anyway there appeared temproarily at least slight 
improvement in the Indo-British relations. 
Three days later the war entered a n1aw phase. It was 
the day when the Pearl Harbour tragedy· occured. The Imperial 
Head quarters in Tokio announced that Japan had entered into 
a state of war with Great Britain a nd the United St a tes from 
the dawn of December 7. SO-· President Roose1rel t declared war 
on Japan on December 8 at 12:30 p.m. through his message to 
the Joint Sessions of the Congress and Churchill declared 
war on Japan in the House of Commons at 3:~)0 p.m. the same 
day. 
Four days later (December 12) Nehru naid that he was 
was not a pacifist but the war bad convincHd him of the futi-
lity of the weapons of war~2 On the dame day, Raj agopalachri 
differed openiy with Gandl1l on the issue of non-:participa-
tion in the \var and said in his speech at 1.ucknow Univer-
sity, 
" The just and reasonable demand of the Indian 
1. The Times of India, December 5·, 1941. 
2. The Statesman, December 13, 1941. 
people is that the governance of India should 
be fully transterred now, dur~ng the war, and 
indeed mor e especially on account of this war 
to a provisionall y formed nationa l government."l 
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Lord Linli t hg ovJ \'lhile delivering his apeech to the As-
sociated Chamb er of Commerce in Calcutta on December 15,sa id, 
11 
••• there still remains unbridged t :ae gulf bet-
ween the parties as regards the future Govern-
ment of India . That that problem remains un-
solved is due to no lack of goodwill, no lack 
of earnest effort on the part of His Majesty's 
Government, the Secretary of Sta te and ~~self. 
we have left nothing undone to brir~ the par-
ties together and to provide the mc:~terials for 
an amicable agreement between them!, to try to 
soothe India's path to the realisa tion of her 
goa l. 11 2 . 
Once again the Viceroy repeated that no solution was 
possible unless India wa s united communally. India was used 
to such an explanation. 
When the All India News-paper Editor's Confer ence met in 
Calcutta, three days 1-eter, Mr . Srinival3an (President) ex-
pressed that, 
"Britain should be prepared to insta ll i mmediate-
ly in seats of power and authority, both at the 
Center and in the Provinces, the natural leaders 
of the people. 11 3 
Britain was also used to such an explanati on. 
Reaction of the Indian Political Parti r3s to the realease of 
~Civil D~sobeuience Pr~soners. -
wnen the Congress working Committee met at Bardoli (on 
1. Times of India, December 13, 1941. 
2. Linlithgow, o:p.cit.,pp.308-309. RiEl speech covers pp.297- - .. .. , 
310. 
3. The Statesman, December 18, 1941. 
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December 23-30) to consider t he general political situation 
and to revise, if necessary, its future-policy, Nehru and 
Azad said that if the Congress specific demands were grant-
ed by the British Government it might be advisable for the 
Congress to make a conditional offer of cc,-operati on in the 
war efforts. But Gandhi found it absolutely impossible to 
suspend Civil Disobedience and was convineed beyond doubt 
that •symbolic' satyagraha, (civil disobe,iience), more tha n 
ever, was necessary. 
Nehru spoke on December 26 and said that the major 
issue before India was the attainment of Purna Swaraj (com-
plete independence) and that India was opposed to Britain be-
cause India was in bondage. On the last day (December 30) 
Gandhi said that, 
11
'l'he discovery of the error makes it impossible 
for me to lead Congress in the struggle for re-
sistance to the war-effort on grounds on which 
non-violence was not indispensable ••• 
••• It is my certain belief tba.t only non-vio-
lence can save India and the vtorldL from self-
extinction ••• You will , therefore, relieve me 
of the responsibility laid upon me by the 
Bombay- Resolution (September 16,1940). I must 
continue civil disobedience for f:ree s peech 
against all war vii th such Congres :3men a nd 
others whom I may sleet and belie·v-e in the 
non-violence I have contemplated."l 
It is made aparent from this that Gandhi desired non-vio-
lent .. non-co-oper a tion with Brita in both in terms of war and 
t he fight for India 's independence. 
1. The Hindu, December 31, 1941. 
On the day the Bardoli resolution (of the Congress 
Working Committee) was passed to the effect that, 
"Only free and independent India can be in a 
position to undertake the defence of the coun-
. try on a national basis. The Congress: is there-
fore of the opinion that the Bombay Hesolution 
of September 16,1940, holds to-day and defines 
Congress- :policy still. 11 l 
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Explaining the meaning of t he Bardoli Hesolution, Azad 
said on January 8 that Gandhi did not 1.vant to carry on Sat-
yagraha on behalf of the Congress but rather on behalf of 
those Congressmen who~ he found to be well up to his standar • 
This wa s not to be interpreted as the withdrawa l of Gandhi 
from "the leadership of Congress. Once again a week later con-
firming the Congress policy of non-vi olenc.e f or Swaraj he 
said, "Our position is one of non-partici:pation and non-co-
opera tion in the vrar effort". 
Furthermore, he explained that where as Congress want-
ed to achieve independence anytime and if need b~, violently, 
if need be by supporting Britain's war efforts in India, 
Gandhi's methods remained non-violent. From this it must be 
inferred that the Congress after the release of the civil 
disobedience prisoners revised its policy towards the war ef-
fort, but Gandhi remained adamant vri th regard to non-violent 
non-co-operation. 
Speaking at the \•forking Committee me eting (December 26-
1. i bid. 
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2 7) of the J.Vluslim League Jinnah opposed vehemently the soften-
ing oi' the Br itish policy tovrards the Congr.3zs. He tr...reaten-
ed t h e British Gover nment , 
" ••• any revision of policy (as opposed to that 
of August 8,1940) adversely affecting the de-
. mand for Pakistan or ~ roce eding on the basis of 
a Centra l Government vri th India as a single 
unit and the •.llslims as a minority will be 
strongly resented by the I'.illslims, vrha. will be 
compelled to resist with all the force at 
their command, vrhich would ••• necessarily re-
sult in a seri ous impediment of· the oountry's 
war efforts, which have so far been largely 
carried on vii th the help and support of Nus-
lims.111 
In the light of the above discussion, oertain conclusions 
become apparent. The British Goverl1Jnent had made up its mind 
that Dominion Status after the war \vas its goal for India. 
vri th that end in view she enlarg ed the Viceroy~s Council and 
appointed the Nationa l Advisory Council of Defense. Th e Con-
gress had made up its mind that nothing short of Independence 
would it accept from Britain. On learning that that was not 
to be granted by the .British Government it launched the In-
dividua l Civil Disobedience Campaign as a symbol -o.f non-co-
operation. The British Government impriso1:1ed those who p ar-
ticipated iri the Civil Disobedience 1-.fovem,ent but was compell-
ed to release them due to Japan's invasion on India. That was 
considered a gain on the Congress side. The vfuslim League, 
too, now made up its rrii.nd that unless Ind.ia was divided into 
l. Times of India, December 27, 1941. 
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Hindustan (Land of the Hindus) and Pakistan (Land of the 
PUre) no solution of the Indian problem could be reached. If 
not as yet embittered the Indo-British relations were cer-
tainly deteriorating. Would Britain make new proposals to 
improve her relations with India? Would E~itain modify her 
policy towards India? If so, what would he the reaction of 
the Indian people to new proposals. These and other related 




BRITAIN' S "DRAFT DECLARATION" AND I~IDIA' B DISAPPROVAL 
The year 1942 saw a new and important chapter in the 
history of Indian independence. It was a n ,;w chapter, for 
never before had a member of the .British C·9.binet visited 
Indi a with the specific goal of a political settlement, on 
which depended India's future political ties with Great 
Britain. 
In t he past , as discudded earlier, there had been a 
few occasions when the Secretary of State and the Viceroy of 
India either collaborated or worked individually to evolve 
a satisfying formula with regard to India's political and 
constitutional set up. 
On January 0, 1942 not less than thlrteen leaders of 
the National Liberal Federation cabled an appea l to }tt. 
Churchill. 1 They recommended that, the Central Ex:ecutive 
council be a truly National Government consisting of non-
officials responsible to the Crown, that there be popular 
governments in the Provinces, a direct re:presentative in the 
I mperial war Cabinet, the Allied War Councils and the Peace 
1. The names of these thirteen were: Sir T. B. Sapru, Srini-
vasa Sastri, Aiyar, J. Prasa d, Jayakar, T. R.Venkatarama 
Sastri, Sir 1<Iaharaj Singh; Chunilal Iv etha., Rahimtoola Chinoy, 
Dr . s . Sinha , 1-1. Yunus, s. Radhakrishnan and 1\f. V. Joshi. 
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Conference, and that the National Government to be on the 
same footing as the goverrunents in other Dominions. On his 
return from Washington D.c. (U.S.A.), Churchill stated that 
he would consider these recommendations and. reply as soon 
1 
as he could. 
The year 1942 sav/ Sir Stafford Gripp::: the Lord Privy 
Seal, as the new Leader of the House of Connnons, though he 
had been expelled from the Labour Party in January 1939. 2 
The Nizam of Hyderabad had asked him (1932) to interpret the 
Treaty Rights in the Port of ¥.Lasulipattam. ~S He had visited 
\Vardha in November 1939 where Gandhi's Sevagram (i.e. ser-
vice or village center) is situated. 4 On Jrebruary 6, 1942, 
he said to the Press, "It would attract me very much to go 
to India if I could do any good to settle the Indian ques-
tion. 115 
Under the Chairmanship of Sir T.B.Sapru the Non-Party 
conference met in New Delhi (February 21-22,1942) and passed 
resolutions the tenor of which was like the one previously 
cabled to Churchill (January 3, 1942). 
As promised, Churchill made a statement in the House 
of Comr.aons on l'~Iarch 11, 1942 to the effect that Cripps would 
1. Churchill \¥as in Washington D. c. when i:.he National Lea-
ders appeal was cabled to him. So when he returned he replied 
to them on January 23,1942. 
2. On February 22, 1942 Churchill had a nnounced Cripps' ap-
pointment to the revised War-Cabinet. 
3. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p.314. 
4. For full discussion of Cripps' life se1:;, Patricia Strauss' 
Crip~s, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,l942. 
6: S1. taramayya, .2.l2...!..£!h, p. 310. 
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go to India. 1 He clearly stated, therein, why he (Cripps) 
was being sent there, for he said, 
" ••• 1ve propose to send a member of the \var 
Cabinet (i.e.Cripps) to India to satisfy 
himself upon the spot, by personal con-
sultation, that the conclusions upon which 
v1e are agreed, and vlhich i¥e believe repre-
sent a just and final solution, will 
achieve their purpose. 11 2 
Cripps was assigned the task of finding out whether or 
not the proposals on which the British Cabinet had unanimous-
ly agreed , would be acceptable to the leaders of the Indian 
political parties. He took with him the 11 Lrraft Declaration" 
containing the proposals unanimously agreed upon by the mem-
bers of the British Cabinet. 
The preamble of the Draft Declaration sought 
" ••• to lay down in precise and clear terms the 
steps vThich they (members of the Cabinet) pro-
pose shall be taken for the earlest possible 
realization of self-goverrunent in India ••• 
The object is the creation of a new Indian 
Union \vhich shall constitute a Dominion, as-
sociated vli th the United Kingdom and the other 
Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crovm, 
but equal to them in every respect, in no way 
subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or 
or external affairs.3 
It should be pointed out at once that .this object, namely 
Dominionhood, \vas not an innovation, as in the "August Offer" 
(August 8,1940 ) it was already promised to India by the 
1. 347 H.C. Deb., 5s., 6350. 




The explanation of the term Dominion is not new either, 
since it \'las clearly and collectively stated by the Prime 
llinisters of Britain, the Dominions and the Irish Free State 
?. 
representatives in 1926.~ 
Briefly stated, the Declaration _inc;J.ucied the •.,fo1lmving: 
(1) An elected body shall be set up to frwne a new constitu-
tion for India "after the cessation of hostilities;" 3 (2)the 
Indian Native States shall participate in :auch a consti tu-
tion-m.aking body; (3) His JYiajesty 1 s Government shall a cce1;t 
and implement such a constitution on condition that (a) any 
province of British India (i.e. Indian Provinces governed 
by the British Government) may make its own decision to join 
the Union, (b) in case a provinc e or a sta te decides not to 
join the Union, His Majesty 's Government shall give it a new 
sepa r a te consitituion on a par with the India Union constitu-
tion, (c) a treaty shall be signed bet-v1een the constitution-
making body and the British Government coYeri ng all necessary 
matters, such as protection of racial and religious minorities, 
arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from 
British into Indian hands; (4) The composition of the con-
stitution-making body, unless changed by the Indian leaders 
l . 377 H.C. Deb. , 5s., 6291. 
2. 299 -'HaC.Deb., 5s., 2768. (Proceedings of Imgerial Con-
ference , 1926); .":A. B. Kei th, s12eeches and · D<)cwnents on the Bri-
tish Dominions, l918-3l,and Coupland,op.c:Lt., pp.335-337. 
3. 377 H. C. Deb. , 5s., 6350. 
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collectively, (a) sha ll depend on the outcClme of the Provin-
cia l elections at the end of the hostilities, (b) t h e pro-
cedure s hall be that "the entire membership of the Lm·1er 
Houses of the Provincial Legislatures sha ll, as a single 
electoral college, proceed to the election of the constitu-
tion-making body by the system of proportional representation." 
(c) Numerica lly such a body shall be 1/10 of the number of 
the electora l college.1 (d) Like the British Indian Provin-
ces, t he Indian States shall have their representatives in 
proportion to their total population. 2 (5) (a) The British 
Government shall "reta in control and direction of the defence 
of India" but the government and the people of Indian shall 
provide money, munition and material (animate and inanimate) 
for winning the \'/orld War II. (b) "The Principal sections of 
the Indian people," shall be invited, "in the counsels · of 
their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. 113 
It must be asserted that some new ideas were embodied 
in the Cripps Proposals. ( 'l'his is not to )e confused with 
the overall offer namely, Dominion Status:, which was not ne;_v.) 
For the first time India's right to secede from the Common-
\'Teal th was recognized and the framing of the new constitution 
1. 3?? H.C.Deb., 5s., 6350, 
2. It should be mentioned that where as the British India rep-
resentatives were elected the Indian States representatives 
were appointed~ This made a great deal of difference. 
3, 3?7 H.C.Deb., 5s., 6350. 
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was to be solely in Indian hands. It is also true that t h e 
procedure of electing the constitution-making body was new in 
that it was to be indirect and by the electoral college of 
the Provincial Legislatures. It \vas also ne:w that a member 
of the British Cabinet was to consult the leaders of the 
principal sections of the Indian people to discuss the 
Indian political problem~ 
According to the announcement of Prime J.vlinister 
Churchill in the House of Commons, Sir Stafford Cripps left 
England by air arriving in New Delhi on 1-la.rch 23, 1942. 1 
Prior to his arrival (l,lfa.rch 20,1942) Lord I .. inlitbgovl, the 
then Viceroy. of India, had sent invi tation:3 to all the poli-
tical parties to meet Cripps in NewDelhi. It is generally 
accepted that Cripps had a personality that was pleasing,and 
yet unassuming, manners that were informal and yet impressive 
and motives that were sincere. 
Immediately upon his arrival he went into action. Bet-
v.,reen March 24 and 29, he JD.e .t almost all the leaders of the 
Indian political parties and the Viceroy and his Executive 
Council and the Governors of the Provinces whom he was sup-
posed to meet. Perhaps, in order that the people might feel 
free to talk i.oii th him, he preferred to stc:w at 3 Q_ueen Vic-
toria Road, New Delhi and not at the Viceregal Lodge which 
1. Strauss gives the date of arriva l as 11arch 22, \vhich is 
\'/Tong. se.e Coupland, .2.E.!.£i t., p. 273. 
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might have some connotation of imperial povrer and authority 
in India. Cripps impressed the India n public with his frank 
and informal behaviour. He bad called a press confer ence too. 
Thi s wa s undoubtedly a new precedure. the u::;ual method employ-
ed by the ~itish Government to convey its message to the 
Indi a n people was through a forma l speech of the Viceroy. 
l"iaulana Azad, the President of the c.ongress Party met 
Cripps on the 25th of JYiarch and Mahatma Ga:ndhi on the 27th. 
As the ,Congress Working Connni ttee1 convene·i in Delhi for the 
negotiations Azad reported to it the Cripps Proposals~ It 
is commonly asserted that Gandhi described the proposals as 
" a post-dated cheque on a bank that was failing." 2 
Cripps held press conferences a number of times between 
~~rch 23rd and April 12th. In such conferences when asked by 
the reporters he commented freely and boldly upon some of 
the clauses of the proposals. 
It was at the l'ia.rch 29th press conference that he re-
vealed the contents of the document. The next day he broad-
3 
cast the document and explained the Bri tie;h plan. 
1. Naulana Azad, Raj end.ra Prasad, Vallalhbhai Patel, Pandi t 
lil'ehru, Raj agopalachari, Bhulabha.i Desai, · J)andi t Pant, Iv.Irs. 
Saroj ani Naidu, Syed l'J.ahmud, Asaf Ali, P •. ,!~; . Ghosh, Sankerrai 
Deo, J. B.Kripalani, Khan Sahib and Pattablil Sitaramayya were 
members of the Congress Working Committee in Delhi. 
2. ~uoted by Coupland, QE•cit., p.279. 
3. P. Sitaramayya (pp.315-17) gives April 30 as the date of 
the publication of the document. That is :Lncorrect, that 
should read Vmrch 30. 
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On the same day (March 30) Cripps.; wrote a letter to 
Azad and sent a copy of that Letter to Jinnah the President 
of the l uslim League. 
Between 11arch 23rd and April 12th, Cripps held a num-
ber of meetings with top leaders such as Gandhi, · Azad, Nehru, 
Raj agopalachari of the Congress Party and J"innah of the '!US-
lim League; Savarkar, Moonje and I~1ookerjee of the Hindu Haha-
sabha (orthodox Hindu group); T.B.Sapru of' the National 
Liberal Federation; Jayakar of the Uon-Party group; Tara 
Singh, Sardar Baldev Singh, Kirpal Singh of the Sikh comm-
unity; Richardson, R. R.Hadow, C.P.Lawson of the :EUropean 
delegation; N. h .Joshi and Jamnadas I"letha of the Labour group; 
Ambedkar of the Depressed Classes; Fazlul Haq and Sikander 
Hyat Khan, the premiers of Benga l and the PUnjab; Maharaja 
of Parlakimedi, the premier of Orissa; B.G.Kher and Pandit 
Govind Bulabh Pant, the ex-premiers of .Bo:nbay and the United 
Provinces and North West Frontier Province; Maurice Gwyer, 
the Federal Chief J·ustice; Henry Craik, the political adviser 
of the Viceroy; Henry Gidney, a member of the National De-
fence council, General Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief, Air 
Narshall Pei tse, the Air Officer Commandelr-in-Chief, from 
the Native States; Jam Saheb of Nawanagar; Maharajas of Bi-
kaner and Patiala, and Navrab of Bhopal; Hamaswami .Ayer the 
Dewan of Travancore and other representatives of the 
Chamber of Princes, (i.e. the political organiza tion of the 
Native States of India). 
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At a press conference on harch 26, Cripps had decla red 
that in the \ifar Cabinet's Plan there was " a lot that was 
adjustable but the fundamental principles are not adjust-
1 
able." This meant t.bat the Proposals were to be accepted 
in toto or be rejected in toto. (11ost of the parties seem to 
have thought that this was a great limitation). 
The Congress \'lorking Conuni ttee met in continuous ses-
sion to consider the British Proposals on l1arch 30 and 31. 
A detailed discussion of how these political parties reacted 
to the British Proposals is in order. The Hindu I•Iahasabha, 
on April 1, rejected the British plan because it could not 
accept political partition of India (Clause C of the DTaft 
Declaration). To her the proposals failed to clarify Indi~'s 
constitutional sta tus in the interim period; the Defence 
proposal was also unacceptable to her. \vhe. t she dema nded 
instead was India's free and equa l status in the Co~non-
wealth. 
In a letter to Cripps da ted larch 31st, the Sikh All-
Parties declared that the proposals were unacceptable to 
them because instead of ma intaining and strengthening the 
integrity of India, s pecific provision for· separation of Pro-
vinces and a con·sti tution for Pakistan haci. been made. Thus 
1 t he cause of the Sikh community had been lamentably betrayed. 
l. Strauss, op.cit., pp .399-401. The text of the correspon~ 
dence between Cripps and Indian leaders bas been convenient-
ly reproduced from 3?8 H. C.Deb. 6350,in Strauss, Cripps, 
Appendix III, pp. 370-412. l\Jei ther Coupland nor Si t a ra.mayya 
g ive t h e full text of this correspondence •. 
· .  
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They said, 11 We shall resist however by all possible 
means separa tion of the Punjab from All-India Union. 111 
.Again l'febru and Azad conferred with Cripps (April l) 
and letters were exchanged between Cripps and Azad regarding 
the question of Defence of India (April 1 & 2). The Congress 
Working Committee passed a resolution which was handed to 
Cripp s by liebru and Azad (April 3). The resolution seems 
to suggest three main reasons vrhy the Congress Working Corliili-
ttee did not want to accept the proposals. 
Firstly, the Congress Party objected to the transfer 
of the Defence portfolio into non-Indian hands (clause e). 
Secondly, if the right to secede v.rere granted to a province 
the national unity would be in danger (clause c); and 
t hirdly, the representa tives of the Indian States in the 
prop osed Constituent Assembly v1as to be by "place nominees 11 
and not by the subjects of those states. In other words,t~e 
representatives to ·the Native States would neither be popu-
larly elected nor represent the interests of the peoples of 
the states, (clause d). 
These objections indicate that the Cri pps Proposals 
were not acceptable to the Congress Party though certain 
principles therein were welcome to the Congress. 
The Depressed Class vehemently opposed the proposals 
l. 378 H.C.Deb., 5s., 6350. 
because as B. R.Ambedkar and R.C.Rajah declared in their 
letter to Cripps dated April lst, 
"'W'e . are all of us absolutely convinced, that 
the proposals are claculated to do the great-
est harm to the Depressed Classes and are 
sure to place theih under an unmi tiagted sys-
tem of Hindu rule. Any such result wldch takes 
us back to the black days of the ancient past 
will never be tolerated by us, and we are 
de.termined to resist any such catastrophe be-
falling our people with all the meanB at our 
command."l 
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The Anglo-Indians also asked for moderate safeguards, 
but the Indian Christians and the Labour g:roup expressed 
opinions a~ost like those of the Congress. On April 2, Azad 
sent to Cripps the resolution of the Congress Working Commi -
ttee rejecting the proposals. Though passed on April 2nd, it 
was not made public till April 11. 2 
Cripps met General Wavell and discussed with him on 
April 3rd, th~ question of defence. On the: same day he 
wrote a letter to Azad requesting him and Nebru to see the 
Commander-in-Chief Wavell on the subject of defence on April 
3 4th at 5:50 p.m. 
On April 3rd, President Roosevelt 'a special represen-
tative and the head of the Economic 1<1ission, Colonel Johnson, 
arrived in !few Delhi with a letter 1'rom the President to 
1. 379 H.C.Deb., 5s., 6350. 
2. For the text of this resolution see 379 H.C.Deb., 5s., 
6350. 
3. For these letters see Stra~ss, op.cit., pp.372-73. 
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an unnamed Indian leader, stated by the New York Times to 
be :t:rehru.l To try to decide \t.fhether his arrival was a co-
incidence as Cripps stated in his report to the House of 
Commons (April 27) after his return or whether it \'las a 
planned intervention, is to leave the field of history and 
enter a foreign field of speculation. 
Whatever the case may be it is ture that Cripps did 
say ( in the House of Commons) 11 ••• I \vi sh to make it a bun-
dantly clear that there was no question of any American 
intervention but only the personal help of a very able 
2 
American citizen." It is also true that howsoever informal 
he may have been in his behavior, Johnson did take an active 
part, for Si taramayya observes that "For a week, it looked·_· 
as though the center of gravity shifted from Cripps to 
Johnson, from London to New YDrk, from Churchill to 
3 Roosevelt." In order to help out Johnson intervie\·Jed 
Cripps and the Viceroy and Nehru and others. 
From Allahabad, on April 4th, ·w-as heard the voice of 
the Muslims of India through the speech of Jinnah, the 
President of the ¥1Uslim League. In it he me:ntioned that he 
\vas "deeply disappointed" in Cripps 1 Proposals for the 
1. New York Times, April 4, 1942. 
2. Strauss, op.cit., pp.316-17; Sitaramayya seems to imply 
that it was no mere accidental coincidence, see op.cit., 
p.317. 
3. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p.317. 
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following reasons: the alleged power of minorities in the 
matter of secession was illusory, since "Hiindu India dominat-
ed the decision for an All-India Union in the provinces", 
Muslims in Bengal and the Punjab would be at the mercy of 
Hindu minorities in those provinces and the Muslims would be 
doomed to subjection; and His IIJ:aj esty' s Government had failed 
to make the Muslims right of self-determination and Pakistan 
explicitly clear. 1 
On the same day (April 4) the Liberal and Non-Party 
leaders namely 'r. B.Sapru and .Jayakar, strongly urged the in-
elusion of an Indian Defence member in the Viceroy's Execu-
tive Council and deG:lared that without thiB the British Plan 
would fail. They recognized the justice of allowing any pro-
vince to secede but they tho ught that that might be disas-
trous to Indian unity. They also demanded that the secession 
of any province should depend on the opinion of 65% of the 
Indian members of the Provincia l Legislature and suggested 
t hat a bare .majority is not sufficient for a matter of such 
d . 1 . t 2 car 1na 1mpor ance. 
Between April 4 a nd 7, Cripps, General wavell, Azad, 
Nehru, .Jinnah and .Johnson discussed the question of defence. 
In his letter to Azad dated April 7, Cripps suggested a 
1. Times of India, April 5, 1942. 
2. ibid. 
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11 Draft Alternative Formula on Defence. 111 The high light of 
this new formula v.ras t hat an Indi a n :Hember \vas to be in 
charg e of t he Defence Depa rtment but the Commander-in-Chief 
(i.e. General \ifavell), who \vas to be a Member of the Viceroy's 
Executive Council, in charge of the \Var Department, should 
control the India n armed forces. to conduct the wax. 'l'his 
meant a sort of division of the Defence Depa rtment into two 
departments - one ca lled Defence in charge of an Indian and 
the other War in charg e of the Commander-in-Chief. The details 
of this ne\v formula on defence need not detain us. 2 But one 
t h ing seems to be clea r that no compromise was p ossible on 
such a solution of the question of Defence. It must b e ad-
mitted hov1ever, that Colonel .Johnson (Roose-velt 1 s p ersona l 
representa tive) tried to help, to a great e:xtent, in evolving 
a workable Defence formula. 
The Prs ident of the Hindu Nahasabha, Dr. Noonj e, cabled 
to President Roosevelt, t h e same day (April ?) complaining 
that the British and United States comment~1 l a cked 11 a 
realistic appreci a tion11 of the Indi a n situation. Ji'Urthermore, 
Dr, l''Ioonj e 1.velcomed the pr op osa ls for indep endence a nd Domi-
n ion Status but not 11 several Ulsters 11 \vhich aggravated 
1. 379 H.C.Deb., 5s., 6350. 
2 . For deta iled functions of the Comma nder·-in.:.chief and the 
Defence Member see 3ita r amayya 's charts in op .cit., pp . 319-
321. 
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communa l strife and possi bly civil war,l 
The Council of Liberal Federation,, on the same day, 
while welcoming Sominion Status for India , reiterated Sapru•s 
wa,rning of the dangers inherent in creating more t han one 
Federal Union. It a lso suggested that t h e :peoples of the 
Indian tat es should select the State repreHentatives on the 
pr oposed constitution-making body and that an Indian be 
2 
appointed as Defence member of the Viceroy' :3 Council. 
Negotiations took :place from April 8th to lOth, bet\veen 
Colonel Johnson, the Congress and Hindu Marui sabha leaders 
but s till the new formula of Defence remain13d unsatisfactory, 
hence unacceptable. During these days the mercury of hope 
reached its highest mark in the political thermometer of 
I ndi a but it dropped to its ~-mves t after Azad and Nehru met 
Cr i pps on the evening of April 9th, and t he negotiations 
were ended. Contained in a letter to Cripps dated April 10, 
JYiaharaj a Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, the Cahncellor of the 
Chamber of Princes, sent a resolution of the India.n States 
Delega tion. 3 
The gist of both the letter and the resolution, was 
t hat, 
"The States should be a.s.sured, however, that 
1. Times of India, Apr il 8 , 1942 . 
2 . ibid. 
3. see the texts of the letter and resolution in 379 H. C. Deb., 
5s., 6350 and Strauss , op.cit., :pp. 387-388 . 
i n the event of a number of States nc. t findi ng 
it feasi ble to adhere, t he non-adhering St a tes 
or group or St ates so desiring should. have the 
r i ght to form a uni on or their own, \v' i t h full 
sovereign status in a ccordance with a. sui t able 
and agreed procedure deivsed for t he purp ose."l 
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Naulana Azad wro te a letter to Cripps (Apr il 10). He 
stres s ed t wo points on '\·Jhich Cr ipps' pr opo ~:mls a nd negotia -
tions had not satisfied the Congress. Firstly, the na t ur e of 
t he Nati ana l Government. Si t a ram.a.yya observes . that, , 
"In his (Cripps) first interview with the Presi-
dent of the Congress, he expl a ined tl~t rela-
ion of the Viceroy to the new lifationa l Govern-
ment 1.-1oul d be tba same as that of the British 
Cr ovJn to the British Ca binet. It was t his 
s t a tement that only tempted President Aza.d to 
convene a meeting of the Working Co~nittee 
a nd constituted the basis presumptive:! for a ll· 
further talks connected with the Crijpps' 
Mission until the iforking Committee 1vere 
wholly disillusi oned on the lOth Apr:il in 
the President's (Azad's) final conversation 
wi t h Sir St afford."2 
Whatever may be t he va lidity of these :ataternents it seems 
abundantly clear that both Cripps and Azad had different 
interpretations of the term "Cabinet", for Azad mentioned in 
the same letter {of April 10), 
" ~e had imagined that t h e new government would 
function with full pmvers as a Cabinet -\.,i th 
the Viceroy acting as a constitutional head; 
but t h e new picture that you placed before ·. us 
was really not very different from the o1d, 
the difference being one of degree and not of 
k ind. 11 3 
1. 379 H. C.Deb., 5s., 6350. 
2 . i bid. 
3. ibid . 
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Secondly, the question of Defence . The Congress could 
not a ccept the new Defence formula because it \vas vague and 
minimized the powers of the Defence Minister. 
In reply Cripps wrote a letter to Azad dated April 10. 
I:n it he stressed the inadvisability and immpossibility of 
ma.k:ing any cbanges in the Indian constitution provided by 
the Act of 1935 to suit Congress demands of a "Cabinet 
Government vii th full pmver. nl 
Azad replied to Cripp s in a letter da.ted April 11 , 
in which he categorically stated, 
"But it is clear that the British Gov-ernment's 
conception and ours in regard to Defence 
differs greatly. For us it means gi vi.ng it a 
National Character and calling upon e~very man 
and v10man in India to participate in it ••• 
The British Government's view seems to be based 
on an utter lack of confidence in the Indian 
people and in witholding real power from them. 112 
The Congress Working Committee issued its resolution on 
April ll th. 'I'his resolution included, more or less, the 
same reasons \vhich the previous Congress resolution of .April 
2nd had, of their inability to accept the Cripps Proposals.3 
The \'forking Committee of the All-India huslim League also 
issued a resolution on the same day (April 11). Briefly 
stated, this resolution puts forth simila:r reasons as 
1. ibid. 
2. ibid. 
3. For a discussion of this resolution of April 2nd, see 
page 139 of this paper. 
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employed by Jinnah in his Allahabad speech of April 4, for 
rejecting Cripps proposals. These need not be repeated. But 
it should be menti oned that clause (2) of the resolution 
categorically stated that , 
" ••• so far as the I•Iuslim League is concerned, 
it has finally decided that the only solution 
of India's constitutional problem is the parti-
tion of India into independent zones; and it 
will therefore be unfair to the l>fuslj.ms to 
compel them to enter such a constitution-ma..k-
ing body whose main object is the creation of 
a nev1 Indian Union, "1 
a.nd it did not approve of the procedure suggested by Cripps 
i.n his letter dated April 2nd, as to how the verdict of the 
I~ovinces was to be obtained. 
Cripps' broadcast, prior to his departure from India ,on 
April 11, made it absolutely definite that he had failed in 
his mission, for he said, "The Draft Decla:ration I brought 
t o India on behalf of the \var Cabinet has been rejected." His 
mission to India ended in failure as he le:ft J.1Te-v1 Delhi on 
April 12th. 
In the preceding pages the Cripps Mission and the major 
difficulties and reasons for its failure with regard to the 
Jnore influential and important political parties have been 
iiscussed. To make the picture clearer, a summary of some 
possible reasons of wby Cripps Proposals were rejected may 
1. 379 H.C.Deb.,5s., 6350. 
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be suggested. 
(1) One of the conditions of these proposals was that 
t:ney were to be accepted "in toto." No political party in 
I nd i a wa s in a position to do it because they did not offer 
what the parties :b..ad struggled for. 
(2) Though Dominion Status was promised, it was to come 
into existence only "upon the cessation of hostilities" and 
not in the present. 'l,hi s did not satisfy t he politica l as-
pirat ions of the Congress Party and the Ivius,lim League. In 
other words , t h e so-called Dominion Status was not a de-
clara tion of India 's independence. 
( 3) The Congress Party, Hindu JY.iahasabha, the parties 
of the Sikhs a nd the Indian Christians could not accept the 
principle of non-adherence for the Pr ovince, a s sugg ested in 
the Draft Declar a tion. In other vlords, nationa l unity was 
to be maintained by discouraging any division of India. To 
add to that, Cripps and the Congress Party were not ready 
to compromi s e of the question of Defence and the na ture of 
the National Government under the Cabinet. 
( 4) On the other hand, the :r.ill.slim League was not ready 
t o a ccep t anything less than Pakistan, i.e. the partttion 
of India at any cost. 
While the Cripps Mission failed, it suggested to the 
Indian people, to t he British Cabinet and to the world, the 
:future Indo-British relat ions. 
Cripps came and convers ed but could not conquer. 
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Aftermath of the rejection of Bri tian' s DrE.ft ])eclarc:.ti on 
!'or _India 
Sin-ce Japan had s pread the war t :o the Pacific and con-
cmered Southeas t Asia., India became a strategic keyston·e of 
Allied defence. Indian leaders realized the importance of 
this situation. So Rajaji demanded a National :B'Tont and 
National Government, "which would enable that (Nationa l) 
Government to go to the people with pride and self-confidence 
1 
and ask -for the people's total war effort. 11 
The following day Nehru stated that the Congress did 
its best to solve t he Indian problem when Cripps came. As 
Jllothing n mv was promised lifehru said, 
11 W"e want to get rid of this world of EKcellen-
cies and Highnesses and the pomp and pageantry 
and wasteful extravagance and incom~tence of 
our British rulers. 11 2 
Gandhi wrote in his Har ijan (April 19) that he did not 
doubt Cri pps ' goodwill but the proposals he presented were 
11 too riduculous to final a ccepta nce a nywhere." Furthermore, 
"Attainment of independence is an impossibility until we have 
solved the communal tang le ••• 11 Jinnah said in nis 1ress 
intervievl, on April 15, that the JYiuslim LE~ague vms :prepared 
to make any reasonable readjustment if the demand for Paid-
stan was recognized by all the Indian parties. 
1. Ti mes of Indi~ April 14, 1942. 
2. The Hind~ Apr il 15, 1942. 
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Rajaji novr took a lead in politica l a cti on. Under h is 
gui dance on April 23 and 25 , tv1o resolution;3, subject to the 
.All I ndia Congress Connni ttee' s approval, were passed in k1.i:ad-
r a s to the effect that t he hils lim League's ·:}laim of Pakista n 
be recognized and· the lVIuslim League be i nvited to participat e 
i n t he insta llation of a :Nationa l Government (at t he Center) 
and Popular Governraent (in the provinces) to meet the emer-
g ency created by the war. \\/hen Raj a ji saw Gandhi and Azad 
both disagreed with him and Azad said tha t he was astonished 
and pained to read the resolution. 
At this time the All India Congress Committee mat at 
Allahabad ( April .99 - lv1ay 2). Azad declared in his presiden-
ti a l address that Br itian's Draft Declarati on denied India 
power over h er own defence because "the .British Government 
have not trust in us." Next day Rajaji resigned from the 
Congress becau s e he differed with its policy. 
On } ay 1, a resoltuion was passed to the effect t hat 
I ndia could deal with Br itain and other nations only on the 
basis ot'- her indepe.ndence and that in event of foreign inva s-
ion_India 's weapon would be non-violent non-cooperation. Next 
day, Rajaji's resolution urging the Congress to recognize the 
l•Juslim League 1 s claim of Pakistan was oppos.ed by Raj endra 
Pr asad a nd Nehru. It was defeated by 120 to 15 votes. So 
Hajaji made a statement at a press conference in New Delhi, 
on Kay 4, saying that he did not, 
" ••• believe the present official policy of Con-
g r ess meets the situation. I must work, there-
fore, to make the Congress cha nge its :policy; 
I must cultivate:public opinion. I want a Na-
tional Front and a National Government, that 
is the key to my future work."l 
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He discussed his :points with Gandhi. Ir must be admitted 
tl:~.at, at a later date, it was Rajaji who ma<ie Gandhi accept 
the partition of India as the lYiuslim League had demanded. 
v!hile Rajaj i took a definite stand on the issue of parti-
tion and defence, Gandhi reiterated on I~ay 16 his faith in 
non-violence and said theat "real genuine unity (in India) 
iE! almost an im:possibili ty until the British power is with-
drawn.112 He accepted Azad's suggestion of five Congress 
representatives to meet five members of the l".J.tlslim League 
but t his was not welcome to the l!J.Uslim League. 
Sir K. Nazimuddin, a member of the Nuslim League V/orking 
Committee, said with regard to Rajaji, that his policy was 
a realistic st~p in the right direction and was the only 
means through which communal harmony could be attained. In 
the same tone Jinnah said, on :t-1ay 29, that :Pa.ki stan and Paki-
stan alone spelt the welfare of both the Hindus and the lvJus-
l:lms. 
lileanwhile, Cripps in a sta.tement to the United Press of 
India emphatically declared that 11 ••• we are not going to 
1. Times of India, May 4, 1942. 
2. The Hindu, May 16, 1942. 
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walk out of India right in the middle of the war, though 
w1; have no wish to remain there for any imperialistic reas-
1 
Oll'lSe It 
Next day at a press conf'erence Nehru again emphasized 
t ;m t India was prepared to give her whole-hearted support to 
the Allies \'lar - effort only when the British Government 
would admit of a complete transference of political power to 
I :ndia. 
Jinnah warned Britain against its submission to the 
Congress demands because "Pakistan was immutable. 11 Rajaji 
sa.w him on June 24. Gandhi \-TI'ote that he wanted the British 
to leave India but never did he contemplate an 'abrupt with-
d.:ral>~al of allied troops'. 2 
Meanwhile, it was announced in London by the India 
Office, on July 2, that Sir Ramaswami Mudalier (member of 
t :h.e Viceroy's Executive Council) and Jam Saheb of Na\'lanagar 
(India-Princes' representative) \vould participate in Bri-
tain 1 s War Cabinet and the Pacific 1:/ar Council in London. At 
the same time the Viceroy's Council was enlarged to 15 mem-
bers. Britain was undoubtedly democratic in recognizing 
India 's representati on in them; but Britain was undemocratic 
i n selecting the Indian representatives because they (repre-
sentatives) were not the choice of the Indian people. On the 
1. The Statesman, June 16, 1942. 
2. Harijan, June 28,1942. 
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contrary those Indian representatives were the mouthpiece 
of the British Government. In any modern democracy such 
behaviour is detestable and worthy of public resista nce. 
Congress decided on Ivass Civil Disobedience:. 
When the Congress \·forking Committee met at ·/ardha (J-uly 
6-14) it decided to take strong action. So on July 14 it 
passed a resolution subject to the approval of the .All India 
Congress Committee stating that , "The abortive Cripps pro-
r)osals showed in the clearest possible manner that there was 
no change in the British Government's attitude to India ••• 111 
The resolution demanded a Provisional Government \·Ihich 
v.rould make a scheme for a Constituent _Assembly and Britain's 
i mmediate v.Jithdrawal to facilitate it. And :furthermore, if 
:Britain failed to consider these suggestions then the Con-
gress would launch a nm'l non-violent struggle on mass scale. 
When Gandhi v1as asked v1hether it was the last chance given to 
.Britain, he quipped, "This is a n open rebellion of a non-
v-iolent chc'l.racter, there is no question of a last chance." 2 
Azad commented that only immediate declaration of 
independence a nd the transfer of all power to Indian person~ 
nel \'lould satisfy the Congress. While conmtenting on the Con-
1. The Hindu, July 15, 1942. 
2. ibid. 
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gress \Vardha Resolution Amri t Bazar Patrika. said that the 
resolution was not an ultimatum but an appe:al and the Hindu 
said that it vtas a call to Britain to release the hold she 
r.J.ad on India. Dr • .Ambedkar, (leader of Scheduled Castes) des-
oribed Gandhi's Mass Civil Disobedience (included in the 
\lardha Resolution) as 'irresponsible and insane 1 • On July 28, 
T. B. Sapru (leader of the National Liberal Federation) said 
that t h e resolution vias 11 111 considered and ill opportune , 11 
but asked Br itain to declare unequivocally that India would 
enjoy complete self-government \'li thin a year after the \var. 
Such political development in India would not go with-
ou t its echo in the House of Commons. So vrhen I'!Ir . Amery 
( Secretary of State) was asked by Hr • .Ammf:>n (labour) as to 
'l.vhat intentions the British Government had in India, he 
sta ted in the House of Commons on July 30, 1942 that the 
Congress demands were untimely. He mildly threatened by s ay-
ing that, 
"His Ivlajesty•s Government, while reiterating 
their resolve to give the fullest opportunity 
for the attainment by India of complete self-
government, cannot but solemnly v1arn all those 
who stand behind the policy adumberated by the 
working Committee of Congress that the Govern-
ment of Ind i a (Governor Genera l and his Coun-
cil) \'lill not flinch from their duty to take 
every possible step to meet the situation. 11 1 
Cr i pps mai ntained t hat the British Government had pledged 
1. 382 H. C.Deb. 5s ., 674. 
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to g ive the. fullest opportunity for the attainment of self-
g overnment t~ India after the war, but the granting of com-
plete transfer of pmver and a nev.1 constitution during the 
'>"f ar was next to impossi ble. 1 
Nov! the Congress \larking Commi ttee met again in Bom-
bay (August 4-5) to reconsider the \ifardh Resolution(J-uly 14). 
The follo' Iing vrere tb.e chief dema nds of the ne\v resolution 
(p opularly knm.vn as the 11 Quit India" Resolution): 
1 ) I mmediate ending of Bri t.ish rule in Ind:ia a nd declar a -
.... i on of India':s independence , 2) Ivlass Civil Disobedience 
under t h e leadership of Gandhi if the first dernand vias re-
,jected , 3) a Provi sional Government, representative of all 
important sections of the Indian people. The Provisional 
Government shall evolve a shceme for Constituent Assembly 
and the Constitution slllill be federal. 4) Freedon of Indi a 
shall be a symbol of and prelude to the freedom of all other 
Asiatic nations under fo r,eign rule. 5) There sha ll be a 
vrorld- Federation and disarmed free natiom;. 2 This 11 Q,uit 
I ndia " Uesolution -v;as ratified by the All India Congress 
3 
Committee when it met at Bombay on August 7-8. Referring 
to the resolution Gandhi said that "we shall get fre edom 
1. Nanchester Guardian, August 4, 1942. 
2. Times of India, August 6, 1942. 
3. The full text of this famous " Q,uit - India" Resolution of 
August 8, 1942, is reproduced in M. S. Va iranapillai's Axe 
\ve '1.\'lo Nations? Kodaikanal: Hima & Co., 1948 . Appendix A, 








by fighting (non-vi olently)" and 11vle must remove hatred for 
the Brit i sh from our hearts." 1 
Br itain ' s su~essive feasures. 
The Viceroy responded to t h is resolution with equa l 
d.etermination. He issued an Order which forbade shop-strikes 
(har t als ) if Gandhi s hould launch the Civil Disobedience 
Iviovement . Furthermore, the Viceroy a nnounced t hat the Con-
!§;ress demand of immedia te withdrawal of Br:L tish pov1er was 
impracticable because it did not represent a ll the elements 
in the Indian population. It reminded the Indian people that 
the Bri tish Government's p olicy was to grant India an oppor-
tunity of self-government a fter t he war and that a cceptance 
of Congress demands would be betrayal of the Allies. 
The Viceroy a nd his Council, through t\vo Govern.111ent 
Orders under the Defence of India Rules, on August 8, l a id 
severe res tricti ons on the Indian Press regarding the pub-
lication of news on the Congress Civil DiBobedience cam-
paign. They also asked all correspondents to be registered 
vii th the Government and emp owered the Prov·incial Govern-
ments to suppress Congress a ctivities. 
On August 9 (Sunday) all the i mportant members of 
the Al l India Congress Committee were arrested and sent to 
1. Times of India , August 8, 1942 . 
Poena for interp..ment by a specia l tra in. Before his a ·rest 
Gandhi ga:ve his message to the nati r;n \1hich is :t'eferred to 
a :3 11 Six Commandments of Ga ndhi Baba (brother)." They v1ere, 
11 (l) Look }lpon yourself as free. (2) \ve are 
free to do anything as long as we remain with-
in the limits of non-violence. (3) Paralyze 
the admini.stration of Government by hartals 
and other non-violent means. (4) a sa.tyagrahi 
(one who practices 'law of love' or 'Soul-
Force') should join the struggle for dying 
and not in the hope of remaining alive. 
(5) Keep the nation alive at the risk: of 
death. (6) Karenge Ya ~~renge (Do or Die).l 
Arrest of Congressmen and Its Reaction. 
\·/hen t he Indian people learnt of these arrests there 
2 
took place a nuraber of disturbances. Mob violence and 
hoologanism became the order of the day. T'ne Gover nment 
issued curfew orders so that no public activity was allow-
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ed between 7:30 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. It prohibited the assem-
bly of five or more persons in the city of Bombay. The Vice-
roy declared the .All India Congress Committee and all the 
:Provincial Congress Committees unlawful. So all the Provin-
c:ial Congress Houses (where the Congress meetings were held) 
1-1rere sealed by the Government. The Governzp.11nt took suppress-
ive measures and machined-gunned people from the air. · 
J.. The Statesman, August 9, 1942. 
~~. The w~iter is an eye 1:..ritness of some of the disturbances 
that took place in various parts of the city of Bombay.In 
3ombay police opened fire 5 times and used tear-gas to dis-
perse the crowds, eight were killed,20 were wounded by bullets 
a nd 35 injured. see Times of India, August 10,1942. 
1 
Perhaps the Government had no choice. 
On t h e s ame day, on behalf of the Iv uslim League, 
.Tinnah appealed to the l-Iuslims not to participate in the 
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di sturbances and c ondemned the Civil Disobedience Campaign 
because it \'las aimed "at the po int of bayonet." Hr. Amery 
appr oved of the steps taken by the Viceroy of India . 2 
}tr . Savar kar appealed to the people on behalf of the 
Hindu iabasabha not to support Congress Civil Disobedience, 
but warned the British Government that only unequivoca l 
declaration of free and equal status with Brita in would save 
the si tuation. DT. Foss Westcott, Bishop of Calcutta and 
Metropolitan of India appealed for an all-party conference 
to firfd a solution. On August 12, T.B.Sapru urged that a 
Parliamentary-delegation should arrive in India immediately 
to discuss the political situation with the Indian leaders. 
The same day (August 12) the British Labour Party and 
the Trade Union Congress issued an appeal to the effect tha t 
Civil Disobedience would seriously injure the hope of India's 
freedom a nd suggested that they would see that a free India 
was established when the war was over. No one need doubt 
1. Mr . llmery stated in the House of Commons (on October 8) 
tha t during the disturbances 846 were killed; 2,024 were 
v-T ounded of which 60 Government s ervants (including mili-
tary and police) killed and 648 wounded, but no European 
Briti sh subject was killed. cf . 383 H. C. Deb .5s .,l342. 
2 . His message \•Tas broadcast in London on:\ugust 9, 1942 . 
cf . 1anchester Guardian, August 9 , 1942. 
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that the Labour Party was sincere in its suggestion. 
Raj a j i condemned the 11 mad destruction and. disregard 
of hume .. n s a fety" whi ch resulted from the Civil Di sonedience 
movement . He al so appeal ed to Jinnah s aying that, 
11 
••• A Provisional Government can and must be 
formed ••• The League can t ake it for granted that 
the righ t of self-determination for the fede-
rating units is agre.ed by Comgress and that any 
such areas may choose to be separate and sove-
reign when the time comes, and be bound with 
the rest of India only for mutual defence ag-
ainst foreign aggression ••• "l 
It will be recalled tllat Rajaji had accep t ed Jinnah's 
Pakistan-scheme in its outline. 
The \•forking Committee of the 'hl.slim League met at .Bombay 
(August 16-20) and passed a resolution. It deplored the 
Civil Disobedience movement and asked the British Govern-
ment to make \vi thout delay, 
".~.an unequivocal declaration guaranteeing to 
rvuslims the right of self-determination and to 
pledg e themselves t~. t they will abide by the 
verdict of a plebiscite of Nuslims and give 
effect to Pakistan ••• Pakistan is the only solu-
tion of India's constitutiona l problem ••• 11 2 
It also showed its willingness to set up a provisional 
government on a footing of equality. 1\•.ro de.ys later (August 
22) Dr . Abdul Latif of Hyderabad did not appreciate the }rus-
lim League's attitude and stated that the Congress and League 
1. Times of India , August 16, 1942. -






jointly should arrive at an honourable compromise with the 
British Government . Sir Firoz Khan Noon suggested that if 
India was divided into five Dominions the present constitu-
tional deadlock would no longer exist. 1 
·when the Hindu l'.Iahasabha 1:/orking Committee met at New 
Delhi (August 30-31) it resolved that the British Government 
declare India's independence immediately, form a National 
Government, negotiate with the leading political parties to 
solve the constitutional deadlock and release all national 
leaders. It a ppointed a s pecial committee to convey his mess-
age through letters to the leaders of the Muslim League , the 
Sikhs, Indian Christians and Depres sed Classes. 
~tt . Arthur Moor, editor of the Statesman, speakir~ on 
behalf of the European Community in Calcutta, declared on 
Sep tember 9, that "the root of India's mistrust of Britain 's 
promises for the future lies in the distrustful attitude to-
\-Jards Indians of those directing British policy at present. 112 
The European ConmlUni ty in Calcutta passed a resolution that 
"the British Government should fort.hwith announce its readi-
ness to transfer full power to a liTational Government 6f India. 113 
l. Five dominions \<Jere to be 1) Bengal and Assam 2) Cen-
tral Provinces 3) United Provinces and Bib..E.r 4) Bombay 
5) the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the north W'est Fron-
tier Province. 
2. The Statesman, September 8, 1942. 
3 . ibid. 
----
Churchill made a sta tement in the House of Comrnons on 
September 10, 1942 that the :british Government policy re-
mained the same (i.e. to grant Dominion St a tus). He main-
t a ined tha t, 
11 The Indian Congress Party doe~ not represent 
all India, It does not repr esent t he majority 
of t h e people of India, It does not even re-
pre s ent the Hindu masses. 11 l 
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Ther eby he probably wanted to convey to the memb ers of 
the Hou .:o e that the demands of the Congress \•rer e not to be 
considered alone. Thus he \vas cons i stently loya l to the die-
hard- policy towards Indi a . 
Nr . Shi mrell (Labour I•Iember) said to Churchill tha t 
h is sta tement "will profoundly disappoint and shock millions 
---
of people i n this country (Engl and )." Further he asked_, 
11 Does he (Churchill) believe tha t by the t h rowing overboard 
of Congres s it "~.<ri ll lea d to a s olution of the problem? 11 • Nr . 
Greenwood (another l ab our member ) s a i d that Churchill' s 
sta tement 11 1.vas couch ed i n language v:hich wa s not cal cula ted 
to i mprove Anglo-Indian relations." JY".Jr. Roberts (Li beral) 
s a i d that if the Briti sh Gov ernment rea lly· meant to stand 
by the Cripps' proposals it --v.ras no use saying whether the 
British Government liked or disliked the policy of the 
1. 383 H. C. Deb., 5s., 302 . Churchi l l's statement covers 
columns 302- 5 • 
.Da ily Ti mes (London), September 10, 1942 . 
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largest party in India. 
Sir Frederi ck Sykes (conservative) s a i d that unless 
C.ongress withdrew its dem.and no further negotiations were 
possible, and \·Ji thout the i mpr isonment of the Congres s lead-
ers Indi a would have fought a civil war . I~ . Namon (Labour) 
s a id tl~t whatever t he intrinsic merits of Churchill's state-
ment , the a ctual l anguage used and its "swashbuckling 'damn 
your eyes 1 sort of thing was a throvlback to the debates on 
the Government of India .Bill."l 
Anyone who studies Chur chill's statement and the 
parliamentary deba te t hat follm,Ted, will be convinced that 
Churchill used provocative l anguage. Nost of the member s v1ho 
expressed such an opinion in the House were the Labour Party 
members , because t he labour party sympathised sincerely and 
openly with India's cause. It must not be inferred from this 
that the .British Labour Party endorsed the Civil Diso bedience 
Movement of the Indian Congress. However 1u· . Greenwood (Lab~ 
our) rep eated in the House when 11r . Amery made a statement 
t he next day (September ll) after Churchill's statement that, 
"No British Government can in future seek to es-
cap e from decisions already taken. British labour 
pledges itself to u s e all its power to see that 
t he undertakings given (by the British Government) 
are fulfilled."2 
1. Daily Ti mes (London), September 10, 194:3. 
2. 383 H.C. Deb., 5s., 557. Amery's statement a nd the debate 
cover columns 552~630. 
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J."'Ir. Sorensen (Labour) totally disagreed vri th Churchill's 
s tatement about the Congress and said 11 The only way in which 
one can test the strength of the Congress party is to turn 
1 
up election~:;- results. 11 
I~ . Amery stated that the Congress was responsible for 
the disorder tbat prevailed in India, and t hat unless unity 
existed between the Congress, Moslems and the Princes, the 
British Govermnent was helpless. Further, he reiterated that 
the British Government wanted India 11 to t a.J.ce her place as 
a freely associated member of that wonderful partnership of 
nations "'.vhich we call the British Commomreal th ••• 112 
Criticism of Statements of Churchill and .\mery in India . 
A number of leaders representing vari ous parties were 
engag ed in talks in Ne1.v Delhi. They cabled a joint statement 
to Churchill and forwarded it to the Viceroy to the effect 
that the Brltish Government should pledge a National Govern-
ment to India. It should consist or· representatives of major 
political interests, it should have complete autonomy in 
international administration during the war and unfettered 
freedom thereafter, it should proclaim India independent 
1. 383 H.C. Deb., 5s., 5@2. 
2 . ibid., 619. 
3. Times of India , September 10, 1942. 
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The Special Committee of the Hindu t~sabha complained 
that it betrayed a, 
"lamentable lack of statesmanship a nd was bound 
to arouse deep resentment throughout India ••• 
Does not IY1r . Churchill realize that inspi te of 
al l apparent diyersities there is one dem<:md 
which can truly be called the Nationa l Demand 
of India, t hat India 's freedom should be reoog.-
ni zed a nd that Eng land should surrender po·wer 
to a National Government forthwith? The crux of 
the problem i s : Is the .British Gove-rnment pre-
pared to part 1.d t h pm!fer? 11 1 
The Committee also compla ined t hat the Viceroy refused 
its request to confer I.•Ti th Gandhi and other Congress l eaders 
in detention. Furthermore, after consulta tion with other poli-
tical group s it declared, "We refuse to accept :Hr. Churchill 1 s 
sta tement as the last \voed in Indo-British politics. 112 
Mr . Jinnah in his press conference cri t icized Churchill's 
statement, for he thought that it did not g ive any impor-
t a noe to t h e Muslim League a nd implied that Brita in did not 
want or value Muslim co-oper at ion. He was g l a d that Chur chill 
v1as gr a ci ous enough to recognize Iv.Iuslim right of self-expre-
ssion. On October ll he stated in his Id (l'vluslim festival) 
message to the l·iuslim that "Either v1e achieve Pakistan or \ve 
perish ••• "3 
T.B.Sapru and Jayakar issued a joint statement on behalf 
of the Liberal Federation tha t 11 \'l e have read with much con-
1. Ti mes of India, September 10, 1942. 
2. ibid., September 14, 1942 . 
3. ibid., October 1 2 , 1942 . 
cern and disappointment Nr. Churchill's speech on the 
Indian si tuation. 111 They recom.t"nended that 
"even now an attempt should be made to es-
tablish wfuthout delay a National Government 
with the help of the l'{[uslim League, M:aha-
sabha andother political parties. 11 2 
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It mus t be pointed out, then, tr~t Churchill's statement 
was vehemently opposed in India and the Indian p eople at 
larg e were one in their demand for a National Government. 
Neanwhile the "India a nd B:ruma Bill 11 received a second 
reading on October 8 ., in the House of Comm.ons. The object 
of that bill was to provide direct Government under sec-
tion 93 of the Government of India Act. Yrr . Amery s a id that 
t he Bill was the result of t he fundamenta l differences bet-
v-reen Congress and the rest of India on one hand and the Bri-
tish Government on the other hand, a s regards the methods by 
which India was to a tta in her freedom. He emphasized tba.t 
Gan~hi's party was a revolutionary par ty yet the British 
Government had succeeded in breaking its back. He did not 
""ant any Congress appeasement but said that a door was not 
closed for favourable consideration of any proposals for an 
3 immediate interim solution subject to t he Viceroy's apporval. 
1rr. Maxton (Independent Labour Party) moved an amenrunent 
1. Statesman, September 16, 1942 . 
2. Hi ndu , September 16, 1942 . 
3. 383 H.C. Deb., 5s., 1386-1460. see section under "India and 
Burma (Temporary and l>tis cellaneous Provisions) Bill. 11 360 
voted for and 17 against the second reading of the Bill. 
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rejecting the Bill as it made no fresh attempt to solve 
t he ma in difficulties of the Federal Government in Indi a . 11r . 
Campbell tephen (I. L.P.) demanded that the Congress prisoners 
be released and Neh:ru be appointed as the Viceroy of India . 
Colonel Oliver St anley (Conservative) said tha t dur ing t he war 
it was i mpossible for the British Government to make a ny n8\v 
offer, for to grant immediate independence Vf ould mean \>Talking 
out and leaving Indi a to the J apanese, a nd the Indi an leaders 
must take the initiative. Ne. Graham \mite (Liberal) suggest-
ed that a nev-1 Viceroy be appointed to t a ckle the problem a -
n evr. lv1r . Greenwood (Labour) mainta ined tl1.a t Amery's cri ti ci srn 
was l ikely to embitter their rela tions v.ri th Ind i a . He urg ed 
t hat negoti a tions be reopened. 
~tr . Attlee (Dominion- Secretary) replied tha t l a ck of 
mutua l trust between the various Indian co~nunities was t h e 
clrief diffuculty. He s a id t hat no Govermnent can negotia te 
wi th t he p eople who are in rebellion but the Br itish Govern-
ment \vas ready to recons ider the problem if the Indi ans made 
nevi prop osa ls. Thi s debate makes it clear tha t the Labour and 
Libera l members v,rere eager to reopen the India n problem again 
because of t hei r deep sympa tby with Ind i a 's desire to become 
i ndependent, equal and free. On the other ha nd, the Conser-
v a tive-p olicy was not to gr ant India independence, but rather 
to g ive her Dominion Status ins tead. 
The Indian people did not sit with folded bands vlai ting 
for the British Government to t ake the initia tive to break t h e 
deadlock • • ajaji outlined a scheme for the Provisional Nati o-
nal Goverrunent on October 21. He suggested that the Viceroy 
should form such a Government from the responsible represen-
tativ es of the Congress and the Nuslim League and prepare 
for the elections to the New Legislature • He said, 
"I am convinced that the present drift is peri-
lous in the extreme ••• Whatever pacifists may 
say, Congress wants to defent the country a -
gainst the Japanese •• • ~tie want to be friends of 
Brita in, and \ve have the ca pacity to forget ••• 
lizy technique is trust - even where they (the Bri -
tish) don 't trust us; it is the only vvay to 
break this vicious circle (of distrust)."l 
The Hindu Mahasabha in its Cawnpore (Kanpur) meeting (Dec-
ember 29-31) delcared that 
" ••• in view of the fact that Britain is not 
pr epared to part with power ••• and of the f a ct 
that Pakistani Muslims a re a ctually threa ten-
ing civil \var and particularly in vievr of the 
f a ct t ha t the principle of Pakistan is being 
encouraged by the British Government ••. the 
lahasabha has come definitely to the conclus-
ion t hat an a ctive movement must· be resorted 
to, to compel Brita in to recognize India as 
a n independent nation as v.fell as to clefend the2 integrity of Indi a against Pakistani 1\llu s lims. 11 
It also asked the British Government to "modify their 
poli~ of the possible vivisection of India as embodied in 
t he Cripps ' Proposals. 113 On the last day of the year 1942, 
Gandhi ~:rrote a letter (from jail) to the Viceroy that "The 
l a\'1 of §!tyagraha knov/s no defeat ••• the period is drav.fing to 
1 . Hindu, October 21, 1942. 




a close, so is my patience." He informed the Viceroy that 
he v1as planning to 'crucify the flesh by fasting.' If the 
Viceroy could "convince me of my error or errors 11 Gandhi 
said he ~.-ras prepared to "make ample amends. u2 
The year 1943 began vii th an exchange of letter s bet-; _ -' 
ween t h e Viceroy and Gandhi. The Viceroy wrote to Gandhi,on 
J-anuary 13, in reply ( to Gandhi's letter of December 31,1942) 
that h e regretted the Congress policy, the violent events 
and Gandhi's silence about them. He suggested that if Gandhi 
consented to "retrace your steps a nd diaeoci a te yourself 
from the policy of last summer" the matter would be nego-
tiated further. 3 To this Gandhi replied (January 19) that 
he deplored the events that followed the arrests of the Con-
gress leaders (August 9, 1942) said that it was the respon-
sibility of the Government but he did not feel any "convic-
4 tion of error. 11 To this t he Viceroy replied (January 25) 
t hat "it is not the Government of India , but Congress a nd 
yourself ( Gandhi) that are on their justification in this 
matter (of disturbances)." 5 
1. The correspondence that was exchanged between the Viceroy 
and Gandhi during December 1942 and February 1943, is re-
produced in Linlithgow, 6p.cit., pp. 417-27. The quotation 
will be found on page 417. 
2 . i bid. 
3. ibid., p . 418. 
4. ibid., P• 419. 
5. ibid., p . 421. 
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January 26 being "Independence Day" the .All India Con-
gress Oommi ttee issued a nation-'1.-lide appeal in the name of 
the Indian National Congress and the Republic of India. It 
appeal ed to the Indian people that they should (1) pay no 
taxes or revenues to the British usurpers, {2) boycott law 
courts, {3) sell no crops or cattle, (4) keep no paper-money 
but deal only by barter, (5) form guerilla bands for self-
protection, {6) strike work and slacken production in fac-
tories, mines etc., (7) leave schools and colleges to "enrol 
a·s soldiers of the revolution", · (8) cease business with Eng-
lish men and withdraw deposits from the British and Imperial 
banks, (9) refuse to work in Government offices and in police-
departments, thus refusing "to be used against the na tional 
revolution", (10) "destory the usurper's authority andes-
tablish the Republic of India ", (11) take "an oath of alle-
giance ,to the republic and vow to rise against the .British 
usurpers on the command of the Congress." The whole pro-
gramme was to be carried out under the slogan "We Do or Die 11 
l (Karenge Ya IYI.arenge). 
Gandhi replied on January 29, that he defended the ·' .. 
"Q,Uit India" r .esolution (August 8, 1942) and declared that 
"If then I cannot get soothing balm for my pain 
I must resort to the law prescribed for satya-
grahis, (i.e. one vrho practices the "Law of 
lol7e") namely, a fast according to capacity. 
l.Statesman, January 27, 1943. 
I must commence after the morning breakfast of 
February 9 , a fast for 21 days ending on the 
morning of Iviarch 2. 11 1 
In reply Linlithgow said that the Congress and its 
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leaders were undoubtedly "responsible for the deplorable a cts 
of violence, sabota~ e a nd terrorism that have occurred since 
the Congress Resolution of August 8 declared a ' mass struggle' 
. t . 112 ln suppor of lts demands ••• He regarded Gandhi's fast 
as a "form of political blackmail." 3 T.o this Gandhi re-
plied (:B,ebruary 7) that he v1ould begin his fast on ~.February 
9 111..v i th the clearest possible conscience. Despite your des-
cription of it as 'a form of political blaclanail,' it is on 
my part meant to be an appeal to the highest tribuna l for 
justice which I rJE.ve failed to secure from you. 114 Thus the 
corresp ondence bet\veen the Viceroy and Gandhi ended. On 
February 9 , Gandhi began his ninth fast in the .Aga Khan's 
Pals.ce in Poena \vhich l a sted till £~~arch 2nd. . 5 
1. Linlithgow, op.cit., p.423 . 
2 . ibi d., p .424. 
3 . ibi d., p.425 . 
4. ibid., p . 427 . 
5. His previous 8 fasts were as follmvs: 
l) Harch 1918, a 3-day fast settled a mill strike. 
2) November 1921, a 5-day fast as penance for riots in the 
city of Bombay when the Prince of Vialesvisited Indi a . 
3) September 1924, a 21-day l)enance bece,use of communal riots. 
4 ) September 1932, "Fast unto death" if award . of separate 
electorates to "untouchables" was not dropped; successful 
5) Nay 1933, a :c 2l.,.dayself- purification fast. 
6) August 1933, arrested on eve of Civil Disobedience Cam-
paign, began fast August l,released August 23,life in dang er . 
7) .July 1934, a 7-day penance for public violence tmvards 
religious reformers. (8) lviarch 1939, "Fast u:nto death" as 
a result of an interpretation of a letter from the ruler 
of Raj . S'f. to Patel ; 1..vas ended on Viceroy's intervention. 
1?1 
IVi:eamrhile on February 13, the Goverfl..ment of India pub-
lished a document "on the Congress Party's -tesponsibili ty 
for t h e Disturbances in India 1942-43." The same was pre-
s ented to the British Parliament by Ivir. Amery as the \"mite 
Paper in March. Its conclusion was that all the evidence 
p ointed to the fact that t h e India.n National Congress under 
the lea dership of Gandhi must be responsible for the muss up-
rising a nd the crimes cmmni tted. 
In the House of Commons Debate (!.:£arch 30) that folloi.<I-
ed the :publication of the vlhi te Paper, 11 r. Graham Wni te (Lib-
eral) s a id that "'l1he vJhi te Paper is indeed a lar.a.entable docu-
ment, because it contains no prop osal wluch c a rries us near-
1 
er to a solution of the India n problem. 
said, 
H.r • .Ammon (Labour) vrhile criticizing the 1V11.i te Pap er 
"I am bound to s ay that, after reading it, I 
regretted its format as likely somewha t to 
acerbate the ill feeling existing, because it 
conveys the impression of being purely an ~ 
p arte statement."2 
He again emp:b .. asi zed the fact that the B:ri ti sh Labour 
Par ty vranted to see tbat 1 the establishment o f a free Indi a 
in the p o s t war world is secure.' Undoubtedly the British 
Labour Party consistently ma intained that policy (i.e. mak-
ing Indi a free a fter the \Var). As such it was one of the 
1. For full text of debate see 388 H.C. Deb.5s., 69-140. 
Quoted from column 81. 
2. i bid., column 95. 
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decisive factors that made India independent a fter t h e \-rar. 
Indi an Political Parties Suggestions to End the Constitutiona l 
Deadlock . 
I>'Ieamrhile s peaking before the 30th Session of the All 
Indi a :iYl'uslim League in New Delhi (April 24-26) J.i nnah said, 
"If t h e Congress leaders sincerely wish for the 
f re edom and independence of both nations - Hin-
dus a n d I.vioslems - there is no other \•ray except 
agree to the Pakista n-scheme. 11 1 
Dr • .Arnbedkar delivered a speech before the Scheduled 
Cl a sse.s an d sai d that 11 ••• both Nr. Gandhi a nd Hr. Jinnah 
should retire from a ctive politics. 11 2 He declared that the 
Scheduled Cla ssas -v;ould not let the Hindus and Ivlosl ems 
arrange for their ovrn political advancement leaving them 
aside. 
The Hindu Mahasabha passed a resoluti on to the effect 
t hat in v.:tew of J-innah' s determination the :f.l.ab.asabha might 
have to fi ght Pakistan single handed. 
The Non-Party leaders ap~ealed to the British Government 
(May 22) tha t the Congress political prisoners either must 
be tried or released. In their joint statement they stated 
t hat, 
"The Viceroy's recent refuse,l to permit any Con-
gress leaders to intervie-v; Gandhi , and I•U' ! .Amery ' s 
l. Statesman, April 25, 1943. 
2. Times of India, I~'Iay 10, 1943. 
speech in the House of Commons (Narch 30 ,1943) 
can be rea sonably interpreted as i ndicat ing 
t hat t h e British Government a.re resolved to 
k e ep Gandhi and Nehru and other prominent lead-
ers in detention without trie~l for the duration 
of t he \·rar . "l 
1?3 
Gandhi 1vrote a l etter to Ji nnah ( lf_ay 26) but · the Govern-
ment of Indi a refus ed to forward it to Jinnah because the 
Government t hought tha. t Gandh i gravely embarras sed Britain's 
1.·rar effort by a n illega l mass-movement during a critical 
time . Next day \'rhen IIIT . Sorens en r a ised a question in the 
Hou s e of Comrnons v..bout staging a trial of Gandhi and the Con-
gress leaders , llfr • .AJnery replied that the Government of Indi a 
had no such intention. Rajaji vehemently opposed the Govern-
ment of India 's a ttitude and declared that, not to allow any-
one to interview the Congressmen was "a crime against the 
p eople of India . 11 
On the other hand Jinnah came out with a strong voice 
against the Congress and declared that the Congress resolu-
tion of Augu s t 8, 1942 , was not merely a rebellion against 
t h e Br itish Government but an internecine war - a declara-
tion of ,,,ar against t he r~ruslim League a nd Nuslim India and 
t hat i f the Congress did not drop its "pistol" ( Q,uit Indi a 
Resolution) no settlement \vas possible. ·· 
A summary of conclusions may now be made. The british 
1. The Hindu, May 22, 1943. 
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Government offered a new Draft Declaration to the Indian 
people for the betterment of Indo-British relations . It 
promised India Dominion Status upon the cessation of hostili -
ties. This was not altogether a new offer because it had been 
pr omised earlier. It was the Conservative policy to grant 
India self -government by degrees and Churchill followed it 
f a ithfully. The two major political parties namely the Con-
gre ss and. the I-:Iuslim League rejected the Draft Declarat ion. 
The Congress Party rejected it becau s e it did not mention 
India 's inde pendence but promised Dominion Status. The Mos-
lem -League rejected it because it did not mention Pa~istan. 
So the Draft Declaration lead to a progressive deterioration 
so far as Indo-British relations vrere concerned. 
After the Draft Declaration t here was asplit in the 
Congress Party and Rajaji a ccepted in principle Jinnah's 
demand of Pakistan but under the dynamic leadership of 
Ganclhi , Congress passed a 11 ~ui t India" Resolution which was 
followed by the arrests of the Congress leaders and an out-
break of violence. 
It is undoubtedly true that a fter the 11 ~uit Indi a 11 
llesolution t he Indo-British relations were most bitter and 
there Vv&S a lot of mud-slinging on both sides. The Bri tish 
Government tried to convince the v1orld t hat the Congre-ss \ITas 
entirely responsible for the violence, terror a nd aabotage 
that followed the Augus t H.esolution, \vherea s t:he Congress 
put the whole blame on the British Goverrunent a nd argued 
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that if t he British Government did declare Indi a independent 
as the rnajority of Indian people were demanding there would 
have been no ne cessity of passing a Quit India Resolution and 
in t ha t event no disturbances \voul d ha.ve t aken place. The 
Congress admitted tha t there was an outbreak of violence but 
totally re jected· the idea t hat it 1va s carried out under the 
fl ag of the Congr ess. It is a lso true that Brita in's 
suppressive measures strengthened t he determination of the 
Indian people in making their demand for Indi a 's indep endence. 
On t he other h8.nd the r![uslim League , staunchly demand-
ed and defended the theory of t v1 o na tions but di d not appr ove 
of the Civil Disobedience Movement of Congress . The ~uslim 
League refused completely to compromi se on the issue of 
Pakistan. 
Churchill 's statement in the House of Commons (Septem-
ber 10,1942) did not hel p to improve the Indo-British rela -
tions . On the contrary it embittered t hem. The Briti sh Lab-
our Party c onsis tently appreciated the freedom- movement of 
Indi a though it did n ot approve of the Civi l Disobedience 
l1ovement of Congress. 
Nm..r Gandhi defended the . 11 Quit India" Resolution and 
began h i s "fast to capaci ty 11 beca use that -vms the only t h ing 
a Satyae;r ahi could ao (February 9 , 1943). That did not make 
the Jv.iu s lim League cha nge its mi nd . On the contrary the I-.fus-
lim League reiterated its demancl of Pakistan (April 24- 26 ). 
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Dr • .Ambedkar ''Ianted Gandhi and Jinnah to retire from 
politics and the Hindu Mahasabha, decided to fight Pakistan 
theory single handed. The Non-Party leaders requested the 
Br iti sh Government to either release or try the Congress 
poli tical prisoner s . It is certa in t hat the British Govern-
ment took drastic steps to put dov1n the so-called "open 
rebellion" of the Congress but in so doing the Indo-British 
relations were tota lly embittered. It is also true that the 
Congress-Muslim relations v.rere no better. 
In such a breakdown of Indo-British rela tions \•Jho took 
the initiative for the betterment of Indo-British relations? 
Did the British Goverrunent ~~ink of changi~g its policy of 
pr ogressiYe realization of self-government in India? . What 
ne\'i steps· \•rere follmved and \v i t h vrhat results? These ques-
tions ar e discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BRITAIN·' S N.E.'VI APPOINTI~JEN1' MID INDIA ' S ENCOURAGJill1ElrT 
Lord V/avell Ne\v Viceroy of India. 
The British Government no\v announced the appointment o 
of Fielf-I'1arshall (Of South E.:as t Asia Command) \'Iavell , as 
Gover~or General a nd Viceroy of India and General Sir Claude 
Acuhinleck as the Commander-in- Chief of India on June 23 . 
\'Iavell \vas to succ eed the retiring Governor General a nd Vice-
roy Linlitbgow in October. 
The day after the announcement Churchill clarified in 
t he House of Commons that v1 i t h regard to the development of 
. ./ 
self-governraent·in India , wavell 's appointment need not be 
interpreted as a change in the settled British policy . In 
~~s farewell address to the Houses of the Central ~egisla-
ture on August 2, 1943, Linlitl1gow once again emphasized that, 
11 It is the discordance betv;een those J?rincipal 
elements , the l a ck of truth, the lack of readi-
ness to accept t he legitimate claims of the mi-
norities, or of parties, or of intereBts, that 
stand in the ,,1ay (of constitutional advance) . 11 1 
In his farewell address to the Chamber of Princes on 
October 14, 1943, Lord Linli tbgo\'T reaffir~ed his "fa ith and 
confidence in the Federal ideal (of the Ac"t of L93o) 11 which 
he thought w·ould contribute "to Indian unity and to the 
l. Linlithgow, o~.cit., p .373; his full address covers pp .359-
375. 
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cons titutional futur e of I ndia. 111 
lrext day ... a j a j i appea led to t he Indi an epopl e not to 
embarrass .Brita in by the acts of violence because t hat -vmuld 
facilitate the conquest of Indi a by the Japanese army. 
Tv.r o days l a ter (October 17) Lord \ ave11 arrived in 
India. He was installed as Viceroy at a ceremony in the Dur-
' bar (Coronation) Hall, at New Delhi on October 20, after he 
had t aken the oath from the Chief Justice of India in the 
presence of the Executive Council and the ruling princes. 
Nov.r Jinnah issued a statement reiterating tha t "to Con-
gress of Hindu Indi a , Pakistan is anathema," but 11 to _. oslem 
Indi a it is an article of f a ith. 11 Furthermore, 
11 Unless fundamenta l deta ils are agreed on there 
can be no settlement or solution of the dead--
lock - the fundamentals being that all parties 
including the .British Government agree to the 
huslim right to self-determination and under-
t ake to abide by the verdict of the 1ruslim ple-
biscite in those zones. On this ba sis a pro-
vi s ional g overnment can be formed for mobili-
sing a ll our resources to resistthe aggressor. 11 2 
vh en Rajaji re quested \favell, on liiovem.ber 12, to grant 
him an intervimv with Ganill~i in jail, he was refused because 
the Viceroy believed tha t 11 there could be no question of 
specia l f a cilities for discussion with per s ons under r es-
traint for revolutionary a ctivities. 11 3 
1. Linlitbgow,op.cit.,p.387;his f arewell address cover s 
pp . 381- 90 . 
2 . Times of Indi a , October 31, 1943. 
3. Hindu, November 12, 1943 . 
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But Raj a ji declared that "inspite of every obstacle" he 
would strive to work for a political settlement. 
'l'he Council of All India }IJ:uslim League had its session 
at Nev.r Delhi {November 14-15). It declared that the necess-
ity of a united India and a highly centralized government 
was a new argument of the British Government \.vhich meant 
" ••• tha t the diehard Tory school in Britain 
does not wish to release their hold on this 
country. When . the British talked of the Cen-
tral Government their sole object was that 
neither Hindus nor Muslims were to be freed 
and (which) meant the continuation of British 
rule."l 
On belw,lf of the National Liberal Federation, Sapru 
suggested in his press conference on November 21, that the 
Viceroy should consider himself a s the head of an Indian 
National Government and summon a conference of all parties 
including the Congress. He emphatically recommended aboli-
tion of the India office and the office of the Secretary of 
St a te for India and suggested that the Viceroy should become 
a lVIinister of State vli th a permanent seat in the British 
Cabinet a nd the House of Commons and Lords. 
When the Non-Party Conference met at Allahabad (Decem-
ber 12-13) it severely criticized the British administrative 
set up and said that "It is an incontestable fact that the 
British are the real repositories of pmver ••• " it was of the 
opinion that, 
1. Statesman, November 16, 1943. 
"Britain can gain the friendship of India not 
by boasting that the number of British troops 
i n this country is greater than ever before in 
the history of the British connection, but by 
transferring the l a r gest amount of povrer to 
Indians during the \'Tar and thus convincing them 
that the British authorities genuinely desire 
to make India free and self-governing."l 
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The l as t vreek of the year 1943 s a\v t hree annual sessions 
of Indian politica l parties. The first one began with the 
Huslim League a t Karachi (December 24- 26). This s ession con-
firmed that India 1 s independence \vas the g'oa l of the l~Iuslim 
League. l'~Ir . Jinnah reminded the session that though Churchill 
had said that he did not take office to preside over the 
liquidation of the British Empire, he (Jinnah) 
" ••• \vould s ay voluntary liquida tion is more 
honourable than a compulsory one ••• and the Bri-
tish Empire will have to be liquidated one day. 
We are nmv impressing on British statesman that 
the only honest way for Britain is to 'divide 
and quit 1 • 11 2 
Next the Hindu Mahasablm had its annual session a t Am-
ritsar (December 26-28). Dr. Mooker jee (president) asserted 
that Hindu-~ruslim unity as the prime necessity was kept a-
live intentionally by Britain an d said t:b...at "none knew 
better than the British Government tbat Pakistan vi<:ts a sheer 
impossibility. 11 The 11alw.sabha favoured Fed.era tion for India 
but it did not want to grant any province a right to secede. 
1. St~tesman, December 14, 1943. 
2 . ibid., December 27, 1943. 
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It also demanded an i mmediate release of a ll Cong ressmen. 
The Nat iona l Liberal Federa tion had its a nnua l sessi on 
a t Bombay from December 29- 31 under the Presi dency of Gi r 
Maharaj Singh. It cri t icized t he Congress- policy of August 
1942 and suggested t hat t he August 8th resolution be treated 
as a "dead letter". It recommended the release of the impri-
soned Congressmen, a confer ence bet\veen major p oli tice.l par-
ties of India and that :Endia's represent a tives at the Pea ce 
Conference must be appointed by the Nationa l Government. 
The year 1943 was a t ragi c one because it saw a f amine 
(April-November ) especially in Bengal with a n unprecedented 
t oll of huma nd lives. 1 Whatever the cause of the famine the 
fact remains that the tragedy would have been lessened if 
not aver ted, if the Government of India ha'i moved rapidly in-
to the s itua tion to organize effective meausres. It is under-
standable i f extremely nationalistic sources put the whole 
bl ame on Br i tB~in for such a food-anarch-JT and a human-tragedy. 
They yea r 1944 opened vTi th the a nnouncement by the 
Indi a Office in London of the a ppointment of Sir Firoz IChan 
Noon a $ the Indian representativ e on the Briti sh War Cabinet. 
He was not representative of Indi a if judg ed by the stand-
a r ds of modern democracy. If he :represented anybody it was 
l. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit rep orted (October) that 700 died -daily; 
It has been estimated tha.t betvTeen Augustl-October 12 , 4794 
died in the streets (these do not include 2492 who died in 
t h e hospitals be twe en Augu s t 16-0ctober 12 ); between October 
16 and 23 , 2155 died.see St a t e sman,October 27 ,1943 . Amery 
said in the House of Commons "In Benga l l a st year (1943) about 
7000,000 human beings died as a consequence of that famine. 11 
see 402 H. C. Deb., 5s. column 1112 . 
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the Br itish Govermaent because he was not appointed with 
t h e consent of the India n people , let alone being elected. 
On February 17, 19£14, Lord favell the new Viceroy of 
Indi a delivered his maiden a ddress to the joint session of 
the Central Leg islature. He s a id that, 
" VIe (the British peo ple and His 1 aj esty' s Gover n-
men t) a re bound in justice, in honour, in the 
interests of progress, to ha nd over to India to 
an Indian rule which can maintain the peace and 
order a nd progress which we have endeavoured to 
establish. ' I believe that we should t ake some 
risk to further this; but until the t v1o main 
Indi an parties at least come to termB, I do 
not see any immediate hope of progre :3s. 11 1 
No one need doubt Wavell's consistency in reiterating 
the diehard British thesis that unless the Hindus and the 
ills lims agreed no political settlement was possible. He did 
not \-lant to release the Congress leaders until he v1a s con-
vinced that the Congress had wi thdrai.'in its "policy of non-
co-operation and even of obstruction." 
Gandhi wrote a letter to the Viceroy on the same day 
in which he s a id, "Nothing but an impartial tribuna l to in-
vestiga te the Government case and the Congress case against 
t he Gover nment v1ill bring out the truth." Furthermore he 
commented that "real war effort must mean satisfaction of 
India's demand." Needless to say that the attitude of the 
Briti sh Government and of the Congress regarding the vio -
lence after the .Allgust 8, 1942 resolution were directly 
1. Wavell, Indian l~oblems of To-day and To-morrow, a shing-
ton: Government of Indi a Informa tion Services, l944, p .5. 
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oppos ite. On Fe bruary 2 2 , l~ s. Ga ndhi died of a h e a rt a tta ck 
whi le Gan dhi was in ja.il. 
Lord •Iavell in reply to Ga ndhi's letter refered him to 
h i s inaugura l speech of February 17, and expressed his sym-
p athy on t he recent dea th of ~tr ~. Gandhi. 
Onc e again the India Office made a n &.nnouncement that 
Nr. Robert Francis ili'udie wa s appointed the Home-l:,iember in 
t h e Gov ern or General's Executive Council a nd that the Maha- · 
r a ja of Kashmir would represent India on the v/ar Cabinet to-
g ether \vi th Sir Firoz Khan Noon. Once a gai n it needs to be 
a sserted that these were a p p ointments by the British Govern-
ment. In that sense neither these men represented India .• 
In rep ly to the Viceroy's letter Gandhi wrote on •.tarch 
9 t hat h e d id not acce1) t the Viceroy's p oint of vie1,·1 a s re-
gards the p olicy of the Congress but p ointed out t hat t h e 
Viceroy's Executive Council wa s not representa tive of Indi a 
at all b ecau:s:e it \vas not 11 cho s en by the free vote of the 
1 p eople. 11 
The Viceroy \vrote back (Narch 28) tha t h e could go on 
far t her than v!hat t h e British Government offered tbrough t h e 
Draft Decl· .. rat ion ( 1942 ) a n d sugg ested t :b..at t h e Congres s 
should co-op era te with him to s ee India d evelop her self-
g ov ernment. Toth is Ga ndhi replied t hat it was t h e Viceroy 
l . Ti mes of India , March 1 0 , 1944. 
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and h i s governE ent t~~t had to co-operate and not the Con-
gres s . He wrote "Is it not h i gh time t hat you co-operated 
with the p eo ple of India through their elected represente.-
tives i ns tead of expecting co-opera tion from them? 111 He 
again stated that 
"The responsibility for what follm.v ed the 
hasty arrests of Congressmen mus t rest solely 
on the government . They invited the crisi s, 
not the authors of the resolution (Augus t 8 , 
1942 ). 11 2 
Fur t h ermore he believed tha t, 
"In dealing vri th Congressmen and others, Govern-
ment have combined the prosecutor, judge, and 
g a oler in the same person a nd thus made proper 
defence impossible on the pa:et of the accused. 11 3 
Finally he declared that 
..... unless there is a change of heart, view and · 
policy on the part of the Government, ·I am quite 
co ntent to remi an your prisoner."4 
The Imperial Conference met in London under the presidency 
of Clw.rchill from ay 1st to 16th. It wa s attended by Sir 
Firoz Khan Noon and the ~fuharaja of Kashmir on behalf of 
Indi a . 5 As pointed out earlier these two men were not ele~ 
ted representatives of India but were cho s en by the Govern-
1. The Hindu, April 9, 1944 . 
2 . i b id. 
3 . ibid. 
4 . ibid. 
5. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Rhodesia 
wer e represented by their respective Prime I"linisters (demo-
cra t ica lly elected by the people) IVJ:r . •lack enzie Kil'1..g , 1ir. 
J·olm Curtin , JYir . Peter Fraser , General Smuts, Sir Godfrey 
Riggins. 
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ment of Indi. (Viceroy and his Council) whereas the other 
members of the Conference 1t1ere really the peoples' representa -
tives. 
While t his Conference \va s in session, the ·war with Ger-
many carne to a n end (Jf.LB.y 9, 1944) and the India Office releas-
ed Gandhi from prison 11 solely on medical grounds". Gandhi 
had \vri tten a le tter to Jinna h on Hay 4 from prison which 
v1as not allo~>Ted to be published till I"lay 18. In this letter 
Gandhi bad suggested a personal meeting with J"innah "fa ce to 
f a ce r a ther tha n talking through correspondence" a nd had re-
quested ~innah to 
" ••• ap proach the great question of communal unity 
a s men determined on fi nding a common solution 
and work tog ether to make our solution acceptable 
to a ll \vho are concerned or interested in it. 11 1 
ihen Gandhi requested the Vicer oy (June 21) to let him con-
sul t the Congress \forking Cormni ttee to seek a solution to 
t he political deadlock -ravell refused it (June 22) on the 
grounds t hat Gandhi hc-'ld reitera ted his adherence to the " Q,uit 
Indi a " Resolution and so bad the Congress. 
Now Haj a ji proposed that if the muslim League endorsed. the 
d emand for the independence of India and co-op erated with 
the Congress in forming a provisiona l inter im g overnment for 
the transitional period a commission should be appointed, a t 
the end of the war, to demarcate contiguous districts in t h e 
1. Times of India , 111ay 18, 1944. 
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North ·vest a nd Eastern Indi a , where the 1•ioslems were in 
absolute majority. If a majority f avoured a sovereign state 
separ a te from Hindustan (India) such a decision be a ccepted. 
Its details need not deta in us. 
These prop osa ls of _ajaji were approved by Gandhi on July 
9 . It must be inferred from t h is tha t Gandhi a ccep ted in prin-
ciple the possibility of division. The Hindu Mahasabha 1 s 
Sav arkar veh emently criticized Gandhi a nd Ra j a ji for conced-
i ng llakistan to the J:lfoslems i:J i thout c onsulting the Hindu l•laha-
s abha and other :political parties; so it ca lled for 11 Akhand 
Hindus t a n" (undivided India ) and "Anti-Pakistan" week . Dr. 
Ar.abed.kar ( Scheduled Castes 1 leader) v elcomed Gandhi 1 s recog-
nition of the necessi ty of a communal settlement but would 
not let the Congress and t h e Iviuslim League "run away vli th a 
Nationa l Government leaving other minorities an d the Schedul-
ed Castes in the cold. 111 
House of Cc~nons debate on the India n Poli t ical Situation. 2 
Nr. Peth ick-Lavrrence (Labour) began the debate in the 
House of Commons and pointea. out ca tegorically the enhanced 
i mp ortance of India due to the war. He said "·vnen the war be-
gan, I n di a was indebted to t h i s country11 but n ov/ 11 ••• from 
being a debtor country India has become one of the grea t 
1. Times of India , July 23, 1944. 
2. The full text of t he deba te in 402 H.~Deb.5s.,l013-ll21. 
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creditor countries of the world ." 1 He a lso suggested that 
Gandhi's colleagues in pr ison should be released because "You 
ca nnot expect peopl e who .. are k ep t in detention on political 
gr ounds to recant their past vie\vS 11 and "Let us get rid of 
t he old distru s t on all sides. 112 
Sir Ge org e Schust er (Liberal) opp osed "any move· for the 
complete break ing-up of India . 113 Nr . Sorensen (Labour) plead-
ed that a "fresh approa ch should be made and the Co ngress 
leaders should be relea sed ••• " 4 1111' . .Amery pointed out tha t 
the British Government did not vrant to go beyond 1:1hat \-ras 
offered in the Cripps-Proposals (1942). He di d not t h ink that 
Gandhi' s p roposals of 
11 
••• the i mmedi a te recognition of India 's i n-
dependence under a provisional Government in 
whi ch the only pm•rers r eserved for t he Vice-
roy ar~ t hose which deal with the contr61 of 
a ctive military operations" and "that India 
is to bear no part of t he cost of her m:rn de-
fencett would f orm "even a startling p oint for 
profi t able discussion with Lord Wavell or with 
the interned Congress Party leaders . 11 5 
Criticizing this debate Gandhi observed tha t 
"The consensus of opini on in the House of Co-
mmons i s for me a terr i ble point er. It con-
firms me in my opinion that the 11 Q,Uit Indi a" 
re solution was no hasty cry conceived i n 
anger . 11 6 
1 • 4 0 2 II . C • Deb • , 5 s • , 10 15 -16 • 
2 . i bi d ., 1018-20; 
3 . ibid., 1029 . 
4 • it bid. ' 10 7 3. 
5 . i biSJ:., 1108. 
6. The Hindu , July 30, 1944 . 
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"C ••• Formula " and its repurcussions. 
The ne1·1 proposals of Raja.gopalachari a s stated earlier 
a ccep ted Pakista n in princi p le and \vere known as 11 c . R. Formulall 
(i.e.Chru{ravati ~ajagopalachari ). It has been also pointed 
out earlier that Gandhi accepted these proposals . So Jinnah 
made a statement on July 30 , to the council of Muslim League 
a t Lahore wh ich said, 
"Let l•'.lr. Gandhi J oJ.n hands \·lith the I•~uslim Lea-
gue on the basis of Pakista n in plain a nd un-
equivocal language and we shall be nearer the 
indep endence of the peoples of India. 11 1 
H~ disagreed vri th the procedure and method of Raj aj i and 
and said, 
" l'i:r. Gandhi is offering a shadovl and a husk, a 
maimed, mutilated a nd moth-eaten Pakistan , and 
thus is trying to pass off having met our Paki-
sta n scheme and the :iY1oslem demand. 11 2 
Furt her more he thought tha t the Indian peo :~?le should unite 
fir s t to wrest "freedom from the umvilling hands of the 
rul ers of Bri tain. 11 
on August 5, Dr. S . P . Yookerjee, President of the Hindu 
Maha sabha iforking Committee met Gandhi a nd expressed his 
strong opposition to any partition of India, thereby rejec-
ting the "C . R.Formula" . 
On August 9, Srinivasa Sastri of the :r:rational Liberal 
1. Times of Indi a , July 30, 1944. 
2 . ibid. 
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Federation in h is statement expressed faith in the unity of 
Indi a and requested Gandhi and I ajaji to "abandon t heir pre-
sent misguided attempt" for a solution of the communal pro-
blem by the division of India . 
The leader of the Sikh-community J.VIaster Tara Si ngh also 
made a pr ess statement that by accepting the 11 C • .l: .Formula" 
Gandhi had "let the Sikhs dmvn" and declarE~d that, 
" ••• should .om agreement be made over the he~ds 
of the Sikhs the reaction among us would be 
terrible. If the British leave the Indians to 
their fate and our demand is not met by the 
Hindu and JY oslem leaders the Sikhs v.ri11 be 
left with only one course, that of open re-
bellion. 11 1 
He emphasized that if the Noslems \vould have Pakistan 
the Sikhs v1ould have "their mvn sovereign state (Sikhistan) 
comprising Lahore and .Amri tsar." 
Lord \<Iavell nmv replied in the negative to Gandhi ' s ne\-v 
prop osa ls discussed earlier, and said that unless the Hindus 
and the Moslems agreed there would be no solution. He rejec-
ted them becaus e t hes e proposals 111·1ere similar to those made 
to Sir Stafford Cripps by the Congress President (Azad)." It 
is not difficult to discern tha t Wl.vell was merely restating 
1.-1hat .Amery had sta ted in the House of Commons on July 28. He 
did not think that, as Gandhi had suggested, the portfolio 
of Defence could be divided so long as the ;,v-a r wa s on. To 
this Gandhi replied the next day that, 
1. The Hindu, August 18 , 1944. 
"It i s crysta l clear that the Br itish Govern-
ment do not propose to g ive up t he power they 
pos sess over 400 million unless the l a tter 
develop strength enough to wrest it from them. 
I shall never lose hope that India will do so 
by purely mora l means. 11 l 
Gandhi-Jinnah Talks; 
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It mus t be point ed out that Gandhi had suggested (July 
27) in his letter to the Viceroy tha t "If there is a desire 
on the par t of the Briti sh Gover~~ent for a settlement 
2 friendly talks should t ake the pl a ce of corresponden ce. 11 
Si n ce the Br itish Government di d not take the initiati ve 
the Indian leaders did so. Jinnah a nd Gandhi me t a t Jinnah's 
house i n Bombay {Sep t ember 9-27) and ha.d a ser ies of t alks 
and corre sp ondence to find a common solution to t he politi-
ca l ·deadlock of I ndi a but t hey ended in failure.3 
They dis.agreed because Gandhi could not accept J-i nnah ' s 
tv-ro-nation theory (as , impli ed in the Lahore Resolution of 
1940) and Jinnah could not a ccept Gandhi's substitution of 
it by the 11 C . R.Formu.la11 • 
Once again the Hindu Mahasabha fork ing Committee re-
affi rmed aft er the "ta l ks" that India v1as "one and indivis-
ible". The Sikh Community Conference a lso reaffirmed their 
1. The Hi ndu, August 18, 1944 . 
2. Tilles of India, August 17, 1944. 
3. The writer was in Bombay at the time of the talks and also 
at the evening prayer-meeting of Gandhi when he announced ; 
that his talks with Ji nnah had failed. 
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o pposition to Pakistan and scdd that "If r~rr. Gandhi and 
l'rr . J"innah are bent upon vivisecting India then the Sikhs 
should be given a homeland worthy of their culture, history 
and traditions ••• ul 
The Non-Party leaders set up a ' Conciliation Committee ' 
on De cember 8, to investigate the quest ion of the future con-
stitution of India under the chairmanship of T. B. Sapru be-
ca use the British Government a.nd all the political parti es 
\oTere talking a bout a new constitution for India. 2 
In his address to the Asso.cia ted Chambers of Commerce in 
Calcutta , on December 14 , J"avell said that, 11 It is now once 
more f a s h ionable to dema nd a move by His h ajesty 's Govern-
ment 1 to s olve the deadlock'~ P ointing out the past t wo 
moves by His h a.j esty ' s Goverrunent (-i.e. the Government of 
Indi a Act of 1935 and Cripps Prop osals of 1942) he v1ent o.n 
to s a y that both thes e a ttempts . had. failed, so 11 His Majesty ' s 
Government sa id t hat they could do no more e;nd that Indi a. 
herself must make a constructive suggestion. 11 4 
The year 1945 began vli th the release from prison of 
l.Times of India, October 16t 1944. 
2 .0ther member s represented their communit ies: Dr. J·ayakar 
(Hindu) could not at tend the committee, Bishop Foss i/estcott, 
( ClTi istia n ), Radhakrishnan (Hindu philosPher), Homi Nody( Parsi) 
£.1ahraj Singh (Christian), l"iohrunmad Yunus (Nohammedan-section) , 
N •• Sarka r ( -·Iindu), Frank Anth ony ( Anglo~Indian), Sardar 
Sant Singh (Sikh). 
3. Statesman, December 15, 1944 . 
4 . ibid.--
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Dr . P . C. Ghosh and Pandit G.V.Pant both prominent members of 
the Congress · orking Committee. This took place on January 
14 . In t h e North \ e s t FT ontier Pr ovin ce after a no-confidence 
motion by the Congress-Party in the Assembly (24 to 8 votes) 
Dr . :Khan Sahib (Congres s -leader) formed the new mi nistry. 
This was t he first occasion since the commencement of the 
c onst itutiona l deadlock that a front-rank leader of the Con-
gress had formed a provincial ministry. In the Funjab the 
strength of the Muslim League Party was reduced as it had 
only 23 members in a House of 175 members. 
New Pr op os als. (June 14, l945) Lord -avell in London for dis-
cussion: {l1arch 23-June 1, 1945). 
Lord \<Iavell a ccompanied by Sir E. Jenkins (private secre-
t ary ) andRao Bahadur V. P . Iv.lenon ( -qeforrn-Commissioner) 1.vent 
to London . The purpose of his visit wa s to discus s with the 
new (i.e. not \var - cabinet ) British Cabinet mi ni sters the 
economic and administrative pr oblems ari s ing from t h e inten-
sifi ca tion of the war against Japan and the Indian constitu-
tional deadlock . These discussions resulted in a 11 \ hi te Paper" 
1 published by His Najesty's Gov er!l.nlent on J·une V!, 1945. IvJr . 
k nery Secretary of St a te for India read it (unusual parli emen-
1. Prime I'Iini s t er Churchill had repl a ce d the \'J-ar - Cab i net by 
a nevi Cabinet in Jl'i:ay 1945. There was no change so far as the 
Secretary of State for Indi e,n vTas concerned, because Amery 
reta ined . that positi on as before. The t ext . and explana tion of 
t he \vni te Paper a nd the rea cti ons of the members may be con-
veniently studied from 411 H. C. Deb.,5s., 1831-7 3. 
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tary precedure ) and exp l a ined it in the House of Commons ~n 
the same day . 
The purp ose of the wni te Paper vms to break the Indi a n 
p olitica l deadlock . The White Paper mainly contained the 
f ollovT ing p rop ositi ons : 1) 11 The offer of l'iarch 1942 , sta nds 
i n its entirety vdthout cha nge or qualifi ca ti ons111 ; 2) " The 
Execut ive Co uncil should be reconstituted" by the Viceroy 
"from among t he leaders of Indi a n p olitica l life ••• in pro-
p ortion ;,,rh ich would g ive a balanced representa tion of the 
main conrrnunities, including e qu a l proporti ons of fuoslems and 
Caste Hindus . 11 2 To facilitate it Schedule 9 of the Govern-
ment of Indi a Act of 1935 \vas to be so amended. 3) 11 In 
order to pursue this object the Viceroy will call into con -
f erence a number of leading Indi a n p oliticians ••• and put be-
fore this conference t he prop osa l ••• a nd ••• invite a list of 
na."l11.es . u 3 4) The members , v1ho sould be chosen from the list 
by the Viceroy, 11 -v/ould ofcourse ac cep t the p osition on the 
basis tha t t h ey v1ould ·vrh ole-heartedly co-oper a,te in sup p ort-
in_g a nd carrying through t h e \var a ga inst Japan to its victor-
i ous conclus ion. 114 5) 11 The members of the Exeuti ve \·rould be 
Indi a ns ;,v- ith excep tion of the _Viceroy a nd the Commander-in-
Chief, would reta in his p os iti on was War l,J.ember. u5. 
1. 411 H.G.Deb., 5s., column 1831. 
2 . ibid., coiUmn 1835. 
3 . ibi d . 
4 . i b i £ ., coulmn 1836 . 
5. i b id. 
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6) An Indi a n J; ember of t he Viceroy ' s Council to be i n char g e 
of Ext ernal Affairs and 11 fully accredited representa tiv- es 
s hall be appointed for repre,sente,tion of Indi a abro a d . 111 
7) Th e rela tions of the Crmvn v•ri th t he Indian St a tes to be 
una f f ected by t he proposa ls. 
1,1r • .Ame ry observed t hat "th ese p rop osa __ s ca n mark a 
g enuine step forward in the collabora tion of the :British and 
2 Indi a n p eo ples towards Indi a n self-g overtunent ••• " 'fhere is 
no reason to doubt t he sincerity of I-tr • .Amery and the .Bri-
tish GovernJnent. 
On the s ame day (June 14) Lord vfavell, in line -vrith the 
' lite Paper, made a broadcast in India prop osing 1) a n in-
vi t a tion to the representative Indi &~n leaders for a Simla-
Conference ~n formation of the Viceroy's New Executive Coun-
cil on June 25, 3 and 2) the immedia te release of the members 
of the Congress Working Committee who were interned from 
August 1942. 4 
Simla Conference . (June 25-July 14, 1945) 
The a im of thi s conference was to create a new Indianised 
Executive Council embodi ed in the ~f.hite Paper (June 14). In 
1.411 li~~Deb ., 5s., column 1837. 
2. i bid. 
3 . The ful l text of thi s broa dcast may be studied from Daner-
j ee, op. cit., pp . 95- 99 . 
4 . Among those released v:ere : Nehru, Patel a nd Azad, all 
former presidents of the Congress. 
his opening a ddress to the delega tes viavell s a id, 
"I have called you together at thi s critica l 
moment i n Indi a 's history to advise and help 
me in advancing Indi a tmv-ards prosperity, 
p olitical freedom ~nd greatness. It is not 
the constitutiona l settlement, it is not t h e 
fin~l solution of India 's complex problems, 
tha t is prop osed . Nor does t he pl an in any 
way prejudge or p:tejudice the fina l issue. 11 1 
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It is t o be pointed out tha t there \vere two main diffi -
cul ties in creating c:~. Council as proposed by the Br itish GGfv-
ernment. Firstly, that the Congress a predominantly Hindu or-
ganiza.tion claimed to represent non- Hindu communi ties, \vhere-
as the huslim League claimed to be only au thori ta ti ve sp ok es-
man for a ll the Noslems though it did not include all 11i os l em 
sects . Second ly, the Punjab Unionist Party hea deu by I~lik 
Khizar Hyat Khan (including Muslims, ~ikhs and Hindus) claim-
ed one of the l•.foslem seats on the proposed Council and did 
not \-.rant to submerg e itself in the communalism of either the 
Congress Party of the Huslim League. 
On request of l~ . Jinnah the Viceroy adjourned the Con-
f erence . The Cong res s submitted fifteen n Clllles includin~ tha t 
of the Viceroy and the Comrnander-in-Chief , but Jinnah sta ted 
in h is letter to the Viceroy on July 9 , tha t he coul d not 
l. J i mes of Indi a , June 25 , 1945. The delegates vJer e: t.ir . 
Gandhi, •.tr . Jinnah, ~ a o Babadur Si vra j ( Scheduled Cl as ses), 
}laster ·r . s ingh ( Sikh), Jvl:r . Bhula.bhai Desai a nd Lia1uat Al i 
Kb..an (the Congress and Deputy huslim Leaders in the Centr l 
. ssembly), R.§\ j@. Govindl a l lvlotila l and I<Jr, Hossa in I main (the 
Congress and I1uslim leaders in the Council of St ate), Dr . 
C. P . Banerjee a nd Si r Henry Hicha rdson (l eaders of the Natio-
nalist Party and the Europ ean Group in the Assembly) . 
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submit a list of names if h e vJas n ot guaranteecl tha t the 
Huslims woul d choose al l the lJluslim members of the :E:x:e cu ti ve 
Council a nd the Viceroy's assura nce tha t he would overrule 
t h e major decisions of the Council i f t hey adversely a ffect-
ed the Nuslim community. This sounded the dea th-knell of the 
Conference. 
In the l as t a ttempt to s ave the Conference the Viceroy 
had persona l meetings vri th Jinnah, Gancl.hi, Azad and I>ialik 
Khi zar but to no purp ose. On July 14, Wavell reported to t h e 
fi na l sess ion of the Congress t bat t~e Simla Conference ha d 
broken do-vm be cause the Congress a nd the 11uslim League dis -
agreed \v i th regard to the a lloca ti on of sea ts in -the Vice-
roy's Council. The Viceroy s a id, 
"l y orig ina l intention Has t hat t he Conference 
s houl d agr:ee upon the strength and composition 
of the Exe cutive Council and tha t thereafter 
parties should send me a list of names. 11 l 
F~rthermore he said, 
"I r eceived li s ts from all parties repr esented 
here ex cept from the European Group ••• and the 
I1uslim League ••• when I explained my soluti on 
(to select a balanced a nd efficient :Executive 
council) to IIJ!r . Jinnah he told me tha t it was 
no.t _acceptable to the 1-'Iuslim League ••• The Con-
f erence has, therefore, f a iled ••• I wish to make 
i t clear t hat the responsibility for t he f a il-
ure is mine. 11 2 · 
It needs to be ppinted out here that the Viceroy ' s orig i-
1. Times of Indi a , July 15, 1945. 
2. Banerjee, op.cit., pp . 99-100. 
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n a l intention d oes not seem to have been revealed or clari-
fied before the delegates. If it ;,.ms~ n o one seems to have 
referred to it during t he Conference. If the Viceroy 1:1a nted 
f irst a nd foremost ~ the agreement aa to the strength and 
comp osition of the Council, one \v enders i:rhy ~ at all , he a sk-
ed and r eceived the li s t of names from all the parties (ex- -
cep t t h e Huslim League a nd J1uropean Group) before such an- _ 
agreement vra s reached? 
T.he India Office in London p a id a tribute to the Vic~ 
roy v1ho had "mo s t patiently a n d ass iduously endeavoured to 
bring the parti es tog ether. 111 Jinnah called the Nei:l Propo- __ 
s a ls 11 a. snare" be c aus e in the proposed Executive Council 
the :L-1uslim Le a gue VJould h a ve been reduced to a minority of 
1/3 a nd t~1.fl-t the five member s of the JI:Ioslem bloc v1ere not 
a llovJ ed to be nomina ted solely by the NU.slim League because 
t h e Congress elaimed t wo :lYioslems and the Unionist Party one. 
Azad o·bserved t hat it ~.,ras a g rea t mi s take t o convene 
the Conference on communa l g rounds. He cons idered the 1-iU.sl im 
League directly a nd the British Government remotely resp on-
sible for t h e f a ilure. He t hought tha t the Hsulim L eague 
shoul d not have been a llowed to veto the Simla Conference. 
\·Jhoever may have b een respobsible for the f a ilure 
there is no doubt tha t Wavell help ed to lessen the bitter-
ness of Indo-British rela tions. He certa inly kindled a hope. 
1. Baner jee, op .cit., p . 97 . 
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It is also true t hat the Viceroy a ttemp ted to Indi a nize the 
Council so tha t, as he said, "the v1ar aga inst J"apan m ,y be 
prosecuted vii th the u tmo st energy till Japan is utterly de-
f'eated.111 
;Bri ti sh Labour Party Came into Pov1er (July 26, 1945) . 
\•ihile Indi a 1vas busy ·~v i th the Simla Conference, Britain 
v1as busy with its General Elections. Though Churchill v10n 
the ~:;ar (Hay 9, 1944) he lost the General Elections ( J"uly 
1945). IVIr. Clement Attlee formed the British Cabinet (J-uly 
26 ' l 945) . 
It is i mportant to note that I1r . Pethi ck-Lawrence re-
placed Hr. Amery as the Secretary of St a te for Indi a . The 
rep lacement of the Conservative Party (under the leadership 
of Churchill) by the Labour Party was a n i mporta nt change 
for Indi a n becaus e as f ar back as 1929, the Labour Party had 
sympathized \1T i th the freedom movement of Indi a and as pointed 
out e a rlier the Br itish Labour Par ty had pledged India it s 
freedom a fter the v-rar . So India rejoiced at lir . Attlee' s vic-
tory ,n<;l Churchill 1 s defea t vli til the high hope that the Bri-
tish Labour Party vJoul d nm·r have a n opportunity to fulfill ·· 
its p ledge. 
'rhe British Labour Party 1.-.ras one of the factors which 
assisted Indi a in a ch ieving its independence. It is interes.ow; 
1. Banerjee, 0p.cit., p . 97 . 
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ti n_g to s p ecula t e viheth e r I ndi a \•Tou l d h ave become inden end-
ent i n 1947 if die-hard conservative Chur ch ill h a d not lost 
t h e 1945 e lections . It is not too much to s ay that Churchill ' s 
d efea t wa s Indi a 's victory. 
Announcing of the Genera~ Elections. 
Aft er the failur e of the Siml a Conferen ce a nd the insta ll -
a tion of t h e Nev1 British Ca binet, Wavell announced on Au gu s t 
21, t hat (1) the General Electi ons to the Central and rovin-
ci a l L eg isla tures \-Jere to be held as sean as p ossible . (It 
will be reca lled that the .Central Leg islature was nov1 10 
y ea rs old established by the Act of 1935. Its norma l term of 
5 yea rs wa s over a lrea dy in 1940 but it wa s granted several 
extensions) . (2) tbat t h e life of t he Central Assembly \·/auld 
exp i r e on October 1, 1945 and (3) the life of the Council of 
t)t a te '\'lould be extended to I~ay 1, 1946 because the electoral 
rolls v.rere not rea dy. The elections w·ere to be fall ovred after 
that da te . (4} The Viceroy would visit London once again to 
c onsult His 111aj esty ' s Govermllent . 
rlavell ' s Conference with Nevi Labour Cabinet in London (August 
26 - Se p tember 13, 1945}. 
According to his a nnouncement of August 21, fa.vell left 
Karachi (Sind) by a ir and a rrived in London on _ugust 26th. 
He h a s a number of discussions es-Jeci a lly with Pethick- La;,v-
renee the ne\v Secretary of State for India a nd the Labour 
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Cabine t on the politica l and economic situa tion in India . 
He r e turned to India on September 16. 
Af t er his London trip Wavell made a broadca st on Septem-
b er 19 , that, 
"His IVJ:a j esty' s Government a r e determined to do 
t h eir utmost to promote in conjunction with the 
lea ders of Indi a.n opinion the early realisation 
of fu l l se±f-government in India. 11 l 
He further revealed tha t it '-' a s the intention of "His 11a-
jes t y 's Government to convene as seon as possible a constitu -
tion- mak ing body11 and to offer 
" ••• some alt erna tive or modified seherne if the 
Cri pps proposals v1ere not accept able. 11 He em-
pha sized t hat 11 His l'iaj esty' s Government a re 
determined to g o ahea d vii th the t a sk of bring-
ing Indi a to self-g overnment a t the earliest 
p os s i ble date."2 
Fi nal ly he concluded tha t 
" ••• Afte r t he elections I :pro p ose to hold dis-
cussions v1i th representa tives of those elected 
~nd of t he Indian St a tes, to determine the form 
"~;lhich the c on s titution-making bdldy should tak e, 
its power and lJrocedure. 11 3 
It mu s t be admitted tha t these sta tements from the Vice-
r oy had a new tone if not a new substance. Thi s bro adcast 
made it abundantly clear for t h e first time t~~t t h e Br itish 
Government was contemplating concretely to convene a constitu -
t i onal Assembly as re uested by the Congre s s an d other part-
ies. The Briti sh Labour Government by making such an offer 
~. Ti mes of Indi a , September 20, 1945. 
2 . ibi d . 
3. ibid:-
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1.·;as trying to fulfill its pledge. 
On the same evening (September 19) Attlee made a bro ad-
ca st from London appealing to the Indicm people to 11 join to-
gether in a united effort to vJorlc our a c onst itution w·hich 
me.j ori t y and rb:i'nori ty communities Hill accept a s just and 
fair" a nd in w:bi ch the 8t a tes as \vell · as the Provinces could 
t ak e their pl a ce. 
It must be pointed out here that the new British Labour 
Government did not str_y o.s did the previous Governments tha t 
the Hindus c.tncl the J.JUslims should unj. te first so tha t the 
British Govern~ent mi ght be ab1e to g ive Indi a self-g overn-
ment by step s. On the c ontrary the Labour Government said 
tha t Incl.i .s. will have a. constitution-making body of its o\<rn 
ch oice. 
Attlee-'vriavell Proposals and its effect in India. 
The All Indi a Congress Cownittee met a t Bombay ( Bep tem~ 
ber 21-23) to cons ider these prop osa ls a nd resolved t:b~t 
"It i s significant that there is no mention in 
thes e broadcasts of the independence of Indi a . 
Nothing short of independence can be a ccep ted 
by Congress and the country. The proposals nm·J 
made are, in the op inion of the A.I.C.C. vague, 
inadequate and unsa tisfactory."l 
It mus t be pointed out t:J:1at this was not a new stand of 
t he Congress. The Congre ss had cla imed 'nothing short of 
l. The Hindu, September 24,. 1945. 
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i ndep endenc e ' s ince 1930 and Br i tain had promi sed progre-
ss ive r ealiza ti on of self-g overnment since 1917. 
Nawabj a da Liaqua t Al i Khan t h e ~fuslim · League's Secre-
t a r y Gene r a l decla red on September 2 4 tha t t hey "conta ined 
n ot hi ng n ew" and uere "the s ame old Cripps proposals which 
t he Leagu e r e j ected i n 1942 . 11 Furthermo r e he s a i d thet 11 The 
only soluti on of t he I ndi c;.n cons tituti ona l problem lies in 
t h e a ccep t a nce of Paki s t a n." 1 
The Si kh co.nununi ty ha d its Akhadi Si kh Congre s s a t La -
h ore on September 2 9 . It did not a ccep t the nmv prop osals 
b ecaus e t hey t hought that t h e prop osals v1ould lea d to Pald -
stan and Pakistcm to them v1a s "a grave mena ce to the r eligi-
ous , s ocial, political and economic v1 ell-being of the i kh 
c ommuni t y ." 2 
The Scheduled castes expres s ed its opposition t o t he 
At tl ee- Iavell propos al s t h rough its -v,rork ing Gommi t tee on 
October 4 a t Poona , becaus e i t could not a ccep t t h e recon-
s tructi on of t h e Centra l Legisl a.ture of the Cons tituent A-
s sembl y as i mplied in the propos a ls . 
The National Libera l Feder a tion ha d it s Council meeting 
at Bombay on November 10- 11 and resolved t hat 
" The Viceroy s hould decla re forth with t hat the 
future step s for the formation of a Centra l 
l. Ti me s of Indi a.t.. September 2 5, 19 45. 
2 . ibi d ., September 30, 1945 . 
Gover~~ent and for the framing of a constitution 
will go fonva.rd not withstanding the dissent of 
a,ny party. Such a decla ration will itself,help 
to bring about an understanding between the par-
ties c oncerned."l 
Eeanwhile, the Indi a Office announced the appointment 
of Sir c. Trivedi a s t he Governor of Orissa. This was the 
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second such appointment of a n Indian as Provincial Governor 
for the full quinquennia l terrp.. Lord Sinha v1as the fir st t ::.c 
Indi an to be appoint~ed . as the Governor- of Bihar and Orissa 
in 1920, but he resigned aft er 12 months of service. 
1'his gesture on the part of the .British Governr.aent \vas 
certainly timely and reflected a slight improvement in Indo-
.British relations~ Furthermore, General Sir Claude Auchin-
leek Commander-in-Chief a nnounced on October 22 tha t the 
Gover:rmrent \vas planning for the complete Indi c;mization of 
Indi a 's armed forces. 
The Briti sh Government 's decision to Indianize India's 
armed forces '.-las necessitated by Indi .s, ' s war record. They had 
realized that given equal opportunity the Indian soldiers 
1·.rer e effici ent and or ave enough to encounter difficult w.ar-
situa tions . The Indi an soldiers had fought in almost all 
i mp ortant fronts of the ·v1ar . In Europe they fought in di cily, 
Italy and Greece. In Africa they fought in North Afr ica and 
Tunisia. In the conquest of El~ etri a and Abyssinia their role 
1. Times of India , November 12, 1945 . 
was outstanding . It has been observed tha t 
" The mo s t i mporta nt military effort of I ndia 
vias t hr freeing of the Burma Road a nd the re-
conquest of Burma·. Thi s ca.mpai g n was one of 
t h e mos t diffi cult a nd int rica te of \• orld •far 
II. 11 1 
So Auchinleck ' s announcement of the complete Indi ani -
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za ti on of Ind i a 's armed fo r ce s a lso help ed to crea te a feli-
citous p olitical a tmosphere beuveen India an d Br itain. 
As announced by t he Viceroy t he elec tions were ca rri ed 
out for t he Centr al Lee; isla ture in Hovember a nd December. 2 
The final results f or the Central Leg isla ture s h owed tha t of 
t he 102 elected member s t h e Cong ress -r,·.ron 56, l>'1'u s lim League 
30, t he Eur opean Group 8 , I ndep endents 6, a nd t he Akali 
Si khs 2 . knong t he 40 nomina t ed members 26 wer e of fici a l and 
14 vrere non-officia l. Iv.Ir. . As af Ali \vas el ec.ted Congress lea d-
er i n the As sembly , Hr. Jinnah of t he Jii:oslem League and 
I'lr • P . J . Griffiths of the Europe e.n Gr oup . 
Some conclusions may now be dravJn. The Briti sh Government 
appointed Lord ':avell a s the l~e~;-.r Viceroy of Indi a not \•li t h 
any vi ew of cha ng e in the Conservative policy tm.;a rds Indi a . 
At the s a..me time t h e Congress and the £1luslim League did no t 
chang e in their demands either. l\fow t he maj ority of the 
1. T. Vl . Wallbank, Indi a , 1\few York : Henry Holt 2c Company ,l948, 
P • 94 . 
2 . The Govermnent of India had announce d the da tes for the 
el ections as follmv-s: Assam, November 21; Centra l Provinces, 
November 22 ; Punjab, November 23; Barnaby, Bi har and United 
Provinces, November 26; Orissa,November 29; Madra s and Sind, 
Becember 1; N. ·vr . F . P. December 4; and Bengal, Dec ember 10. 
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Indian political part ies began their severe cri t icism of 
the Vi ceroy 's Council and due to the i mmedi a te threat of 
Japan I s invCJ,s ion began t o c l amour for a national Govermnent. 
The Brit i sh Gov ernment vras in a critica l pos i tion because of 
the Japanese invas i on of Burma and the f amine in Bengal. 
This situa ti on ·~va s a bit relieved by timely precaut i ons . 
The British Government in order to win t h e Indi an peoples 
full s uppor t l n the \var eff ort aga inst Japan appointed t~v o 
Indi an representatives on the War-Cabinet a nd the Imper i al 
Conferenc e , t hough no t by-i. the consent of the Indi an people. 
u O tha t d i d not hel p much to i mprove t he Indo- Br itish rel a-
tio.ns. 
The British Govermment then relea sed Gandhi on medical 
grounds . Novl aj a j i 'l.>lho had a ccepted Pakistan in principle 
pleaded with Gandhi and Gandhi accepted Rajaji 's theory tha t 
in order to a.ahieve India's independence the Huslim League's 
demands must be met a t least half-way. But the Hindu l'iaha-
sabha and the Sikh community did not accept Rajaji's theory. 
They had unequivocally res olved to figh t tooth and ~L il 
Jinnah 's Pakistan. 
The Br itish La,b our Party pleaded to release the deta ined 
Congressmen i n order to make fresh a ttempts to solve Ind.i ~ n 
political deadtlo ck but Amer y ' s o:pi nio _ was ~:of the opi nion 
that no change in British policy v1as pos s ibl e . 
Since t he Br iti sh Government made no a ttempt to end the 
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I ndi an politica l deadl6ck even though the war was over , 
Gandhi and Jinnah took t h e initi a tive to find common ground 
betVJeen the t\•ro major politica l part i es of India. Their talks 
ended in f a ilure becaus e both the parties were a damant in 
t he ir demands . Though it must be admitted tha t due to Faj a ji's 
effort, Congres s had modi fied its p olicy tmvards t h e hu s lim 
League ' s dema nd of Pakis tan. 
Nov! \v avell "'rent . to London an(i c· tJne back with Nevv- Prop osals 
(June 1 4 , 1945) . These prop os a l s were ma i nly directed tov1a rds 
the expans i on of the Vi ceroy ' s Council. They were of f e red in 
order to s eek comple t e co-opera tion from the Indi a n pe opl e 
to \v in the war against J apan. So the vJCu did help Indi a i n 
getting some c onees s ion from t he British Government. In 
order to expl a in his prop osa l s \ avell ca lled the Siml a Con-
f erenc e (June 25 - July 14 , 1945 ) but it bore no fruit. How-
ever it nrust b e pointed out t hat {avell's efforts help ed to 
dilute to a certa in extent t he cor r os i ve bitterness of Indo-
~r itish re l a tions t hat had existed s ince Augu s t 8 , 1942. 
At t h is junction the Br itish Labour Party cD.me into 
pov1er (July 26 , 1945 ). The victory of the Briti sh Labour Par -
ty \vas profoundly p ortentous f or India in a s much as it h aa 
undevi a tin,g ly s i ded vli t h Ind i a ' s cause . '.vavell again went to 
London for a d i scuss i on vvi th the nevi Lab our Cabi net Fr om 
t hi s point on the British p olicy tovrards India changed radi.;. 
ca lly. 
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On his return \'Iavell a nnounced ( September 19, 1945) to 
the Ind i a n pe ople tha t the J3r i ti sh Government had a cce:::)ted 
fully Ind i a ' s r i ght d>f self-determina tion. As such India \·las 
to b ecome a compl ete self-governing nation a t the e arli est 
p ossible date. He a lso s u gg ested a poss ibility o f a Consti -
tuent Ass embly after t he elections. But these new Attlee-
Wavell p rop osa ls d id no t creat e bu oy a nt enthusia~ in I ndi a 
because Cong ress s tuck tenaciously to 'noth ing short of 
independence here a n d novr' a nd the Nuslim League ' n oth ing 
s hor t of a k ista n her e a n d now '. 
However the a nnouncement of t he Ind i a office of a n 
Ind i a n a s the Provisi onal Govern or a nd oir Cl a u d e uchin -
leek ' s a nnouncement of comp~ete Ind i ani zat i on of I ndi a ' s 
o,rmed for ce s c on tri buted towa rds the i mp rovement in Ind o-
Br itish re l a tions. It must be a s serted t hat Ind i a 's meri tor-
ious war-re cord was one of the most imp ortant factor s that 
convinced Brita i n tha t I nd i a co u ld heroica lly defend herself. 
It was t h erefore v1or t hy of indep endence. 
vlhat d i d the :Sri ti s h Lab our Party d o to fulfi ll it s 
pledge of India's complete i ndependence a fter the v1ar? What 
\4as t h e resp onse from the Indi a n pe op l e? These a n d other re-




Britain Grants India Her Independence 
The year. 1946 commenced with the arrival in New Delhi of 
the British Parliamentary delegati on . to India on January 6. 
It left India for Britain on February 8 after an extensive 
five-week visit to various parts and discussions with vari-
ous parties of India. The delegation was led by Professor 
Hobert Richard (Labour). In his final press conference he 
said, 
11 There are deep divisions among you, but those 
divisions disappear ip the unity with which 
you very rightly demand a measure of self-govern-
ment ••• vJe are all conscious of the fact that 
India has at last attained politica l manhood. 11 1 
Now the Provincial election began with Assam on January 
9, followed by 'elections in other provinces a nd ending at 
diffe r ent times up t o the middle of April. 2 Of the General 
votes cast Congress polled 8 0 per · cent. Of t he Fi:oslem.- votes 
cas t the Nuslim Lea.gue polled 74 per cent . In 1937 t he Con-
g ress 11.ad '.von 704 of the t otal 1 , 585 sea ts in the 11 provin-
1. Ti mes of India , February 9, 1946. 
2 . The-var ious parties ca st their vot es a s follov1s: 
Congress 11, 86 3 , 053 Krishak I?r:Oja 132,581 
hU.slim League 4 ,530, 538 J ami a t-ul-Ulema 1 02,190 
Connunists 653 , 489 (non~League Muslims) 
Schedu led Castes Fed. 509,217 Nationalist· 1"1Uslims 118,661 
Punje,b Unioni s ts 413,815 A.hras 67,461 
Hi ndu Eahas a bha 285,567 Khaksars 21,100 
Akahi Sikhs 178,509 
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ces but in 1946 it won 930 . It secured an absolute majority 
i n e i ght provinces. 1 
The l·iusli:m League had captur ed 109 of the 492 Ji ... oslem 
seats i n 1937, but in 1946 it secured a s pecta cular success 
by capturing 482 sea t s . It must be admitted t hat the m~in 
is sue i n the provinci a l electi ons s o ~ar a s the Iruslim League 
v1as concerned v1as Pakista n c::..nd J innah ".·1on electi on on that 
i ssue . Taht was the greatest victory for J innah &md the hus-
lim League because it wa s for t he fir s t time t hat t he ~ruslim 
League had fought t he elections on t he ba sis of Pcili i s t an. 
That undoubtedly gave t he Huslim League a ma ndate from the 
Iv~o s lem electorat e to be a ccomplish ed in the mea r future. 
Br i tish Cabinet ~~1issi on. 
In conjuncti on with the Viceroy's a nnouncement of :::>ep tem-
ber 19, 1945 , I'Ir . Attlee announced i n the House of Commons 
on Febru ~ry 19, 1946 , t hat 
11 In view of the paramount i mportance not only 
to I ndi a and t he British Commomrea l t h but to 
t he pea ce of t he world of a successful outcome 
of the d i s cus sions vr i th t he lec:.ders of India.n 
opinion, His Majesty's Gov erruuent have decided 
to send out to Ind i a a s pecia l mission composed 
of Cabinet l inisters to seek in a ssocia ti on 
with t h ese leaders on the princi ples and pro-
1. The follouing are t he names of t hose eight provinces : 
Ass am, Bi har , ombay, Centra l Pr ovinces, 1adr a s, North est 
Frontier Pr ovince, Orissa and t he Punj ab. The Congress a lso 
increased its representati on i n Bengal from 52 to 86 , a nd 
i n t he Punj ab from 19 to 51, in Sind from 7 to 22 . 
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cedure r e l a ting to t h e constitutional issue. 111 
Fr om this it is p l a in to see t h a t t he object of the 
}.ii ss i on \va s to arrive a t an agreement vli th t h e Indi a.n lea ders 
on t h e princi ples a nd procedure of g r a nting Ind i a self-g overn-
Ill.Ent. 
The Hou s e of Commons h a d a debate on India on l•ia rch 15. 
l11r . :rt . A. Butler (conservative) bega n the debat e a nd ob serv ed 
t ha t , 
11 Indi a ' s war r e cord, to which we should a ll de-
s ire to pay tribute, a nd the str:t~ding of Indicm 
sta tesmen, which many of us have exp erienced 
a t first han d on many occasi ons, neeessita te 
a n early adv a nce tm·mrds tha t g oa l of self-gov-
ernment to 1·rhich ':Je a re a ll p ledged."2 
Church ill a lso a dmitted tha t, 
" 'l'hese pro p os a ls (Cripps,l942 ) were .rrL.de by us 
a t a moment i:Jhen t h e dang er of J apanese inva s-
ion t :b...rea tBned Indi a in a t errible me.nner, <:md 
I, p ersonally , was i ndu c ed to a g ree to them by 
t h e a ll-comp elling vrar inter es t, a s it seemed, 
of trying to r a lly al l the forces in Indi a to 
the d efence of their soil against Japanese 
agg ression a n d a ll t h e horrors t r.J.a t '\ifould foll-
Ovl therefrom. 11 3 
Undoubtedly, the brave performance of the Indi a n s ol clie:r s 
both in Indi a a n d a broad and t h e persistent efforts of the 
Ind i a n n a tionalist lea ders were two of the most powerful fa~ 
tors \·lhich made Bri t ain 's \v ithdravra l from Indi a inevita ble. 
1. 419 H. C. Deb., 5s., columns 964-65. 
2 . 420 H. C. Deb., 5s ., 1414 . The whole debs. te covers columns 
1414-1476 . -
3. 422 H. C. Deb., 5s ., column 2121. 
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In reply to I1r . Butler , l{!r . Attlee decl rLred in the House 
of Commons t hat , 
" •• t v.Ji ce in 25 y ears India has pl ayed a grea t 
part in the defeat of tyra nny. Is it any wonder 
t hat to-d~y sh e claims - a s a na ti on of 400 ,or·o, ooo 
p e ople t hat ho.s hli ce sent her sons to die for 
freedom - t hat she should herse l f have freedom 
to decide her des tiny? ~ colleagues (Lord Pethick-
Lawrence, Si r St a fford Cri :pliS, I•lr . A. V.Alexander ) 
are go ing t o India with the intention of using 
t he ir utmost endeavours to help her to attain 1 t hat freedom a s s peedily a nd fully as possible. 11 
Fur t hermore he s a id that, 
"If ••• she (India) elects for independence, in 
our view she has a right to do so. It will be 
for u s to help to make t he transition as smooth 
and easy as possible. 11 2 
He firmly believed t hB,t, 
11
' e cannot a l low a minority to pl a ce a veto on 
t he advance of the ma jority . \'/ e e.a nnot dicta te 
h ow t hes e difficulties may ~be overcome. Our 
first duty is to g et the machinery of decision 
set up . That i s t he main purpose of my honorable 
friends (i. e . Cabinet ~~lissi on) and the Viceroy. 
We a lso w~nt to see s e t u p an interim Govern-
ment."3 
This 1.-1as certa inly a ne\<J approa ch of the Lab our Government 
to t he Indi e:;_,n communa l problem. 
:JYiT . - ichards (Labour, \•lrexr.J.8.In ) s a id t hat "The \var gave a 
g rea t filli p to the deman d for India n indep endence. 114 )Yll' . 
Sorensen (Labour ) s a id , 
11 It has novl been recognized t hat indep endence 
1. 422 H.~Deb., 5s., c ol umn 1419 . 
2 . ibid. 1421. 
3 . ibid. 1422 
4 . ibid. 1439 . 
is a r eality. It is a demand ma.de by the Indian 
people of all sections and ca n no longer be 
eva ded ••• the IncU a n pe ople themselves have made 
this demand for a long time, a re making it still, 
and will never be content until a t last it is 
achieved."l 
Jf.!I' . Thomas h eid {Labour) s a id, 
11
'1'her e is prc.ctically no one in t hi s country 
no1~1 \>lho is opposed to ~waraj_ or 12urna. swar§!J_ 
if India wants it. Those "~:lho tell the Indian 
people to t he contrary are misleadin.g them. 11 2 
)Y.fr . Cove (Labour) said, 
11 
••• t hi s p ov1erfu l urge for m:.tional indep endence 
is l.·rork ing ••• in India and it ca nnot be stop1:ed. 
If we attempt to stop it we shall do so a t our 
own p eril. That movement (of na t ional ism) must 
and will go on and nationaL~ independence must 
be realised.tt3 
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Fur t hermore h e said , "I should imagine that the very fact 
of a Labour Government g iving independence to Ind i a would 
r a lly progressive moral forces throughout the world. 114 
From these discussi on s three conclusi ons rr~y be ea sily and 
clearly infer red. Firstly, the Labour Government lw.d decided 
to grant India Independence. Secondly, it had so decided, a s 
t he members admitted, because ~f the rising tide of Indi an 
nationalism and t h ic-dl y India 's war r ecord . 
In t hi s deba te, for t he fir st , it \va s r eadi ly a cce:p1fle "'. 
t hat Indi a 's independence vras inevitable . As such India 
sh ould be gr a n ted a cons titution-maki ng body and B.n inter i m 
goverrunent to f a ci l ita te t he final withdrawal of Brita in. 
l. 422 H. C. eb., 5s., colwnn 1448 . 
2. ibid.' 1455. 
3 . i b i d ., 1457. 
4 . ibid. 
The La.bour Government hoped t hat India would a ccept t h e 
re s p onsi bility to g over n her s elf. 
IVLr . At tle e 's St a tement of t h e Aims of the Ca bi n§ t J!ii ssion 
an __ !ts Rea ction in Indi a . 
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The Congr es s \•lark i ng Comm.i tte e a r;pointed, on I<Ia r ch 15, 
a specia l committee of Aza d , Nehru and Patel to negotia te 
v.ri t h t he His s ion . Azad s a i d the Amery 's sta temen t lmd "hel p e d 
t o cr ea te a d e s irabl e a t mos pher e." Nehru obs erved tha t, 
11 \Jl e have arrived a t a s t age when no half-mea sures 
can b e considered, a nd onl y discus s i ons ba s ed on 
the a ccept a nc e of .I ndi a n independe nc e ca n b ear 
fruit. 11 1 
~1r . Gandhi \vas vary che er f u l about i t. Bu. t the Nu slim 
Leagu e c omment ed less f av our abl y because Attl ee ha d s a i d tha t 
t he mi n or ity c ould n ot be a llowed to veto t h e adva nce of t h e 
majori ty . Nr. J innah in a pr ess interview s a i d , 
" I r eg r et tha t vfr . Attl e e ••• has done rop e- walk-
ing •:!hen he sai d ' vre cannot a llo•:r a minor ity to 
pl a c e a veto on t he a dv ance of a majority '. He 
lu~s f a l len into t he trap of f a l s e propaganda 
t ha t has been ca rried on f or some time. Ther e 
is n o questi on of veto or h6lding up the pro-
g re s s or a dvancemen t of a majority ••• I want to 
r eitera t e t ha t the ¥rusl i ms of India are not a 
minority, but a na ti on and self~determination 
i s t heir birth-right. 11 2 
Thereby Jinnah reiter a t ed t ha t t he I~"lU slim League's pos i• 
t i on r emai ned defin ite - i. e . it s tood for t he di v ision of 
- - --- --· - --- - -
l. The St a t esman, I•1a rch 16 , 1 946 . 
2 . Quot ed by lVioha.mmC:td Ashra f, Ca.bine·t Hiss i on a nd .Af ter , 
Lah or e : I mperial Pr inting Wor k s, 1946, p . 3 . 
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Indi a and t he establishment of Pa~istan. 
Sir T. B.Sapru (Nationa l Liberal Federa tion) s a id, I think 
it is a most satisfa ctory sta tement yet made by any (.&-i tish ) 
Pr i me N:i n ister on the Indian question. 11 
'l'he Cabinet f/.d.ssion In India (l>iarch 23-June 29,1946). 
The members of the British Cabinet Hission Lord Pethick-
Lawrence (oecretary of St a te for Indi a ), Sir St a fford Cripps 
(Pr es ident of the Board of Trade) and}~ . A.V.Alexander 
(Firs t Lord of the Admira lty) \vho left R'rl_gland on Earch 19, 
arrived a t Karachi on the evening of l;:J:a rch 23 . The follo\·1-
i ng day they were greeted by Lord \'Iavell (Viceroy of India) 
t he fourth member of the Mission, _at :New Delhi. 
Lord Pe thick-Lawr ence in a press conference on :Har ch 25, 
s a id, 
11 1'he discus s ions nm<T to begin are preliminary 
to t he se tting up of a. machinery, \vhereby t he 
form under which India can realise her full 
independent sta tus can be determined by Ind-
i ans . The objective is to set up a n accep t-
able machinery qui ckly and make the necessary 
interim arrangements . 11 l 
Fur t hermore he said- t hat 11 ~ ·e have come .;- i t h only one fix 
ed intention a nd t hat i s to pl ay our full part as represent-
ing His ELajesty's Government in helping India ns to a chieve 
t he ir independence."2 
1. Ti mes of India , J:.arch 26, 1946 . The full text of this 
s t a tement is conveniently reproduced in Ashraf,ou .cit.p 7-11. 
2 . ibi d .,After thi s stat ement Pe thick- Lavn ence and Cripps 
ans-v1 ered a number of questions, see Asbraf , on . cit., pp.ll-18. 
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Explor a tory St ag e of the Talks a t New Delh i (l>'la rch 26 - ·' p ril 
11,1946). 
On l· a rch 26-27 t h e JYii ssion fir s t h e a r d t he mews of the 
member s of the Viceroy 's Executive Council, Nex t t h e His s ion 
met the eleven Pr ovin cia l Govern or s ( ~~rch 28-29 ). Cripps 
me t J i n na h on l•'Ia rch 30. He a n d L ord Pethick-La\:/rence met 
Ga ndhi, Bardolot a n d Kllan Saheb (Congress Premiers of Assam 
and :N . ~i . J? . P . ). Then t h e }1ission met the Na\vab of B...'ho:pa1 
(Cha ncellor of t h e Chamber of Princes), the l ulers of the 
n a tive St a tes of G·v/a lior, Pati a l a , Bi kaner a n d Hawan agar; 
1<1. . Sadullah, G. li.I . Syed, A. Q,a iyum ( the t r ... ree Iv.Loslem l eaders 
of Assam, Sind a n d n . - r. F . P .) a nd T. B. Sa pru (Libera l Federa -
tion). 
On April 3, Az a d a n d Ga ndh i met t h e ~1issi on s e:p · rately. 
The nex t day t h e I:lis s i on r e ceived Jinnah, G. H.Hidayalutta 
( Sind l~ emier) a nd t h e Rulers of Dungar pur a nd Bila s pur 
( smaller sta te s repr e sen t a tiv es). On April 5, Tar a Singh ( Si d~ 
l eader), .Ambedkar ( Sc h e dule d Castes l eader) a nd K. llYa t Khan 
(th e Pr emi er of Punj a b) met t h e h is s i on fol l ovred by the p re-
mi ers of Bomb ay, Bi l1ar, Orissa , t h e Centra l Province s a nd t h e 
Unit ed Pr ovi n ce s on April 6. Then the next d ay H. S .Suhra-
war dy ( Bengal Premier a n d Mosl em lea der) ~et the Yrission. on 
April 9, the Navmb of Chi t a ri, R. Aiyer a nd 11. Ismail (Prime 
T~ini s t ers of Hyera bad , Tr a v a ncore a nd J a i pur resp ectively) 
\vere received by t h e 1'li s s ion. On April 10, Sir J.Vlahar a j Singh 
(Ind i a n Cl1ri stia ns 1 lea der) a n d Frank Anth ony (Ang lo-Indi a ns' 
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repre s enta tive) v1 ere interviewed by the members of the Cabi-
net h i ssion. 
Thus t h e Cab inet 1'1is sion met a lmost every typ e of rep re-
senta tive of the Indi a n pe op l e . On April 11, the Hi ss i on 
i ssued a sta tement t hat t h ey now prop osed to contact t h e Con-
g re ss a n d the Muslim League (major political parti es ) in 
ord er tha t these a r ti es may neg o t i a te ;Ji th each ot- er . The 
L.i s si on t hen a djourned for a shor t re c ess "during 1·1hi ch t h er e 
woul d be a n OJ?l)ortuni t y for d eci s ive consulta tion between t he 
Ind i a n par ti es ." The explora tory p ha se of the l~ussion was 
over . 
\vhile t he l~'J.i ss i on 1vas meeting with v a r ious delegat i ons , 
t he f~l Indi a Muslim Leagu e s p ons ored a c onvent i on of over 
500 members of the Centra l a nd eleven Provinci a l Leg i slatures 
in Neitl Delh i from April 7 to 9 . l\tt . J innah in his presidential 
address ( April 7) s a id t hat " \V e ca nnot accep t any pr op os 1 
wh i ch w·ould be , 
of Pakista n. 111 
in a ny way derogatory to the full sovere i g nty 
I!'ur t h ermor e, 
11 l e c a nnot agree to a sing le consti t ution-mak-
i ng body, be ca us e it wi ll me a n our sign ing our 
d e a th-'.varrant a nd w e cannot agree t o consider 
a ny inter im a rrangement unless t he Pakistan 
scheme i s a ccep t ed a s a 'sine gua non . 11 2 
He s a. i d , 11 vie will fig ht for it (Pak is t a n) i f ne ces s a ry die 
1, 2. St a te sman, April 8, 1946. Full text of this speech 
may be s tudied from Ashraj, op.cit., pp.l9-26 . 
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for it; but take it we must - or vle persih. 111 The Conven-
tion passes a resolution on April 9 , the most i mportant 
par t of vlhich demanded tv1o separ ate constituti on-making 
bodies be cause, 
11 
••• the a ccept ance of the !l'i:uslim League demand 
of Pakistan and i te ;implementation vli thout de-
lay are t he ~in!L£.Ua_._..!!on for the »>uslim League 
co-operation and parti cipation in the formation 
of an interim government a t the Centre. 11 2 
.A..fter this resolution all the members of the Convention 
signed a pledg e which began "Yri th the words, 
"I , a member of t he Iv.iuslim League 
Par ty of the Leg isla tive Assembly/ 
Council do h ereby solemnly declare my firm con-
viction that t he s a fety and security a nd the 
s alvation and destiny of the Mualim Nation in-
habit ing the Continent of India lie only in the 
a ch ievement of Pakistan v1hich is t he one equi t-
able, honourable and just solution of the con-
s tituti ona l problem."3 
J innah 1 s inaugura l speech , the Convention 's resolution 
and the pledge undoubtedly indica ted that the ~u slim ~eagu~ 
would not be s a tisfied '"i th what t he Cabinet l'Iis sion had 
offered namely (1) a consti tution-making body and (2) an 
inter i m g overnment. 
Second Stage of the Cabinet Mission (April 16-May 12) 
11r, Jinnah met the lfission on April 16 and Azad on April 
17. The same day Azad 1 s new formula was published. It 
1. Statesman, April 8, 1946. 
2. Ashraj,op.cit., p.29. The full text of this resolution 
covers pp.27-29. 
3. ibid., pp.34-35. 
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included (1) complete independence (2) a United India (with 
a Federation composed of fully autonomous units). To this 
Liaquat Ali Khan (General Secretary of the Muslim League) re-
p lied that Pakistan "is the solution of India's problem and 
only way in 1-vhich Indi a ca n achieve its independence c:.t t h e 
e arliest. 111 
Aft er t h is the Ca binet Nissi on s p e n t a s h ort h oliday in 
Ka s hmir tull April 24 . Cri l)llS conve r s ed with Nehru a n d J·innah 
on April 25 a n d with Gan dhi, Az a d a nd Ji n na h on April 26. 
On April 27 t h , Lord }')eth ick-Laerence wrote letter s to 
Aza d (Congress President) a n d Ji nna h (J!..Uslim L e a.gue Presi-
dent) t he mo s t i mp ortEm t part of \vhich de a lt vri t h a s cheme 
b a sed U}J on t h e f undamenta l princi ples. It rea d 11 1I'he future 
c onstitutiona l structure of Briti s h Indi c:~ is to be as follovls: 
" A Uni on Gover nmen t dea ling \v i t h the follow·ing 
subjects - Foreign Affa ir s , Defence a nd Co-
mmunica ti on s . 1'her e 1.-lill be t1:ro Group s of pro-
vi n c es a n d the oth er of t h e predomin~ntly fuu s -
lim provinces, d e a ling with a ll oth er subjects 
with t he provinces in t h e resp ective Groups 
d e s ire t o be de a lt with in common. The Provin-
ciil a l Government s vrill dea l \v i th a ll oth er sub-
j e ct s a n d \'rill have all the resi du a ry sove-
reig n rights. 
It is to be con templ a ted thEt t h e Ind i a n St a tes 
will t a ke their a ppropri a te place in· this s truc-
ture on terms to be neg otia ted with them. 11 2 
l. s br a f, on .cit., p .38. 
2 . A. C. Banerjee, ~cit., pp.ll0-11. Th e Corresp ondence of 
the Ca binet Mie!si on >;lith t h e Congress a nd t h e !<1uslim L eague 
between April 27- 1ay 12, 1946 cover s pp .ll0-137,. 
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To this Azad replied t hat t he Congress could not "form 
Groups of provinces under the Federal Union and more so on 
relig i ous or communal ba sis."l 
r.u· • .Ti nnah in reply (Apr il 29 ) enclosed a copy of the 
Lahore r esolution. Thereby he confirmed that t he tiuslim 
League ·v1 ou l d hav e no t h ing s hort of Pakistan. 2 'I'hes e replies 
clear ly suggested t hat the Cabinet Mis s i on would not succeed 
in reconcili ng these dire.etly opposit e vievrs of both the Co~ 
gress e;md t 1e 1·1Uslim League. 
In their conver .>ati ons with t he leaders the Cabinet Li:ission 
d iscussed t heir proposa ls and the p0ssibility of a joint 
c onfer enc e of the Congress an d the lruslim League to find a 
common solution to the Indi a n problem. Both these parties 
a ccep t ed such an invita ti on on April 28. 
Gecond Siml a Conferenc e (:Hay 5-12) 
As agreeQ., the joint conference commenced a t Si ml a on Eay 
5. Azad , Patel, Nebru and Chan ("Frontier Gandhi") represent-
ed t he Congress. On the other hand, .Tinnah, Liaqua t Al i ilian, 
J:Javra b I smail lilian a nci Nishtar re1:ire s ented the lvlu s lim League. 
Though Gandh i wQs not of fici ally i n cluded in t he Congress-
delegation h e arrived in Si ml a . Genera l Auch i nlek a lso arriv-
ed for c onsultation. The Congress and the •1uslim League 
leaders a nd t h e Cabinet member s discussed freely the questions 
1. A. C. Banerjee, op.cit., p .ll2 . 
2 . s ee t his letter and resolution ibid., pp.ll3-l6 . 
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of (1) a Union Center for a ll India (2) Provi ci a l g rouping s 
a nd their pow· er and ( 3) · the consti tu ti on-m ,king body. 
On I-1ay 12 the Cab i et Nissi on a nnounced tha t, 
"After considering the viev1 s put forward by 
the tvw parties, t he Conference has come to 
the c onclusion that no use would be served 
by further discussions, and that therefore 
it should be brought to a conclusion."l 
In a second statement the Br itish delegation added tha t 
t he failure of the Simla Con;f'erence 11 does not in any way 
bring to an end the mission which they ar e charg ed by His 
Hajesty•s Govern)flent and the Briti sh people." 2 
:Never before bad the British Government held such a joint 
conference with a s pecific purpose of uni t .i ng Congress and 
the 1•1\lslim League . It ruus t be pointed out that t h e Simla 
Conference failed because the two Indian Par ties c ould not 
agree as regards the future cons titutional s tructure of India. 
There i s no r ea son to doubt the sincerity of the Briti sh 
Labour Government i n general .and of the British Cabinet 
I~lission in par ticular in its purp os e of implementing India 's 
independence . 
Third St§lge of the Cabinet l•ii ssi on (l~ia.y 16-June 29 , 1946) . 
Af ter the brealcdovm of t h e Simla Conferenc e the members of 
the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy had no alternative excep t 
1. Times of India, Nay 13, 1946. 
2 . ibid. 
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themselves to draw up proposa ls for the i mmedi a te constitu-
tiona l a rra ngements of Indi a . This they did. 
These viere couched in a sta tement issued simul ta.neously 
in New Delhi and in London (in t he House of Commons ) om h ay 
16. :Prime JVlinister Attlee read them {proposa ls) before t he 
l House of Cormnons . This statement, one of the most important 
do cuments in t he constituti onal history of India , conta ins 
24 par agr aphs. These may be summarized a s follows: 
(l) Hej ection of Palcistan as the l\LUslim League demanded 
it on the administra tive, economic, military, geogi·aphica l 
and sta tistical basis. Paragraph ll declared, 
"We - are t herefore unable to advise the British 
Government that the pov1er \vhich a t present re-
sides in BTiti sh hands should be handed over 
to two entirely separate sovereign sta t es" (of 
Hindustan an~ Pakistan).2 
(2 ) An Indi an Union of St a tes and Provinces dealing with 
foreig n aff a irs, defence e.nd communications, theother powers 
being vested in the provinces. (3) the representatives to 
the Constitution-making body to be elected by the members of 
the Frovinci~l Legisla tures on (p roportional) p9pulation 
basis, and by a negoti o.ting committee of the Native States. 
(4) the Advisory Committee to report to the Union Cons.tituent 
Assembly "the list of fundamental rights, clauses for pro-
l. For the full text of the Cabinet Nission's St a tement as 
read by Amery see 422 H. C. Deb., 5s., 2109-2120; cf. Banerjee, 
QE•Cit., pp.39~53. 
2 . 422 E. C. e b ., 5s., 2113. 
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tecting minorities, ancl a scheme for the administration of 
triba l a nd excluded areas ••• " l (5) the Viceroy to request 
11 the provincial legislatures to :preceed \vi t h the election of 
t h eir representa" tives a nd the St a tes to eet u p a negotiating 
comr11i ttee . 112 (6) a trea ty between the Union Constitution 
.Assembly and the United Kingdom to f a cilita te the transfer 
of p ower. (7) " .An interim government hav:i:ng the support of 
t he major p olitical part ies . 113 In the final paragraph 
(1\lovember 24) the members of the .Cabinet Hission a n d the 
Viceroy said, 
"We, therefore , no~,,, l ay before you proposals 
\·Thich ••• •:fill enable you to a tta in your indepen-
d ence in the shortest time and 1:1i th the least 
d anger of internal disturbance and conflict. 11 4 
J:i'urthermore it warned tha t 11 The a lterna tive 1.vould ••• be a 
grave dang er of violence , cbaos a n d even civil vTar. 11 5 
These proposals make abundabtly clea r t hat the British 
Gov ernment rejected Pakistan , granted India a Union Constitu-
tion, pr ovided for a Consti tuent ·~ · Assembly and an interim g ov-
ernment. These proposa ls vTere unique because foli the first 
time in t h e history of Indo-Briti sh rela tions the British 
Government had recognized Indi a 's right of complete indepen. 
dence. 
The credit for this certainly goes to the Labour Govern-
l. 422 H. C. Deb., 5s., 2118. 
2. ibid. 
3 . ibid.' 2119 . 
4 . ibi~, 2119-2120. 
5. ibid ., 2120 . 
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ment, which thus departed from the Conservative policy of 
g r a nting India Dominion St a tus c ome time in the fUture. 
Churchil l , the staunch upholder of the Conservative British 
p olicy to\va r ds Indi a s a id in the House of Commons: 
"During these negotiati ons it has been increa-
singly clear that the object sought wa s not 
Dominion St a tus ••• but direct a n d innnedia te in-
dep endence. I am sure t hat the results of this 
short circuit have been fully realized by the 
House. It certa inly came as a surprise to meYl 
On I'-1ay 22nd t he l"'ission presented a 11 Hemora ndwn of s t a tes 
Treaties a nd Para.mountcy 11 to the lia\vab of Bhopal (Chancellor 
of the Chamber of Princes) . 'rhe substa nce o f the mai n points 
2 
l a id dmvn in the lJ.emornadum 1.vas as follm-1s: 
l) 11 His Majesty's Govern:nent have now declared tha t if the 
Succession Government or Governments in British Indi a desire 
independence, no obsta cle vJould be pl a ced in their wa.y. 113 2) 
Pa r amountcy \·Jould remain in operation during the interim 
period. 11 But the Br itish Gove r nment could not and v1ill not in 
any circumstances trcmsfer paramountcy to an Indi a n Govern-
mant.114 3) The Native St a tes 1·rould contribute to the framing 
of the nevr constitutiona l s tructure e:md if necessary , "form 
or join admi nistrative units l a rge enough to enable them to 
be fitted into the constitutiona l structure. 11 5 
l. 422 H. C. Deb., 5s. 2123 . 
2 . Th e full text of the l• emorandum is a v a ilable in Banerjee, 
o p .cit., pp .l50-l53 . 
3 . ibid., p .l51. 
4 . ibid.' 
5. ibid.' 
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(4) Until the ne~<..,r agreements a re comple ted the existing 
arrang ements between the St a tes a nd the :New Government b e 
a llowed to exi st . (5) His hajesty' s Government wi l l cea se to 
exer ci se t he pa ramountcy so that 11 the rights surrendered by 
t he St o:.. tes to t he paramount p ower (British Government) will 
return to t he St ates, 111 (6) The St a tes may enter into 11 a 
federal r e l a ti onshi iJ vfi t h the ·· succession Government or Govern-
ments in br itish Ind i a , or f a iling this 11 to enter "into 
:particular lJOli tica l arrangements \'li th it or them. 112 
The Cabinet Hi ss i on 's l:>r' oJ2_osals and their re;perouseion among 
the I ndi a n People. ---- · 
The Congress Working Con~itte e pass ed a resoluti on on 
]iay 24 . 3 It pointed out cer t ain matter s on which t he Congres s 
did not agree vii th the 1·1is s ion 1 s proposa ls a nd gave i ts ovm 
i nter pr et""tion to var i ous parts of t h e proposals. The \fork ing 
Corr@ittee of the All Indi a Schedu led Ca stes issued a 2000 
vlord resolution on .June 4 . It s a i d , 11 It was n oticed with pro-
found i ndi gnation that tile Cabinet Nis s i on had not mentioned 
4 
the Scheduled Castes, even onee, in the cours e of sta tement," 
t h e propos als "are absolutely illusory a n d um-Jorthy of ser -
ious c ons i derati on. 11 5 
1 . 422 H. C. Deb. , 5s ., p . 152 . 
2 . i b i d .' p . 153 . 
3 . Th e full text of t h i s resolution i s reproduced in ~shraf , 
on.ci t ., pp .l90-194. 
4 . ibid., p .l97. 
5 . ibid., p .l98 . 
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.Jinnah published a sta tement on Nay 22 in v1hich he a are-
fully analys e d the pr op osals. He reiterated 
11 I regret that t he £1.i:ission should have nega-
tived the ~uslim demand for the establisrunen~ 
of a complete sovereign St a te of akistan, 1.vhich 
1.ve st i ll ho ld is the enly solution of the con-
stitutional problem of Ind i a and which a lone 
ca n secure stable g overrunents and lead to the 
happiness and welfare not only of the t \vo major 
communities but of a l l the p eoples of this sub-
c ontinent.11l 
Spe ak i ng beforethe me e ting of the Al l India _,Iu slim League 
Council i n Ner.·l Del hi on June 6 he s a id, 
" ••• I repel with a ll t he emphasis that I ca n 
corrmand t h e ar guments a nd the rea sons an d t h e 
way in which the Hissi on has mutilated t h e facts 
for no other purp ose ex cept to plea se and appease 
t he Congress . 11 2 
The Counci l of the Al l Indi a Muslim League passed a 
res olution on .June 6. In essence it said, 
11 Paldsta n still remains the unalterab le objec-
tive of the Huslims of Indi a" cond s a i d 11 ••• in-
a smuch a s the basis and t he founda tion of Paki -
stan are inherent in the Hi ssion 's pl a n by vir-
tue of the compulsory grouping of the six us-
l i m province s ••• 11 t he :i':Luslim. League 11 is vlilling 
to co-op era te vii th the constituti on- maki ng 
mach inery proposed in t he s cheme outlined by 
the J.lii ss i on ••• "3 
On behalf of the s t a.nding Committee of t he Chamber of 
Princes t he Navvab of Bhopal ( Chancellor) issued a ste.t em.ent 
on June 10 a ccepting v1ith certain qua li f ica tions the Hissions 
1 • .Tami l - ud- d i n , Some Recent Speeches e.nd \vri ting s of I.-Ir . 
Jinnah, Lahor e: Imperial Pr inting Works, 1947, vol.2, 
p . 395 . Hi s statement covers pp .389- 401 . 
2 . i b i d ., p . 403 . 
3 . ~shraf , op.ci t ., pp . 200-20l. The full text of t he League ' s 
Hesolution covers pp .l99- 20l. 
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proposa,ls •1 
On the s ame day the General Council of the All India 
States Peoples Conference passed a resolut i on which critici~ 
ed the prop osals for i gnoring , 
11 The 93 million people of t he Indian St a tes. 11 
Bu t it said 11 The Council \·relcome, hmvever , 
the statement tha t par amountcy will end when 
the new Al l I ndi a Constituti on comes into 
effect."2 
Announcement of the Inter im Government (J"une 16 , 1946). 
Bet\11een J·une 12-15 Lord \:'Iavell cor responded with the Con-
3 gress and t he League a s regards t he inter i m arrarJ.gement. On 
June 16, the Viceroy atild t he Cabinet Mission released a joint 
sta tement. It de clared t hat 11 It is urgently necessary that 
a strong and representative Interim Government should be set 
up ••• 11 The Vice!'oy therefore invited the follm·ring to be 
members of the pr op os ed Interim Governnient . 
11 Sar dar Bal dev Singh ( Sikh Ak:al i Party) Sir N. P . 
Eng i neer (:Parsee Community ), lVlr. Jagjivan Ram 
(Schedul ed Castes ), Pandit J"awharlal Nehru ( Con-
gress), IV.lr . }11 . A. Jinnah {Huslim League), navlab-
zada Liaquat Ali Khan (Nuslim League, l~ . H . K . 
He..htab (Congress), Dr. John Natthai (Indi an 
Chri s tian) Nawab Noharnmad Ismail Khan { I~'li.lslim 
League), Khwaja Sir Nazimudin (Mus l i m League), 
sardar Abdur ab Nishtar (:fo•J.uslim ~e~-ge) l~'Jr . 
c. Rajag opa lachar i (Congress), Dr . Rajendra 
1. For t he full text of t h i s sta t ement see Ashraf,o ;p .cit., 
pp . 206 - 208. a l s o Baner jee on .cit ., pp.l76-l78 . 
2 . Banerjee , mp.cit., p .l79 . . 
3 . This correspondence may be studied from Banerjee, ~it., 
J?P•l 79-189. 
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Prasa d (Congres s) Sardar Vallabhai Patel (Congress). 111 
]urthermore it s e.id t ha t " Should t h is proposa l be a,ccep -
ted the Viceroy 1.1 ill a i m at inaugurating the ne\'T Government 
2 
about the 26th of June ." Even if the Congress and/or the 
Muslim League declined to join it sta ted clearly tha t 
11 
••• it is t h e intention of the Viceroy to pro-
ceed with t he formation of un Interim Govern-
ment which will be a representa tive as p ossi ble 
of those willing to a ccept the sta tement of May 
16. 11 3 
He · a l s o directed the Provincial Governors, 
11 
••• to summon the Provincial Leg islative Assem-
bl ies forthwith to proceed ':lith the elections 
necessary for t he s etting up of the c onstitution-
. m.alcing mach inery ••• 11 4 
After this announcement to clarify the quest ion of 11 parity11 
( equ a,l repr esenta tion) correspondence \•Ta s exchanged between 
Congress and t he Viceroy (June 18-25).5 On June 26 , the 
Cong re s s ~'forking Comrai ttee passed a resoluti on on the state-
ments issued by the Ca binet Hission on (Hay 16) and the Vi ce-
roy (on June 16).6 It said 
"The Committee ar e una ble to a ccep t the proposals 
for the formation of a n inter im Government a s 
conta ined in the sta tement of June 16 ••• 11 be-
cause it 11 can never ••• a ccept an artificia l and 
unjust party or agree to the veto of a co~nunal 
g roup."? 
l.Times of India , June 17,1946. Of t hes e 14 members of the pro-
pos ed Interim Govern.ment 5 \vere Congressmen, 5 1-'..!.osl em,l bi kh, 
1 Ind i an Christi a n, I ~arse e and 1 Scheduled Caste . 
2 . ibid.' 
3 . ibid ., 
4 . i b i d .' 
5. ~ Azad- vlavell corresp ondence see Banerjee, op. cit., pp.l9-l-200. 
6 . For text of t h e re s oluti on Ti mes of India ,.Tune 27, 1946. 
7. ibid.~ -
Furth ermore, 
" The Co:mmi tte e l1.ave, h ovrever de ci ded t h a t t h e 
Congress woul d join the :pr op osed Constituen t 
• ssemb ly vri t h a v i eH t6 framing t h e c ons ti tu-
tion of a free, unit ed a n d- democratic Indi a ."l 
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Lord ·,·Iav ell h ad also cor resp onde d '.vi th Jinnah during j-une 
2 
18- 20 . Hr . J i nnah vrrot e to t he Viceroy_ that the lV.iu s lim 
Le ague c oul d not a ccep t t ha t t h e interim g overnment be form-
e d on 5 l1osl.em, 5 Congress , 1 Siki~, 1 Chl.~istian and 1 &che-
,. 
duled c a ste bas is. Hm-rever aft§l.n prolonged discussions t he 
viork i n6 Committee of t he Huslim Le a gue info rmed Lord \{avell 
on June 25 of their decision to part icipa te in an inter im 
g overnment. 
'I'he Si kh Community a nd t he Scheduled Castes c ame out in 
strong oppos~ti on to the Briti sh Proposals, The Si khs deci d e d 
not to serve in t he pr op osed Inter im Gove rnment an d Dr • . 
-
.Ail"lbedka r (Leader of . the Scheduled Castes and former Labour 
r.:t.ember on t he Viceroy's Execut ive Council) protested that 
the Sch eduled Cc:~ste s nominee di d not- repre~ent t he Scheduled 
cas tes because he h a d b een elected entirely by Hindu votes. 
"Care- t~ker Government''(June 29 , 1946). 
On .June 26 the Cabinet l\ii ssion a nd Lord \lfavell issued an 
offici a l sta tement t h a t the c ons titution-making body could 
now proceed a nd t hat the Viceroy would s e t u p a tempora ry 
1 . Times of Ind i a , J une 27, 1946. 
2 . For letter s of Jinnahand \'lavell, cf, Bane r jee, op .cit., 
pp . 203-221. 
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" Care-ta k er" Government of officia ls to ca rry on in the inter i m 
p eri od. Af t er fourteen v1eeks stay in Indi t h e :b'ri ti sh Cabi-
net I-iission left Indi a by a i r on .June 2 9 a n d a rrived in ri-
t a i n on .July 2. 
Lord tiavell announced t h e names of t he members of the 
"Care- t aker" Gover11..m.ent officials on J·une 29 as follows: ..., ield 
J.:i:a rsh all Sir Cl aude Auchinleck ( Comnmn d er-in-Chief) 'l.var ; Sir 
Georg e Spence, Lav1 a nd Educa tion; Sir Er ie Coa tes, Finance; 
Sir Robert Iutchings, Fo od and Agriculture; Sir E. Corra n 
Smit~, War, Transport, Ra ilways , Posts a nd Air; Sir Gurunath 
Be1.1oor, Commerce a nd Commonvrealth Relations, Sir Akbar Hyd ri, 
Labour \·orks, J.l- ines , Pov-rer, He a lth a nd Informa tion; lvtt . A. A. 
- -augh, Home Department, Su pplies and Industries. 
It must be point ed out t ha t because several p ortfolios 
were ass i gned to one m~1ber the tota l membership of the 
Executive Council wa s reduced from 15 to 8. All the members 
of the 11 Ca re-taker 11 Government excep t Auchinleck v1ere high 
department officia ls and members of the Indi a n Civil Service. 
Of the eight members three were Indi a ns. 
The next day t he Viceroy announced a lso that the nomina• 
ti on da tes for the Constituent Assembly would be bet~Jreen 
.July 8 -12 a n d the elections 'l.·rould t ake place a s soon as 
p ossible af-ter .July 15 and vT oul d conclude by the end. o f July 
a nd that the Constituent Assembly was exp ected to meet in 
x ew Delh i a bout August 10. On the same day he appointed 
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Sir B. N. au as constitutiona l adviser in cha rge of \vork co- .: 
nnected v.ri th convening of the Constituent Assembly . 
The Al l Indi a Congress Committ ee met in Bombay July 6 -
? . It r a tified t h e working Committee 's dec i sion a ccep ting 
t h e British Cabinet ~i ssi on's long term constitutiona l pro -
p osals . But it rejected an interim I ndi a n Govern.nent by 204 
votes to 51 . It insta lled Nehru a s President of the Congress . 
The \ ork ing Committee of the wslem League met a t Bom-
bay July 2? - 29 . It passed two resolutions on July 29 . The 
first resolution declared that, 
"The partic i pation of t he Nuslims in the pro-
p osed constitution-making machinery is fraught 
\<Ii th danger , and the counci l he reby wi thdravrs 
its a ccep t ance of the Cabinet Mission's pro-
p osals \'lhi ch was communica ted to the Secretary 
of State (Pethick-La\<Trence) by the Pres ident 
(Jinnah) of t he Muslim League on June 6 ,19 46 . 111 
The second resolution declared that 
11 The J.iualim League is convinced that the time 
has come for the Muslim nation to resort to 
direct a cti on to a chieve Pakistan and get rid 
of the present slavery under the British and 
contempl a ted future Hindu dominati on,and calls 
on the Huslim nation to be ready for every 
sacrifice. 11 2 
The Iliuslim League Working Committee also called e.n all 
t he I\fuslims of Indi a to observe August 16 as "Direct Action 
Day 11 • Ylr . Jinnah at a press conference on July 3 1 said that 
11 \;le are not opposed to a Constituent Assembly. Our demand 
1. Ti mes of I ndi aL July 30 , 1946 . 
2 . i bid. 
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ha s been t ha t there should be t\vo sovereign Constitu ent Assem-
bli es. 11 From t hese s t a tements it is clea r t hat t he ··1'uslim 
League di d not a ccept the Briti s h Cabinet ' lviission' s proposal s 
becaus e t hey did not recognize Pakista n as demanded by the 
Muslim League. 
On .August 12 it ''ras officially announced tha t vii t h the 
appr ova l of His Majesty's Gov ern~ent the Viceroy had i nvited 
Nehru to discuss proposals for the immediate forma tion of an 
i n t erim g overnment. Nehru accepted it and said on August 1 3 
t hat 
"It is our desire to have a representa tiye Pro-
visi ona l National Govermnent a s s0on as possible 
so tha t v1e may unitedly fact the great problems 
t hat confront the country an d lead Indi a to full 
i ndependence. 11 1 
He also observed t hat t he Muslim League's co-opera tion i n 
f orming such a g overmnent \vas welcome to the Congress. 
As stated..before, August 16 was "Direct Action Day11 for 
the Muslim League. It led to unparalleled mob violence and 
incendiarism in Calcutta lasting for three days. It brought 
the life of the city to a complete standstill as the Muslims 
mobs scoured the city, beat up Hindu shopkeepers and looted 
and burned shops andoffices. The Statesman estimated that 
the death-roll totalled over 4000 and the number of wounded 
exceeded lo,ooo. 
1. The Hindu, August 14, 1946. 
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Interim Government (September 2,1946). 
The Viceroy and Pandi t N"ehru had preliminary conversa-
tions on August 17-18 on the formation of the Interim Ind-
ian Government. On August 25 Lord Wavell officially announced 
the resignation of the "Care-taker" Government officials. He 
also approved the appointment of an interim Government pro-
posed by the Congress Part~ This Interim Government the 
Viceroy said would take office on September 2 and would con-
sist o!· six Congressmen, five Moslems and three minority 
members. The names of the members of the Interim Government 
were as follows : 
Eandit Nehru (President of Congress), V.Patel (Congress 
Working Committee), Rajendra Prasad (Congress Working 
Committee), Asaf Ali (Moslem, deputy leader of the Congress 
~arty in the Central Legislative Assembly), C. Rajagopalachari 
{Congress Working Committee), S.C.Bose (Congress Working 
Committee and Congress Oppositmon leader in the Central Legis-
lative Assembly), J. Mathai (Indian Crhistian , an economist 
and managing director of Tata Ltd.), Baldev Singh (Sikh, 
Development Ninister in the Punjab}, S.A.Khan ( a non-League 
Noslem, formerly Indian High Commissioner in South Africa), 
Jagjivan Ram (President of the All India Depressed Classes 
League, affiliated to Congress), S.A.Zaheer (a Congress 
l-1oslem and Lucknovl Law-yer (, C.H. Bhabha (Parsee, a director 
of the Central Bank of India and a prominent business man 
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fr om Bombay) • 
It should be pointed out that the names of the Nuslim 
League did not appear in t hi s list because t he ~uslim League 
had deci ciecl not to join the Inter im Government. The Viceroy 
sai d in h i s brDad6a st: 
"Let me state cle&rly t h e offer (of Interim 
Government) which has been m&.de a nd is still 
open to the I~i.oslem League. They ·• ca n prop os e 
5 na.mes for pl a ces in a Government of 14 , of 
which 6 will be nominees of Congress a nd 3 
wi l l b e representa tives of mi nor ities. 11 l 
l·'tr . J"i nnah i n reply to t he Vicer oy's appeal on AUgust 26 
sai d, 
"The Viceroy only added insult to injury by 
nominat ing 3 Hoslems who, he know, do not command 
either the respect or confidence of ~ruslim India 
&.ncl more Iviuslim names rema in to be announced. 
v/e have made it clear that the only solution of 
India's problem is division of India into Paki-
stan and Hindustan, which would mean real free-
dom for the two major nations and every possible 
safeguard for the minorities in the respective 
states. 11 2 
On September 2, Pandit Nehru and six of his collegues form-
ed the Interim Goverr.unent. Nebru \vas made the Vice-President 
and the Viceroy acted as President of the Inter im Government. 
The remaining,_ members of the Interim Indian Government were 
sworn in on September 11. 
Pandit Nebru declared that the Interim Goverr.JD.ent "proposed 
to function as a corporate v.1hole, as a cabinet. 11 He said the 
1. 'rimes of Indi a.L August 19, 1946. 
2. Stat esma n, August 27, 1946. 
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aim of the Interim Government was to achieve India's complete 
independence. On September 7 in his maiden broadcast as. 
Vice-President of the Interim India Government he said, 
"The Interim National Government is part of a 
larger scheme which includes the Constituent 
Assembly, which will need soon to give shape 
to a Constitution for a free and independent 
India. 11 1 
As regards Indo-British relations he said, 
11 In spite of our past history of conflicts we 
hope that independent India will l~ve friendly 
co-operative relations with Britain ••• "2 
In order to seek the co-operation of the MUslim League 
the Viceroy invited Jinna.h to New Delhi and conversed with 
Pim on September 16. On October 5 Jinnah and Nel1ru met in 
New Dellri. Jinnah reported his discussions with the Viceroy 
and Nehru to the working Committee of the MUslim League. 
The I~slim League then reconsidered the problem of Interim 
Indian Government. Again on October 12, Jinnah met the Vice-
roy and on October 13 informed the Viceroy that the Muslim 
League was ready to join the Interim Government. 
On october 15 the Viceroy announced the nomination of ·~· 
3 five members by the Muslim League to the Interim Government. 
The Viceroy announced on October 25 the names and portfolios 
of the members of the reconstructed Interim India Govern-
1. Times of India, September 8, 1946. 
2. ibid. 
3. Their names and portfolios were as follows: Liaquat Ali 
Khan, Finance; I.I.Chundrigar, Commerce; A. R.Nishtar, Communi-
cations, Posts and Air; G.A.Khan, Health. 
ment. 1 on October 25 Lord \•Iavell said in his broadcast, 
11 \'li th the formation of the Coalition Government, 
India has taken another great stride forward on 
the road to freedom. It is my desire and hope 
tl1at all elements in the Government shall work 
together in harmony, both in dealing with the 
present pressing problems of India and in fur-
thering the formation of a new Constitution, 
which will enable the British Government to com-
plete the transfer of power to India. 11 2 
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It must be pointed out that the Muslim League and Con-
gress formed a Coalition Government though both these parties 
had different approaches to the Indian Constitutional problam. 
On November 14 Jinnah made a statement to press correspondents 
that the League would boycott the Constituent Assembly be-
cause the Muslim League had decided that the only solution to 
the Indian problem was the creation of Pakistan and Hindu-
stan. Three days later he asked the Viceroy to postpone the 
meeting of the gonsti tuent Assembly sine ·_die. 
It was officially announced in New Delhi on November 20 
that the proposed Constituent Assembly would meet in pre-
liminary session for the first time on December 9. Next ~ 
Mr. Jinnah declared that the decision of ·the Viceroy· and o£ 
His Y~jesty's Government to summon the Constituent Assembly 
1. Nehru, Patel, Singh, Prasad and Ram retained their former 
portfolios but }mthai received new portfolio of Industries 
and Supplies, Bhabha that of Works, Itines and Power, Asaf 
Ali that of Transport and Railways and J.N.Mandal (Scheduled 
Castes) that of Law. S.C.Bose, S.A.Khan and S.A.Zaheer re-
signed so that Muslim League members may enter the Interim 
Government. · 
2. Times of India, October 30, 1946. 
for December 9 was a 
" ••• blunder of a grave and serious character." 
FUrthermore he charged the Viceroy that he was 
" ••• blind to the present serious situation 
and the realities facing him, and playing 
into the hands of Congress. 11 1 
He also said that 
"• •• in these circumstances, it is obvious . 
that no member of the 11uslim League will 
participate in the Constituent Assembly. 11 2 
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The Muslim League had entered the Interim Government but 
it had not accepted the Cabinet Mission's long-term proposal. 
Nehru said on November 21 that, 
" ••• the League entered the (interim) Govern-
ment not to work it but because they feared 
they (moslems) would be weakened if they 
kept out. 11 3 
So on two po·ints the Muslim League and the Congress dis-
agreed. Firstly, the 1ruslim League boycotted the Constituent 
Assembly whereas the Congress accepted it. Secondly, the l!Ius-
lim League did not accept as did the Congress Party that 
the Inter im Government was in any sense a Cabinet or a Coali-
tion Government. 
London Conference (December 3-6, 1946). 
In order to avert .. the threatened breakdown of the Coalition 
1. Times of India, November 22, 1946. 
2. ibid. 
3. ~Hindu, November 22, 1946. 
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Interim Government in India and in view of the Iv.Alslim 
League's boycott of the Constituent Assembly, His £1ajesty 1 s 
Government asked the Viceroy on November 26 to fly along 
with the representatives of the Congress Party, ~~slim League 
and the Sikh community for consultations in London. Next day 
¥~. Arthur Henderson, the Under-Secretary of State for India 
said in the House of Commons that, 
"The purpose of the proposed discussions is to 
endeavour to reach a common understanding bet-
ween the two major parties on the basis of 
which the work of the Constituent Assembly can 
proceed with the co-operation of all parties."l 
On November 30, Lord Wavell, Nehru, Sardar B. Singh,Jinnah 
and Liaquat Ali Khan left Karachi by air for London. They 
arrived in London on December 3. From December 3-6 Wavell 
and the Indian leaders conferred with the Prime Minister and 
the members of the Cabinet at 10 Downing Street. On December 
6 the final Round Table Conference took place under the 
Chairmanship of Prime Minister Attlee. At the conclusion of 
the Conference it was officially announced that, 
"The Cabinet Mission -have throughout maintained 
the view that the decisions of the Sections (of 
the Conati tuent Assembly) should, in absen·ce of 
agreement to the contrary, be taken by simple 
majority vote of the representatives in the Sec-
tions. This view has been accepted by the Mos-
lem League, but Congress have put forward a 
different view. They have asserted that the 
true meaning of the statement, read as a whole, 
is that the provinces have a right to decide 
1. 430 H.C.Deb., 5s., 1615. 
both-as to grouping and as to their own constitu-
tion."! 
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Nehru and Baldev Singh arrived in Delhi by air on Decem-
ber 8. The London Conference ended in failure because the 
Congress and l~slim League could not agree that the voting 
in the sections should be by majority vote. 
Constituent Assembly (December 9, 1946). 
Though the Muslim League (75) members were absent the 
first Constituent Assembly opened on December 9 and Sir s. 
Singh ( a distinguished lawyer) was appointed provisional 
Preisdent of the Assembly. On December 9 Rajendra Prasad 
(Member of Food and Agriculture} was elected as permanent 
Chairman. Four days later Nehru introduced into the Consti-
tuent Assembly a resolution in the form of a "declaration 
of objectives." It :called on the Assembly to proclaim India 
"an independent sovereign republic." 
Congress acoe:pts Cabinet lvlission'.s interpretation of December 
6, 1946. 
The Congress Working Committee discussed the Cabinet ~tis-
sion's interpretation regarding the method of voting in the 
Sections into which the Constituent Assembly would divide when 
its preliminary session ended. On December 22 it announced 
1. ~~nchester Guardian, December 7, 1946. 
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that any reference to the Federal court was "uncalled-for" 
and "unbecoming" and "unsuited" to the dignity of either Con-
gress or the Federal Court because the Muslim League had 
not joined the -Assembly. 
The All India Congress Co~ttee met at Delhi from Janu-
ary 5-7. It had a long debate again on the interpretation 
of the Cabinet !fission after which on a motion by Nehru a 
resolution was adopted by 99 votes to 52. It recommended 
that Congress should accept the British Government's state-
ment of December 6 so that the Muslim League might join tha 
Constituent Assembly. 
Mr. Jinnah arrived ar Karachi from London on December 
21 and announced on January 7 that the League's Working 
Committee would be called to consider the Congress acceptance 
of the British interpretation of December 6. When the Work-
ing Committee of the- MUslim League met at New Delhi on Janu-
ary 31 it reaffirmed its decision to stay out of the Consti-
tuent Assembly and declared that 11 the continuation of the 
Assembly and tts proceedings and decisions are ultra vires, 
invalid and illegal, that it should be dissolved ••• 111 
Attlee's Announcement of the Transference of Power to India 
(February -20, 1946). 
Prime Minister Attlee announced in the House of Commons 
1. 433 H.C.Deb., 5s., 1396. 
on February 20 that His ~mjesty•s Government intended to 
transfer power to the "responsible Indian hands not later 
than June 1948. He said, 
"His ¥1aj esty• s Government desire to hand over 
their responsibility to authorities establish-
ed by all parties in India in accordance with 
the Cabinet Mission's plan, but unfortunately 
there is at present no clear prospect- that 
such a constitution and such authorities will 
emerge ••• His Majesty's Government wish to make 
it clear that it is their definite intention 
to take the necessary steps to effect the trans-
ference of power into responsible Indian hands 
by a date not later than June 1948. 111 
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FUrthermore, he expressed on behalf of the British people 
" ••• their good will and good wishes towards the 
people of India as they go forward to this final 
stage in their achievement of self-government. 
It will be the wish of everyone in these islands 
that notwithstanding constititional changes, the 
association of the British and Indian peoples 
should not be brought to an end; and they will 
wish to continue to do all that ia in their 
power to further the well-being of India. 11 2 
He also announced the ~ppointment of Lord MDuntbatten as 
the Viceroy of India in succession to Lord Wavell. ¥~. Attlee 
said that Lord Mountbatten, 
" ••• will be entrusted with the task of trans-
ferring to Indian bands the responsibility for 
the government of British India in the manner 
that will best ensure the fUture happiness and 
prosperity of India."3 
It must be pointed out that this statement of Attlee cer-
tainly went a long way to improve the Indo-British relations. 




Next day Pandit Nehru described the British Government's 
decision as "wise and courageous" and as "removing all mis-
conception and suspicion.u He appealed to the Muslim League 
to enter the Constituent Assembly so that the transference 
of power might take place smoothly and rapidly. 
~ Hinduetan Times described the British statement as 
"epoch-making" and as "an historic decision \vhieh will finally 
end the Indo-British conflict in a manner worthy of civilized 
1 
nations." The Times of India commented, "It puts an end for 
all time to any doubts about British intentions."2 
The Congress Working Committee which had a three day 
eession in New Delhi welcomed on March 7 the British Govern-
ment's decision to transfer power to Indian hands by a defi-
nite date and invited the ¥mslim League to nominate repre-
sentatives to meet Congress spokesmen for discussing the new 
British decision. 
Arrival of Lord Mountbatten (Y~ch 22, 1946). 
The twentieth and the last British Viceroy Lord Mount-
batten arrived by air with Lady Mountbatten at Delhi on I~ch 
22. Next day Lord Wavell left by air for Britain. Lord Moun~ 
batten took the oath in the presence of Sir Patrick Spans, 
(Chief ~ustice of India) and the members of the Indian Interim 
1. February 23, 1947. 
2. ill..Q;. 
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Government. After his inauguration as the Viceroy of India 
Mountbatten began a series of interview with the leaders of 
Congress, Moslem League, the Sikh Community, the Hindu Maha-
sabha and the Indian States. On April 22 Nehru states that, 
"The Moslem League can have Pakistan if they 
wish to have it, but on condition that they do 
not take away other parts of India which do 
not wish to join Pakistan."l 
To this Jinnah rep~ied on April 30 that, 
"The question of a division of India as pro-
posed by the Muslim League is based on the 
fundamental fact that there are two nations -
Hindus and ~~slims. We want a nat ional state 
in our homelands which are predominantly ~~s­
lim and comprise 6 units - the PUnJab, the 
North West Frontier Province, Sind, Baluchi~ 
stan, Bengal and Assam. This will give the 
Hindus their national state of Hindustan 
which means __ three-fourths of British I .ndia ••• 
The transfer of power to Pakistan and Hindu-
stan must mean a division of defences as a 
sine qua non of the transfer. 11 2 
So Jinnah forcefully reaffirmed his goal of Pakistan when the 
British withdrew from India. 
New British Plan for Transference of Power (June 3, 1947). 
Meanwhile His Majesty's Government asked Lord Kount.;. 
batten to come to England for further discussions. He 
arrived in London by air on I~y 19 and had discussions with 
the Prime lfinister, Sir Stafford Cripps and A.V.Alexander 
1. Times of India, April 23, 1947. 
2. ~·• April 30, 1947. 
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Lord Listowel (Secretary of State for India) and Lord Addison 
(Dominion Secretary). 
On May 23 in a special meeting of the Cabinet the Vice-
roy was briefed about the plan to be submitted to the Indian 
leaders by him. He left by air for New Delhi and arrived there 
on May 30. On June 2 he handed to the Indian leaders the Bri-
tish plan of procedure for the transfer of power in India. 
On June 3 Prime ¥dnister Attlee made a statement to the 
1 House of Commons. It was publushed simultanwously as aWbite 
Paper. It described the new British Plan for India and announ-
ced the Government's intention to introduce legislation dur-
ing the current session for the transfer of power in India 
during 1947 on a Dominion Status basis. This transfer of power 
was to be entrusted to one or two successor authorities. It 
further sta~ed that whether India should be divided or not 
was for the Indians themselves to decide. Virtually, however, 
the announcement of June 3 facilitated the partition of India 
into two indpendent dominions - India and Pakistan. 
~a's Response to the New British Plan. 
Nehru said, 
11 It is with no joy in my heart that I commend 
these proposals to you, though I have no doubt 
in my mind that this is the right course. For 
generations we have dreamed of and struggled 
for, a free and independent United India."2 
1. 438 H.C.Deb.,5s., 35-40. 
2. Statesman, June 4, 1947. 
liJr. Jinnah said, 
It is clear the plan does not meet in · some 
important respects our point of view ••• But so 
far as I have been able to gather, on the whole 
reaction in MUslim League circles in Delhi has 
been hopef'Ul. 11 1 
Sardar Baldev Singh (leader of Sikh Community) said, 
"The Plan that has been announced is not a com-
promise. I prefer to call it a settlement. It 
does not please ever ybody, not the Sikh Commu-
nity, anyhow. But it is worth-while. Let us 
take it."? 
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The Hindustan Times commented that the British Plan was, 
•• ••• most impartial and carefully thought out plan 
devised for the quickest and most peaceful trans-
fer of power ••• the main thing about the new plan 
which must appeal universally to the people gf 
India is that it has been accepted by the Con-
gress, the Moslem League and the Sikhs. This new 
ho~e of agreement among conflicting parties 
should itself commend the plan to the people. 11 3 
It must be inferred that the new British Plan was ~ccapt~d 
by · the -- Indian people. 
The All India Congrews Committee met at New Delhi on June 
15. It adopted a resolution accepting the British Plan by 
153 votes to 29, with 32 abstentions. It said, 
"Tlle All India Congress Comm.ittee welcomes the 
decision of the British Government to transfer 
completely by next August ••• the Committee accepts 
the proposals embodied in the announcement . of 
June 3 which have laid down a procedure for as-
certaining the will of the people concerned. 11 4 
1. Times of India, June 4, 1947. 
2. ibid. 
3. June 4, 1947. 
4. The Hindu, June 16, 1947. 
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This meant that India's division was considered inevi-
table. Pandit Nehru again emphasized that 11 lt must be realiz-
ed that it is not :possible to coerce unwilling :parts to re-
main in the .Indian domain. 111 Sardar Patel said that India 
had to choose between 11 partition or complete balkanisation 
and anarcey. 11 Gandhi philosophically commented that though 
he had previously opposed Pakistan "sometimes certain deci-. 
sions, 2 however unpalatable they may be, have to be taken. 11 
While J.P.Narain the leader of the Socialist wing of Congress 
criticized the Congress Working Committee's acceptance of 
the British Plan and expressed his strong opposition to the 
partition of India. 
The Council of the l'Iuslim League met in Irew Delhi on June 
9. It also decided to accept the British Plan by 400 votes 
to 8. It passed a resolution which said, 
"The Counvil is of the opinion that the only 
solution of India's problem is to . divide India 
into two - Pakistan and Hindustan. On the 
basis, it has given earnest attention and con-
sideration to His ~~jeaty•s Government's state-
ment (of .June 3)."3 
The All India Committee of the Hindu 11ahasabha met at New 
Delhi on .June 8 under the :presidency of Dr. S.P.Mookerjee. 
It adopted a resolution saying, 11 lt reiterates that India 
is one and indivisible, and that there will never be :peace 
1. The Hindu, June 16, 194?. 
2. ibid. 
3. Times of India, June 10, 194?. 
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unless the separated areas are brought back into the Indian 
Union." Tlnl.s it opposed the British Plan and the partition 
of India. 
The Scheduled Castes endorsed the British Plan on June a, 
and requested His Majesty's Government to include Harijan 
(Scdeduled caste) members on the Boundary Commission to be 
set up under the new British Plan. 
So it was agreed that India should be divided. The Bri-
tish Parliament passed "The India Independence Act11 on Jti1y 
16. This act provided for the setting up in India of two in-
dependent dominions of IDndia and Pakistan to take effect as 
of August 15, 194?. It also announced that the paramountcy 
which the British Crwon exercised over the Indian Native 
States lapsed as of that date. 
On July 19 the Viceroy announced a redistribution of the 
portfolios in the Indian Interim Gover~ent with the effect 
of creating two separate Governments one for tpe Union of 
India and the other for Pakistan. 
British Empire in India Comes to an End: August 14, 194?. 
The British Empire in India founded in 1858 came to an 
end with the formal transfer of power by Britain to the two 
new Dominions of India and Pakistan on August 14-15, 1947. 
Nehru requested the last Viceroy of India Lord Mountbatten, 
to become the first Governor General of the India Dominion 
and he was formally sworn-in to his new office on August 15 
at 8:30 a. m. He received a 31-gun salute after which he 
hoisted the national flag of India for the first time. He 
then delivered a message from His Majesty the King which 
read: 
"On this historic day (August 15, 1947) when 
India takes her place as a free and independent 
Dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations 
I send you all my greetings and heartfelt wish-
es. With this transfer of power by consent 
comes the fulfiLment of a great democratic idaal, 
to which the British and Indian peoples alike 
are firmly dedicated." 
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On the same day 3innah became the first Governor General 
of Pakistan and he administered the oath of allegiance to the 
Pakistani Cabinet. As he assumed the office a 31-gun salute 
was fired and the Pakistani flag was hoisted and the Dominion 
of Pakistan became a reality. 
Thus ended the British Empire in India and also the final 
decade of Indo-British relations. \v.hat happened after August 
15, 1947 is beyond the limit set f "or this dissertatio-n. The 
Indo-British relations after the arrival of Lord Mountbatten 
were - far more encouraging and promising. This may be seen in 
the words of Nehru who was the implacable en~ of British 
rule in India, He said, 
"The British Government, on behalf of their 
people,have expressed their goodwill and good 
wishes to the people of India. We · have had a 
long past of conflict and ill-will. But we ear-
nestly hope that this past is over. We look 
forward to a peaceful and co-operative tran-
sition and to the establishment of close and 
friendly relations with the British people 
for the mutual advantage of both countries 
and for the advancement of the cause of peace 
and freedom all over the world."l 
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A summary of the events set forth in this last chapter 
is in order. The British Parliamentary delegation visited 
India between January 6 and February 8 and observed that India 
had attained political manhood. This delegation helped stabi-
lize Indo-British relations. 
In the Provincial elections the Congress won 930 seats 
and the ¥ruslim League 428 seats. The aongress polled 80% of 
the General votes and the ¥ruslim League 74%. This was the 
first time that the !~slim League had won an election on the 
Puistan issue. 
The British Cabinet Mission arrived in India on ~fuXch 23, 
1946 and stayed till June 29, "with the intention of using 
their utmost endeavouDs to help her to attain that freedom 
as speedily and fully as possible .. " And it did ' tliat. In the 
first stage (}~ch 26-April 11) the Cabinet ~lisaion conferred 
with the leaders of the Indian political parties. In the 
second stage (April 16-May 4) the Cabinet lfisaion disclosed 
the sbheme which included(l) an Indian Union (2) two groups 
of Provinces (3) the Constitution-making body. 
The Congress could not agree with the second and the I~s-
lim League could not agree with the first. In other words the 
1. Government of India Press Release, washington D.e., Febru-
ary 25, 1947. 
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Congress wanted a united India but the Muslim League claimed 
partition of India (Pakistan) and two constitution-making 
bodies. In the third stage (May 16-June 29) the Cabinet ~lission 
and the Viceroy drew up the proposals (Y~y 16) themselves for 
the immediate constitutional arrangements of India because 
Congress and MUslim League had disagreed with each other. These 
proposals categorically rejected Pakistan and specifically 
provided for a Union Constitution, a Constituent Assembly and 
an Interim Government. 
Furthermore, the Cabinet Mission made a provision for the 
Indian Native States (May 22) to enter into a federal rela-
tionship with the new government or governments. The Congress 
accepted the long-term proposals but rejected the Interim 
Government. The I~slim League rejected the proposals. The 
Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes opposed them. On .June 29 the 
"Care-taker" Government of officials was installed by the V16e-
roy and on September 2 it was replaced by the Interim Govern-
ment under the leadership of Nehru. The Muslim League did not 
join the Interim Government, :f.'or a .; sh<i>r.t _wbile but on Octo-
ber 15 it joined the In~erim Government. The }~slim League, 
however, boycotted the proposed Constituent Assembly and did 
not co-operate with the Congress in the Interim Government. 
So a London Conference was convened (December 3-6) and 
it tv-as officially announced that the Muslim League view that 
the decisions of the Sections of the Constituent Assembly 
should be taken by simple majority vote of the representatives 
250 
in the Sections was in line with the Cabinet I~ssions Pro-
posals but Congress had a different view. 
The Constituent Assembly opened on December but the 
MUslim League members were absent. On February 20, 1947 ff~. 
Attlee announced that the British Government would transfer 
power to India to "responsible Indian hands not later thail 
June 1948" and Lord Mountbatten was appointed the Viceroy 
of India to complete the task of such transference of power. 
On March 22 Lord Mountbatten arrived in India and on 
June 3 a New British Plan for transference of power was 
announced after he had discussed it with the British Cabinet. 
This plan recognised for the first time division of India in-
to the Dominions of Hindustan and Pakistan. The Congress and 
the li'.Illslim League accepted this new plan. On July 16 the Bri-
tish Parliament .. .P.~ssed "The Independence Act" which set up in 
India two independent dominions of India and Pakistan to 
take effect from ~gust 15, 1947. 
on the same day the Vicero~ announced the names and the 
portfolios of the members of the Indian Government and the 
Pakistani Government. On August 3 the India office declared 
the names of the Governors of the India n and Pakistani provin-
ces. On August 14 at mid-night the British Empire in India came 
to an end and on August 15 the Dominions of India and Pakistan 
came into existence. India was divided. Lord Mountbatten be-
came the first Gover nor General of the Dominion of India at 
251 
the request of Nehru and Jinnah the first Governor General 
of Pakistan. 
The Indo-British relations bad been very cordial after 
the Cabinet I~ssion's announcement of ¥~y 16. The Labour 




The study of "A decade of Indo-British Relations" (1937-
1947) shows several factors which contributed towards the 
final peaceful withdrawal of the British Rule from India. 
I. The Rising Tide of Indian Nationalism: 
The Indian National Congress (founded in 1885), the largest 
single political party had begin the Indian independence 
movement as early as 1906 when it demanded from the British 
"&waraj" (i.e.Home-rule). The object of the Indian National 
Congress \vas "the attainment of Swaraj by the peopl.e of India. 
by all legitimate and peaceful mea.ns.u The l'flUslim League 
(founded li 1905) too, demanded the independence of India. 
Every other political party such as the Sikh Akali, Scheduled 
Castes, the National Liberal Federation in India demanded 
compelte indpendence. 
The tide of Indian nationalism did not rise with subst~ 
tial strength until there appeared on the political stage 
Mahatma Gandhi, a lawyer by profession, with a unique philo-
sophy of Non-violent -Non-co-operation as the political weapon 
which threatened the decline of the British Rule in India. His 
contribution towards the Indian independence movement is un-
doubtedly the greatest because it was he who inspired politi-
cal consciousness in the minds of the Indian masses; This is 
not to claim, by any mena, thatGandhi alone won independence 
: . ' 
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for India, that would be fantastic, but rather to suggest 
that the Indian people won their independence umder .'h,ilis dy-
na.mic leadership. His doctrines of 11 Ahimsa" (non-violence), 
"Satya.graha" (love-force) provided the means by which the 
Indian people peacefully and democratically opposed the 
British imperialism in India. 
The two major political parties of tndia (i.e. Congress 
and the I~slim League) declared time and again, in unmistak-
able terms that nothing short of independence would be accep-
table to them. To this goal of compelte independence of India, 
all the Indian nationalists stuck tenaciously and rejected 
Brita in's offer of progressive relaization of self-govern-
ment through the Government of India Act (1935), through 
Cripps' 1tlission(l942). Therefore she had to recognize In-
dia's claim of complete _independence. 
II Britain's loss of the SUpremacy of Sea-power and India's 
m-ea.Htorious record in· the vlorld vlar II._ 
In the year 1939 Britain entered the Second \vorld War 
agaimst Germany. In order .to ;fight this \var successfully 
Britain was forced to rely heavily on India's men, material 
and munition. It is a fact that India during World War II -
produced the greatest voluntary army in the world. The meri~ 
orious record of the Indian soldiers in almost every theatre 
of the war convinced Britain that India could potentially 
defend herself against a foreign invasion and no longer need-
ed British protection. 
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British imperialism was founded on sea-power and the Bri-
tish Rule i n India was a by product of t hat sea-power. In the 
Second World War, however, the British supremacy in sea-power 
was lost, and Britain was faced with the necessity of with-
drawing from Indi a since "Britannia" no longer ruled the 
waves. 
. 
III. India's improved economic status: 
~ 
Britain had exploited India's market and raw materials as 
India was her colony. She had followed a preferential tariff 
policy which had not helped India to ga in economic stability. 
More over India had to donsume British manufactured goods 
which resulted in an unfavourable balance of trade for India. 
But during the Second Worl d \var circumstances fo r ced Britain 
to state in India a number of industries related to war. This 
resulted i n a favourable balance of trade and f or the first 
time in the economic history of India , India became a creditor 
country of Britain. In other words Britain became a debtor 
country to India and India's sterling balances increased in 
the Briti s h treasury. This impact of the improved economic 
status increased India's prestige and strengthened hvr case 
for independence . 
IV. The Co-operative attitude of the British Labour Partl· 
The British Labour Party had pledged to make India in-
dependent. It fought with the Conservative Party in the 
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Hou s e of Commons for India's cause. It came into power in 
1945. Therefore the Labour Party began to take the necessary 
steps for a peaceful transition. It sent a Cabinet ]1ission 
(1946) to India with a view that "the realization of full 
self-government can come only by the orderly and peaceful 
transfer of control of the machinery of state to purely 
Indian au thorii ty." 
It was Attlee, · the Prime ¥rlnister of Britain and the 
leader of the Labour Party who announced the time-table of 
Britishwithdrawal from India. It· would be interesting to 
speculate whether India would have gained independence in 
1947 i ·f the Conservative Party under the leadership of 
Churchill was in power instead. 
It is a remarkable fact that there was no bloodshed 
when Britain w~th~~w by peaceful means and transferred 
pow·er into the hands of the Indian people themselves. Such 
an end to British rule in India in 1947 is a striking chapter 
in world history. 
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The British Pa rliame nt -pg ssed the Gove rnment of India 
Act i n t h e year 1935 . It provi de d for e.n All- In dia Feder .tion , 
an n t h e e J. e v en Governor's Provinces and Siy Commissioner' s 
Pr ovin c e s were g rant t:r1 c. uton omy . The Gove rnor - Gene r a l e. s the 
bead of t h e J:t' ederal Gove r nment "va s to be appointed by Bri t e_in 
fo r f ive yea rs . 'rh ~. s Act remov e <'l. dy a rchy f rom the p rovinces 
but r e - en f orced it a t t he Centre . Th e Council of St a te a nd the 
Hou s e of s sembly were to be tl:l e t wo Houses of the Federal 
Pe.r li ament . Franchi se ·as extended t o 6 mi lli on women Emd 29 · 
miJlion men . The Fe deral part of t he Act n e v er came into b e ing 
bu t the pr ovi nci al pa rt began to f unc tion, pa rt l y on Jul y 3 , 
1 9,.., 6 a n d f ul l v on April 1, 193 ? . On th e \'\b. ole the Act of 193 5 
wef'. ::1.o t - rhat the Congr ess and t he ~:Ius lim Leagu e h a d wanted . 
The lJ:? ti ve St a tes a cc e p t e d the ct . 
The Congress Pa rty \on ?11 and t h e i.Tosl em Le a g ue 424 
seat s i n the Gene r al Elections o f 193 ? . The ri s i n~ tide o f 
ra t i onalism W 8S one of t h e c h j ef factors tha t rr.ad e Brita in 
vd .t hdr aw f rom India . The Congress hEd d e c i dec'l. to comb a t the 
-
new Constitut i on of 19 '""' 5 an 1 to try to " establ i sh an i nde::_:>en -
fl. en t democra tic state by me an s of fl Constituent Assembly . " 
The I> .• u s lim Leagu e fl lRo r e s olved the.t ttthe object o f t h e _ll-
India Muslim LeBg u e shall b e the establishme n t i n Inr1ia of 
f u J 1 indep en dence . tt Tb e Con .gr e ss a n c1 the Huslim Lee.c;;ue co-
op e r a t e d _with Brita i n en d acc ep t ed Pr ovinc i a l Mi n istries . 
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In 1 938 the. Congres s showed its firm de t enn ina tion to 
ach ieve comp l e te inc1_e p endenc e from Britain under a ny ci rc"Lun-
ot ~ nces . The l'Jnslim Leagu e , too , v!e.n t eo. to shore 111i th Congress 
th8 chempionshi p of ID dia's freedom strugg le . 
I n 1939 Congress declared th'l t in the Centr9_l Government 
the peo~le of the Native "t a t e s should have control, not their 
r ul ers. oo the Congr ess strove f or a g reater control a t the 
Cente:r.- c.nd rejected t he Federation . '11J:1e ·,Iuslim League, too , 
rAjectecl th e r.lede r a tion as it "as not assured of ec:u 1 ren re -
sent ation in the Central Government . 
''{:hen World iiiar II ce_me Ind i a was dragged into the '.Tar 'tri th-
out h er consent. Inclo - Bri tish relati ons v.rere tense . ';for lc_ i rar 
II provi~ed a g olden opportunity for Ir dia to consolidate her 
Dosi tion both poli ticeJly e.nd economically, with rege.r d to 
Brita in . Britain ~, e_s determined to 14J in the Vle.r and India , her 
independence . 
Britain now offered Ind i a Dominion Status after the war 
end enla r g e d the Viceroy's Collncj_l . The National Advisory 
Council of Defenc e was f ormed to seek the co- o~eration of the 
I ndi'3.n peop le i n Brit ish war efforts. But Cong r e ss was not 
s at isfied f or she we.nted complete inde})endence for India. 
The Congress launched a Civil Disobedience Camp:?.i gn un.der 
the leadership of <IahHt ma Gandhi v.rhich united the Incl.i an people 
ag'l inst Britain. Brita in us ed su:!)resei v e me f' sures but he.d to 
release th8 Congr ess po1i tical :9risoners a s J e.par.. 1:vas moving 
towards India . So the Jape.nese threat of inva sion of India 
2 68 
he l p ed IndiR in gaining some concessions from Britain. 
The 1v1usli rn I .eague now claimed that the division of India 
into Hindustan a nd Pakisten was tl1e only solution of the 
Indi an problem. So t he r e were three a ns1• ers to t h e Indian. 
p roblem by three parties. Britain's answer ~.ras Dominion 
St atus aft er the 1."m r, tha t of the Cong ress, comrlete ind e pe n -
dence Emd tha t of the 1Iuslim League, Pek: istan. Th e Indo-
British relations were certainly d eteriorating. 
In 19~9 Britain offered India a new Draft Declaration 
through Sir Stafford Cripps, for the b etterment of Inc1o- Bri -
tish relations. It p r omised India Dominion St a tus u~on the 
cessation of h ostiliti es,--which was not a ltoge ther new. It 
wa s in line with the policy of Britain 's Conservative Party 
to ~re n t India self - gove rnment by degrees and Churchill was 
the champ ion of that policy. 
But both Congress a n d the Muslim League rej ected it because 
it fsj lecl. to mention an indepencl.ent India a n d Pakist<>n, a s Con-
gress a nd the 1 uslim Leag ue had respectively d emanded. The 
Cong r ess adopted ~ "Q.ui t India" Resolution (August 8 , 1942 ) 
which re sulte d in the s.rrest of t he Congre ss leaders and an 
outhreak of violence. This embittered the Indo-British rela-
tions. The Muslim Leag ue refused any compromise on the Paki -
s te.n issue. 
Bri t9.in t hen appointed Field lviarshall Wevell as the new 
Vi ceroy of India but not vri th Rny view to a. change in her poli-
cy towar ds India. She reali zed the i mportan c e of' the full 
269 
eupport of the Indian people against Japan's lnva sion, but such 
a s upport was not to come unless some n ew . steps were t aken . 
So Brttain appo·i nted two Indi an r epresentative s on the Br i tish 
we.r Cabinet an d t he Imperia l Conference, without the consent 
of the Indian people h owever . Therefore, Indo- Bri tish rela t ions 
di d not improve . 
Now Brita in released Gandhi from je.il on medical g rounds . 
Meantime Ra ja,ii accepted i n principle Jinnah's Pakista n and 
Gandhj a ccepted Rajaji 's t hes is that to achieve India 's inde~en-
dence the Muslim League's rlemand must be met at least half - way . 
The British Labour Party ask ed that the de t e.ined Congressmen 
be releasAd s o t hat fresh a ttempts mi ght b e made to solve the 
Indi a n political dAadlock; bu t the Secretary of St a te f or India, 
lv'lr . Ame r y , declared t hat no change in British pol i cy ,Nas 
poss ibl e . In 1944 Gandhi nnd Jinnah t ried to s olve the Indi an 
problem but their t alks f ailed . 
Meant ime Vvavell returned from London with t he proposals to 
and the Viceroy's Council. He of fered these proposals to exp . -
secure complete co-operation fr om the Ind i a n people to win 
t h e ifar a gainst J apan . Wavell called the Simla Conference 
(June 24- July 14, 1945) to expla in t he proposals but it bore 
no fruit . However, his efforts helped to dilute the corrosive 
bitterness of Indo- British rel ations t hRt had existed s ince 
August 8 , 1942 . 
Now t he Briti~h Labour Party c ame into power (July 26, 1945) . 
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Its victory we.s portentous for India as it had unc evie.tingly 
f avoured India's indepen dence. Wavell once 1:1gain went to Lon-
don on August 26 , 1945 f or a d iscussion with the new Labour 
Cabinet. From this point on the British :90licy towHrds India 
changed r _dically . 
On his return WaveJl declared (.September 19, 1945) that 
the Bri t.~_sh Government ha d accepted fully tha t India would be 
gr anted complete independence a t the earJles t possible date. 
He al so s~id that after the general elections a Constituent 
AsserrJbly !ould meet . The Labour Government certainly stood by 
its p l edge . 
But Congress s t uck t enaciously to "nothing short of indepen-
denc e her e and now'' a nd the Muslim League to "nothing short of 
Pakistan here and now." The India offi ce sta ted that an Indien 
vrould b e appointed a s a Provincial Governor . Sir Claude 
-uchinleck announced the complete Indianization of India's 
e.r med f orces . This helped to i mprove the Indo-British rela-
tt ons. India's meritorious war - record was one of the most 
important factors in convincing Britain tha t India could 
defend h erself . 
The British Pa rli amentary delegation visited Indifl between 
Januery 6 and Februe_ry 8, 1946, and sai d that India had att9in-
ed poli tj_cal manhood. It help ed in improving Indo- Eri tish 
rel "ltions . 
Then came t he General Elections. Congress polled 80% of 
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t he Genera l votes a nd the Muslim Le agu e 74% . It vas the first 
time tha t the Muslim League had won the e lections on the 
s p ecif ic is s ue of Paki s t a n. 
1-eanwhil e the Brit:i.sh Cabinet l\Ii s sion, the f irst o f its 
kind , a rrived in In die. on March 23 cm d stayed till June 29 to 
hel p India a ttain her freedom as speedily a n d as fully a s 
:p oss:)_bl e . It pro pos ed a n Indian Union , t wo g roup s of Provin-
ces a n d tl e Constitut ion-mak ing body. The Congress rejected 
the second and the Muslim League the fi rs t and t h ird beca use 
Congress cla imed an un divi ded Ind ia an d the Muslim League, 
Pakistan. 
When the Cabir:et Mission learnt tha t there we.s n o agreement 
betvveen Cong ress and the l•IJ:uslim Leagu e , in consultati on vd th 
the Viceroy, it drew u p proposals . It r e jected Pakista n but 
proposed a Union Constitution, e_ Cons tituent Assembly, en 
Interim Gove rnment a.nd a federal relationship betHeen the 
Ind ian States and the rest of In dia. Congre ss rej e ct ed t h e 
-Interim Government and the :i\~usl im League r e jected t he pro-
p osa ls compl e t ely as they d i d not guara ntee Pc:.kistan . 
On June 29 , 1946 the Viceroy installed the "Care- t al<:er" 
Govermuent of officials a nd on September 2 replac ed i t by the 
Interim Government un de r the leacl. ership of Nehru . The 1uslim 
League di_d not join the Interim Government, to b egin with, 
though Congress h ad ch anged its decision . On October 15 the 
Iuslim Leagu e fina lly joi_ned the Interim Gov e rnment but boy-
catt ed the Constituent Assembly e.nd r efuse d to co-o-perate 
wi th t he Cong r es s in the Interim Government. 
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To end the. t deadlock Britain conven ed a Lond on Conference 
(December 3-6, 1946), an d Cl.ec l ar ed t ha t the 1v1uslim League's 
vie\/ ttat t he decisions of the s ec tions of th e Consti t u ent 
As sembl y sh ould be t aken by simpl e ma jor ity vote of the r epr e-
sentatives i n the s ections was in line · vith the Cabinet 
~;I i.. ss ion' s proposa ls. The interur et e. tion of t he Congress was 
d i ffe r ent. 
The Constituent As s embly open ed on December 9 without the 
·Iuslim League membe rs. On Februe ry 20, 1 947 Prime Minister 
Attlee announced t h at the British Governmen t ha d deci de d to 
t r ansfer power to India to "responsibl e Indie.n han ds not l a t er 
t han Jm1e 1948 , ' and tha t Lord Mountbatten would perform th a t 
tas k . It wa s the mos t i mport a nt a nnounc ement of the Bri t i sh 
Labour Party . Vount ba tten a rriv8d----.in Indi a on ~'ie.rch 2"-' , 194 7. 
He conferred with the Indi en l eaders about t he ,Indi an probl em 
nd returned t o Engl and to discuss a nev pl an vith the Bri t i s h 
Cab i net . 
On Jun e 3 , t tlee e.nnounced the new Br itis h Pl a n vvhich 
recogni zed f or t he f irst t i me d ivi s i on of I ndi a into the Do-
mini ons of Hindustan an d Pakistan, The Congress and the J:i:us -
J.i m Lesgue a cc ert ed it. On Jul y 16 th e British Parliament 
passed " The Indi a Independence Act 11 which brough t i nto be i ng 
t wo inclependent dominions of Indi a and Paki s t an . 
On t he same d o.y Lord r.!fountb?t tten announ ced t he names and 
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the por t f olios of the members of th e Indian and the Pak i stani 
Government s . On Au gust 3 th e Indian office set f orth the 
na mes of the Indian end Pakistani provinces. On Augus t 14 at 
midnigh t the Br it i sh Rul e in Indi a C2I!le to an end nd on 
August 15 the Domin5_ons of India g_nd. Pak i s t an came into exis-
t ence . India was thus divided. . The last Viceroy Lord 
Mountbatten, a t the request of Nehru, bee me the firs t Governor-
Gener a l of t h e Dominion of India a nd Mr . Jinnah t he f i rs t 
Governor-Gene ral of the Dominion o f Pakistan . 
The Indo- British relations had been very cord i a l after the 
Ca binet Mission's announc ement of lviey 16, 1 946 , and they 
entered into e. new nh a s e a fter August 15, 1947. 
The chief factors iHhich contributed towards the final 
p ea ceful wi thdrawa1 of the British from India were (1) the 
ri s ing ti de of Indian nationalism, {2) Britain's loss of 
supr emacy of her se9.- p ower and Inc'l i a ' s merit orious record 
· \iorlc1 Var II, (3 ) India ' s improved e conomic status a nd l . 
{1) the c o-ope r a tive a ttitude of the British La b our Part y . 
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